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Executive Summary 
This report describes the research we have conducted on identifying the technological 
advancements envisaged in the period 2007-2027, the research challenges that will be faced 
for the assessment of dependability and security of these complex systems and systems of 
systems (SoSs), and the assessment framework envisaged for these systems. The research has 
been conducted as part of a project titled “EMR (Extra Mural Research) proposal SoSoS 
Development Methodologies for Secure System Evolution” which has been sponsored by UK 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). 
The report is structured as follows:  
 Part 1: Define and characterise the 2027 research challenge by a review of existing road 
maps, technology watch papers and by brainstorming with DSTL (and NATO) contacts. 
 Part 2: Propose and justify a Security Evaluation Framework based on existing 
approaches from other sectors and disciplines. This draws on present state of the art in 
assessment of SoS of COTS based components and in particular explain and understand 
why existing methods do not either scale or otherwise translate to the SoSoS context. 
 Part 3: Define the characteristics of a security evaluation framework based on the future 
context explored in Part 1 with the proposed framework in Part 2. It also characterises 
the research challenge. 
The research challenges from the context we and others envisage are as follows: 
 Critical societal role – The technological advancements discussed in section 2.2 and 
2.3 show that an unprecedented reliance on technology may be created. Due to the 
increased access to advanced technology the future generations will become more 
vulnerable to either deliberate or unintentional disruption of the system implemented 
with these technologies.  
 Unprecedented scale and complexity coming from the ubiquity and pervasiveness of 
systems that are driven by adaptation and evolution, ambition and requirements, the 
blurring of boundaries and the increased tempo of threats and operations. It occurs 
through design and deliberate policy and accidentally, or as side effect, of other trends. 
It is shaped by the economic and political forces: systems were once seen as technical, 
then socio-technical and now we can see political-economical-socio-technical (p-e-s-t) 
systems 
 Concerns regarding privacy are likely to become especially important. The widespread 
data sharing and communication that will be required to make the new systems function 
may lead to serious infringements of privacy. Various infringements are possible such 
as identity theft, data laundering, disclosure of personal data, surveillance, risks from 
personalised profiling etc. 
 Trust / Assurance – The new technological advancements, especially those on ICT 
systems will require substantial level of trust to be placed on the new systems. Hence 
the new technology needs to be trustworthy. Building trustworthy systems (especially 
complex interconnected SoSs) will pose a significant challenge since current methods 
for both building and assuring a system that is sufficiently dependable or secure will 
most likely not scale well when applied to these complex systems. 
 Inter-dependence and dependence – The future socio-technical ICT systems, as 
discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, are likely to be complex inter-connected and inter-
dependent systems in a much greater scale than they are now. Hence the assessment of 
the various security and reliability attributes cannot be done in isolation for each 
constituent component of the systems or SoS.  
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 Interoperability – There is likely to be an increased difficulty in architecting complex 
systems of systems. There might for example be inconsistencies between architectures 
(including inconsistencies in the interfaces) of the different systems of an SoS or 
inconsistencies in the timescales (timebands) in which the different systems interact. 
 Socio-technical aspects – The future systems are expected to become increasingly 
socio-technical in nature, hence the role of the human users and operators within the 
system, and their fallibilities also need to be considered in the overall assessment of the 
system.   
 Blurring of boundaries – The complexity of the future systems and the large inter-
dependence and interconnectedness of the components will make it very difficult to 
define what the boundaries of a system or a SoS are, i.e. where does one system end 
and another one begin. This makes security and dependability assessment of a SoS very 
difficult. Assumptions may need to be made about the systems boundaries which may 
not hold in practice, hence leading to wrong conclusions being drawn from the 
assessment. We envisage future blurring of boundaries between human/machines and 
between classes of devices. 
 Information explosion – The future systems will deal with radically increased volume 
of information due to advance in sensor and networks technologies. There will also be 
greater pressure on both systems and human decision makers to deal with information 
in shorter response times. This will challenge effective decision-making progressively 
at all levels. 
 Rapid obsolescence of technology – The predicted pace of new technological 
innovations, listed in section 2.2 and 2.3, is likely to render existing technologies 
obsolescent more quickly than at present and also lead to heterogeneous systems 
composed on many generations of technology. 
 Tempo – There will be increasing tempo to operations and systems with dynamic and 
ad hoc coalitions being formed. Reconciling timing issues as systems and organisations 
are brought together to form larger SoSs also becomes an issue. There might be 
inconsistencies in the timescales within which the different systems interact and there 
might also be differences in the time domain within which two organisations, that form 
part of the same SoS, interact, e.g. which tasks/process are considered more urgent will 
depend on the organisation.  
These implications might seem very incremental in that they are just extending social and 
technological trends we can already see. However this hides the fact that they would apply to 
many different future scenarios. Even those in this report are quite disparate but one can 
imagine a wide range of futures of different economic wealth distribution, of relationships 
between the state and the individual, of levels of social cohesion and of conflict and threat. 
However we have not analysed extreme scenarios where we see anti-technology refusenik 
cultures, disenchantment with a technology (e.g. as a result of successful attack of key 
systems, their oppressive use by the state, breakdown of complex systems such as financial 
markets), or scenarios of extreme state control. Nor have we tested the robustness of the work 
to developments in quantum computing. 
The challenges posed by current and future systems and threats leads us to propose an 
ambitious shift in perspective to an evaluation framework that attempts risk based, market 
sensitive, psychologically aware, evidence based approach to the assessment and 
communication of security (and dependability, resilience).  The approach must be capable of 
addressing the scale and complexity of adaptive systems of systems (p-e-s-t systems) that 
have heterogeneous human and technical components and are deployed across a variety of 
organisational, political and legal boundaries. This report is on the evaluation of systems; 
however the actual achievement of trustworthy systems to time and budget is not a solved 
   Executive Summary  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 3  
problem, as the current difficulties with the NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT) system  
[1] testifies. 
 
The proposed framework would be composed of: 
 Evaluation and communication of risk-based resilience. 
 The definition of the evaluation target and the assumed threat model. 
 A claim-argument-evidence assurance case approach. 
 Methods for addressing scale and tempo required of both events and operations and 
system evolution. 
The framework is probabilistic and should explicitly address uncertainty, both aleatory 
uncertainty in the world as well as epistemic uncertainty arising from incompleteness of 
knowledge. The framework should also: 
 
 Consider the economics of security and the role of the markets. 
 Have methods for handling decisions and evidence of different levels of confidentiality 
and trust. 
 Consider the (possibly conflicting) expectations of multiple stakeholders. 
 Be justified and validated (unlike many current standards). 
 Be repeatable and trustworthy but recognising the importance of human judgements 
 Be adapted as threats adapt to how the evaluation works. 
 It should be applicable in graduated manner commensurate with the importance and 
criticality of the system or service being considered. 
The framework has been defined to address issues along the following themes: 
 Confidence / Trust 
 Diversity and Heterogeneity 
 Complexity and Emergent properties which may arise from the novelty of the systems 
developed / integrated 
 Structure 
 Resilience 
 Tempo and adaptation 
 Markets 
We then elaborated some of the research directions along these themes into two inter-related 
broad areas: 
 Resilience and security cases as an overarching approach within which we address: 
resilience models, claims decomposition, arguments, scalability and tempo. The 
argumentation will be about a service or system in an environment. To give meaning to 
the claims and to understand them they should be based on a coherent set of underlying 
models. 
 Models for giving meaning to and supporting the evaluation. These will be disparate, 
multi-formalism models. We need to understand the interrelationships, the required 
abstractions and levels of fidelity. They will include models of the system environment 
and particular economic and threat models. 
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We also point out that an evaluation framework is not a neutral, technical object. It will have 
an impact on society and as with any risk based approach there will be those that benefit and 
those that suffer the costs of the framework. There may be unintended side effects and the 
market may operate to deliver certain levels of resilience but not necessarily the required level 
of resilience required for society critical systems (and occasionally the market may even 
hinder / prevent the delivery of security/resilience). The need for supporting policy and 
regulation should be born in mind and the research on the evaluation framework should feed 
into and enable research underpinning any emerging political initiatives. For example, on the 
tradeoffs between and conflicts of interest that may arise between the government, society 
and individuals, such as issues regarding intellectual property rights and privacy, human 
rights issues, individual liberty etc.   
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1 Introduction 
This report describes the research we have conducted on identifying the technological 
advancements envisaged in the period 2007-2027, the research challenges that will be faced 
for the assessment of dependability and security of these complex systems and systems of 
systems (SoSs), and the assessment framework envisaged for these systems. The research has 
been conducted as part of a project titled “EMR (Extra Mural Research) proposal SoSoS 
Development Methodologies for Secure System Evolution” which has been sponsored by UK 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). 
The project proposal stated that there would be three main tasks of the research conducted as 
part of this project: 
 Task 1: Define and characterise the 2027 research challenge by a review of existing road 
maps, technology watch papers and by brainstorming with DSTL (and NATO) contacts. 
 Task 2: Characterise the present state of the art in assessment of SoS of COTS-based 
components and in particular explain and understand why existing methods do neither 
scale nor otherwise translate to the SoSoS context. 
 Task 3: Characterise the research challenge by addressing the INDEED themes of 
adaptation and diversity; confidence and uncertainty; time and structure and 
responsibility and trust. We would consider issues from the perspectives of: 
♦ probabilistic approaches to diversity and adaptation in socio-technical systems that 
incorporate changing perceptions of dependability, learning and adaptation with 
experience. 
♦ models of organisational responsibility and the underlying trust between agents. 
♦ argument modelling approaches that address confidence, uncertainty and diversity 
and by using trust models to support the presentation of assurance cases. 
♦ the notion of timebands as structuring mechanism. 
The rest of the report will present the research conducted for each of these tasks. The report is 
structured as follows:  
 Part 1: Define and characterise the 2027 research challenge by a review of existing road 
maps, technology watch papers and by brainstorming with DSTL (and NATO) contacts. 
 Part 2: Propose and justify a Security Evaluation Framework based on existing 
approaches from other sectors and disciplines. This draws on present state of the art in 
assessment of SoS of COTS-based components and in particular explain and understand 
why existing methods do not either scale or otherwise translate to the SoSoS context. 
 Part 3: Define the characteristics of a security evaluation framework based from the 
future context explored in Part 1 with the proposed framework in Part 2. It also 
characterises the research challenge. 
 Summary and Conclusions: Summarises the report, presents the main conclusions and 
lists suggestions for possible extensions to the report. 
 Appendix A: Details three scenarios developed by a NATO Research Task Group on 
the Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies. 
 Appendix B: Details analysis of the three scenarios presented in Appendix A. 
 Appendix C: Details research trends and challenges in the assessment of COTS 
components. 
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 Appendix D: Lists the assessment techniques and methods that are possible for COTS-
based development. 
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2 Part 1: The future context 
2.1 Introduction 
This section characterises the systems and their dependability context predicted to occur up to 
2027 and from this summarises the main research challenges faced for assessing their 
dependability and security. Of course it would be too unrealistic to try and predict the exact 
nature of the products and services that will emerge. Instead we hope to capture sufficient of 
the trends that we can provide some design criteria for a security evaluation framework. We 
have used a variety of sources to identify the predictions of technological advancements and 
trends and similar to [2] we followed a three-forked approach: 
 Top-down scenario driven approach: in partnership with a NATO Research Task 
Group IST-048/RTG-020 we developed three Scenarios to identify primarily the 
security and dependability challenges that can be faced by large SoSs. We have 
provided details of each of these scenarios and the analysis that was performed on these 
scenarios in Appendices A and B respectively. Additionally we have studied Scenarios 
developed by others, for example [3], [4], [5].  
 Lateral approach: we studied existing roadmaps and strategic trends documents to 
critically analyse the predictions made on those documents for the future technological 
advancements and the research challenges faced when and if these emerging 
technologies are deployed. Main sources for this section were [6], [7], [8], [2] and the 
references therein. 
 Bottom-up approach: we studied and reviewed current state of the art in the 
dependability and security assessment of systems to identify the research challenges 
faced when the current approaches are attempted for assessment of emerging systems or 
SoSs. The main sources for this work have been the recently completed state-of-the-art 
reviews (in which Centre for Software Reliability (CSR) was also a contributor) 
conducted as part of the EU-funded ReSIST [9] and AMBER [10] projects and the 
references therein. 
2.2 System characteristics and context 
The AMSD EU sponsored Dependability Roadmap for the Information Society in Europe1  
[2] identified the key dependability related characteristics of future systems and these can be 
grouped as issues of: 
 Scale and complexity. 
 Adaptation and evolution. 
 Blurred boundaries. 
 Heterogeneity. 
 Multiplicity of faults and threats. 
We have taken these as a starting point and augmented with additional insights from a 
complementary EU Study on the dark side of ambient intelligence [5], and from the UK 
Foresight programme [3]. The defence and security context are provided by the Global 
Strategic Trends Programme [6],  Network Enabled Capability [11], Global Information Grid 
[12] and by discussing with DSTL experts.  
                                                     
1 Robin Bloomfield was one of the principal authors. 
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2.2.1 Scale, complexity and pervasiveness 
In [2] we envisaged a growing scale and complexity of systems. As hardware capabilities 
improve and costs reduce, there is continuing pressure to attempt to build systems of ever 
greater scope and functional sophistication, especially for the software components: given 
Moore’s law, Metclaf’s law and Bell’s Law this was hardly a prescient prediction. 
The reasons why software is difficult have been covered elsewhere [13]. The scale and 
complexity comes from the ubiquity and pervasiveness driven by adaptation and evolution, 
ambition and requirements, the blurring of boundaries and the increased tempo of threats and 
operations. It occurs through both design and deliberate policy as well as accidentally, or as 
side effect, of other trends. It is shaped by the economic and political forces: systems were 
once seen as technical, then socio-technical and now we can see political-economical-socio-
technical (p-e-s-t) systems e.g. in health service, financial markets etc. In the defence context 
there is the momentum given by the Global Information Grid [12], Network Enabled 
Capability [11] and Network Centric Operations as well as by the tempo and variety of 
military operations. 
It is now commonplace to predict a growth in the use and pervasiveness of Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) ([6], [2], [14]).  In the DCDC  report [6] it is stated that 
“Wearable and implanted wireless ICT is likely to be accessible to all that can afford it in the 
second half of the period [2020 onwards], and users will be linked through sensors and 
networks that are enabled by computers that are significantly more capable than at present, 
possibly by 100bn times if quantum computing reaches its potential”. The aforementioned 
sources also comment on the security and privacy concerns that will develop from the 
widespread use of these pervasive applications (e.g. [6] states that “…the majority of the 
global population will find it difficult to ‘turn the outside world off’. ICT is likely to be so 
pervasive that people are permanently connected to a network or two-way data stream with 
inherent challenges to civil liberties; being disconnected could be considered suspicious”). 
For more concrete scenarios of the predicted technological advancements and their use the 
reader is advised to read the scenarios depicted in [2]. 
These trends are also reflected in the Calls for Proposals  FP7-ICT-2007-1 and FP7-ICT-
2007-3 of the Seventh Framework Programme (2007-2013) (FP7) of the European 
Commission on ICTs [15]. The principal stated objectives of the funding are: 
 “…to research, demonstrate and validate new computing architectures and algorithms 
that will allow designing, programming and managing future high-performance ICT 
components with up to one Tera (1012) devices integrated in a single chip.” 
 “…to investigate an invisible, implicit, embodied or even implanted interaction 
between humans and system components, for natural interaction (including 
communication) in surrounding environments, themselves augmented with pervasive 
and ubiquitous infrastructures and services.” 
 “…to overcome major scientific, technological and theoretical challenges for quantum 
technology to deliver on its promise to radically outperform its classical counterpart 
not only in terms of processing speed, capacity and communication security, but also, 
in the ability to solve classes of practical problems which currently cannot be solved”. 
The pervasiveness and growth of the internet can also be expected to continue. Semantic web 
[16], for example, which is an evolving extension of the World Wide Web, may bring a new 
way in which the internet information is organised and used.  
2.2.2 Adaptation, evolution and architecture 
The increased scale and complexity of systems is partly explicitly intended (as in the NHS 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT) system [1]) but also an effect of federation and 
integration of systems of systems. Systems will be under continuous incremental development 
Part 1: The future context  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 9  
and deployment – they are never finished, evolution is incessant, upgrades, changes in 
functionality and new features are being added at a continuous pace [1]. Two main strands of 
development are: 
 self-configuration and adaptation – systems are expected to be able to respond to the 
changing circumstances of the ambient where they are embedded; 
 multiple innovative types of networking architectures and strategies for sharing 
resources – GRID-like, peer-to-peer, “on-the-fly” services, Trusted Web services etc. 
This is emphasised in [6] that predicts that our reliance on networks and the complex nature 
of our environment, (with often poorly understood properties), will increase.  They state that 
“higher bandwidth, greater processing power, larger datasets, smaller sensors and greater 
understanding of the dynamics of physical and virtual network behaviour will converge to 
allow new types of network connection. However, the growth of many networks is not and 
cannot be governed by top-down planning and occurs in a decentralized manner, often 
analogous to naturally occurring systems”. 
Web services technologies are expected to continue growing [17]: “Over the next 15 years 
[from 2008], we’ll see the rise of many trade-secret-based companies that do everything from 
image rendering to statistical calculations to heat-flow analysis ….No large corporate 
program will be able to run effectively without using of these services, and to do so, it will 
have to tell its secrets to service providers. Webs of trust will become webs of contracts, and 
control over security will be out of the hands of any individual organization”.   
Continued growth is also expected in the development and adoption of virtualisation of 
computing and computer resources.  For example, [17] states “the current trend to use a 
single physical-logical PC for everything will reverse—for example, I’ll eventually use my 
“office work” computer, my “Web browsing” computer, my “e-banking” computer, my 
“personal theatre” computer, and so forth. The fact that they may all exist in the same box is 
irrelevant because what matters is that they’ll be self-contained and non-interfering, yet will 
also have different levels of security and dependability”.  
Virtualisation hence promises a new way of organising computing resources and more 
flexibility in the way users interact with the systems, but security concerns will arise from the 
closer proximity of virtual machines and the location of resources in the same physical 
host(s). 
2.2.3 Blurring of boundaries 
The AMSD roadmap [2] discussed the boundary-less nature of the systems and 
interconnectedness – few systems have a clear-cut frontier, and they are in systems within 
systems, within larger systems; in addition connectivity might be achieved through common 
underpinning information infrastructures that become a critical factor. Nodes and services of 
the system might be reachable from everywhere and the overall system might exhibit 
unpredictable emergent behaviours. 
According to predictions made in [6], the English language will most probably consolidate its 
position as the globally dominant language for data and global services.  But there will be a 
proliferation of other trans-national languages (e.g. Spanish, Mandarin or Arabic) hence 
“sophisticated translation devices are likely to become widely available”. More generally  
“interdisciplinary advances involving cognitive science are likely to enable us more 
effectively to map cognitive processes” [6]. Amongst the advances predicted are self repairing 
networks (which are predict to be developed in the next 10 years) and the prediction that 
before the year 2035 the mapping of human brain functions and the replication of genuine 
intelligence is possible. Whether or not this is achieved the more near term implications are 
that greater understanding of cognition will allow us to develop new approaches to 
computation particularly to interfaces. 
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2.2.3.1 Synthetic environments and decision support 
Interfaces are crucial to decision making. In [6] it is predicted that combined advances in 
social science, behavioural science and mathematical modelling will lead to more informed 
decision making.  Hence “advanced processing and computational power will permit a new 
level of pattern recognition (Combinatronics) enabling the decoding of previously 
unrecognised or undecipherable systems and allowing the modelling of a range of biological 
to social, political and economic processes”.  
Stemming from these advancements, simulation is predicted to become an increasingly 
powerful tool to aid policy and decision makers (but it may also “blur the line between 
illusion and reality” [6]). Later in the same report [6] it is predicted that the advancements in 
the ICT and Cognitive sciences fields are likely to produce advanced decision-support tools 
which are likely to be revolutionary leading to opportunities for novel or decisive application. 
Even though they predict that most of the advancements are likely to have positive effects, 
some advances are also predicted to present potential negative effects (e.g. perverse 
applications, such as the use of genetic engineering to produce designer bio-weapons). 
2.2.4 Heterogeneity 
As is evident with current systems, there will also be continuing increase in heterogeneity of 
the future systems caused by the use of components of different generations and the need to 
support legacy services, applications and protocols along with more modern variants. There 
will be multiple COTS and SoSs that are brought together for particular missions. The 
components and systems will be of different provenances and trustworthiness. This will be 
reflected in the range of standards that they might comply with and there will be an increasing 
need to address interoperability issues. 
The increase in heterogeneous and disparateness of systems is partly due to the blurring of 
boundaries between systems; partly due to the different levels of scale; partly due to the 
blurring of human/device boundary – wrist-held gadgets, wearable devices, implantable 
devices; and partly due to the adaptation and evolution discussed above. 
Advancements in biotechnology are predicted and the software related impacts are 
“development of artificial sensors capable of interfacing with the human mind and prosthetics 
capable of mimicking human actions precisely, improving human performance beyond 
current levels” [6]. The same source also states that due to the high costs of the biotechnology 
research that the distribution and benefits will be unevenly distributed in the society.  
Details of short-medium term funding on biotechnology and ICT convergence (2007-2013) 
can also be found in FP7 call ICT-2007.8.3 [15] of the European Commission. 
Advancements are also predicted in the area of nanotechnology. In [6] it is claimed that 
“advanced nanotechnology, at the interdisciplinary frontier where physics, chemistry and 
biology meet, will be a key enabler of technological advance and will underpin many 
breakthroughs, including materials and sensor development and their application in 
manufacturing, synthetic reproduction and health care. Nanotechnology will result in more-
capable systems and artefacts that are smaller, lighter, cheaper and less energy hungry. Out 
to 2020, its application is likely to be predominantly in electronics and materials, including 
bacteria resistant agents, stain resistant materials and nanocomposite materials. After 2020, 
nanodevices are likely, such as nanobots”.  Additionally in [17] it is claimed “The devices we 
use to connect to information systems will become smaller and smarter, but also more 
specialized and more diverse. Most of the functionality we’re used to on our desktops today 
will move “into the cloud” as connectivity gets more ubiquitous, more robust, and cheaper.”  
Most of the advancements above are clearly to do with hardware, but they will also impact the 
software applications that are developed to make use of the underlying layer of 
nanotechnology hardware. 
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Details of short-medium term funding on nano-technology (2007-2013) can also be found in 
FP7 call ICT-2007.8.1 [15] of the European Commission. 
2.3 The security context 
2.3.1 Multiplicity of faults and the threat space 
The AMSD roadmap [2] rather succinctly characterised the threat space in terms of 
multiplicity of fault types – in particular the growing danger of malicious faults, both due to 
individual or organised external attackers, and due to deceitful insiders – and the  need to 
model and understand the multiple interactions and interconnections (human, technical, 
social, market) among systems, when they all depend on each other.  
More recent publications ([11], [12]) amplify this and focus these especially in a security and 
military context. For example in [11], regarding the UK MoD planned Networked Enabled 
Capability (NEC), it is stated that “The growing threat from cyber attack, to which we will 
become more vulnerable as our reliance on the network increases, must also be contained 
through new measures”. Both [11] and the US DoD Global Information Grid [12] document 
envisage the tighter integration and interoperability of military and defence agencies, 
departments and systems over the network hence exposing these networks to an increased risk 
from cyber-attacks.  
Some of the reasons for the increase in the threat space may be: 
 Wider availability of technology – Technology will become more widely available and 
affordable [6]. This technology is likely to have both military and commercial use.  It 
will benefit the less technologically capable, particularly through cheap, novel 
applications. But the availability of this technology to the less technologically capable 
and inexperienced users will also increase the dangers of system or application mis-
configurations which will create vulnerabilities in systems, making them more prone to 
malicious attacks and machine hijacking. 
 Rapid Mass-Mobilization – The pervasiveness of ICT will enable communities of 
common interest to be established very quickly and coordinate the mobilization of 
significant numbers of people. According to [6] “Rapid mobilization – ‘Flashmobs’ - 
may be undertaken by states, terrorists and criminals, and may involve dispersed 
communities across international boundaries, challenging security forces to match this 
potential agility and ability to concentrate”. An example of rapid mass-mobilisation 
may be the cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007 [18]. Even though the exact 
perpetrators of the attack are not known for sure (Estonia initially blamed the Russian 
government for involvement; the Russian government denied any involvement) it 
seems like a large number of the attacks may have come from disparate sources 
influenced by a common cause [19]. 
Innovations in forensics and counter-forensics tools and applications are also predicted, 
especially in commercial settings where litigation proceedings to get remuneration from 
consequences of attacks or breaches may be launched more frequently. For example, [17] 
states “Forensics and counter-forensics, a major trend in security to come within the social 
fabric. Military [computer security] failures don’t allow appeal: if you didn’t protect your 
transmissions, you won’t get far complaining about being exploited. Commercial security 
failures are quite different, and if you collected the right evidence, you could recover by 
suing.” The Estonia attack [19] highlights difficulties with attack attribution (and not only 
governmental but also commercial sites, such as banks, were targeted in this attack).  
2.3.1.1 Unintended side effects 
There might also be various unintended side effects (especially in the security context) from 
the advancements in technology. For example, the intelligence agencies’ capacity to penetrate 
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the cyber-space may be reduced due to the increasing use of obscure languages and 
commercially available ‘strong’ encryption tools and algorithms [6]. We may also see 
increasing pressure from nation states on developers of system to provide secret trap-doors 
and others surveillance mechanisms as a price to pay for access to markets. 
In [6] it is stated that “innovation, research and development will originate from more 
international and diffuse sources and will proliferate widely, making regulation and control 
of novel technologies more challenging”.  Further [6] states that (the emphasis is ours) “the 
exploitation of these may have catastrophic results, especially those associated with 
nanotechnology, biotechnology and weapon systems. These may be unintended, for example 
‘runaway’ nanotechnology or biotechnology, or intended, such as the development and use of 
directed energy or electromagnetic-pulse weapons”. 
Other side-effects include: 
 Information warfare – [6] reports that some states are developing sophisticated 
“information warfare capabilities” by exploiting the pervasiveness and pliability of 
digital information to gain commercial or political advantage. They predict that the 
threat of opportunistic hacking and network manipulation will also continue at an 
increasing rate and intensity. They predict that both hostile nation states and 
opportunistic criminal or terrorist hackers will represent a significant threat to military 
ICT systems. Hence these ICT systems will require robust and comprehensive 
protection.  
 Technology leakage – The interconnected nature of the networked systems will increase 
the risk of deliberate or accidental technology or information leakage [6]. This is likely 
to happen in spite of stringent regulations and security.  This may lead to a “widening 
number of state and non-state actors accessing advanced and sensitive technologies”. 
For military and other safety-critical systems or SoSs this may result in hostile states 
organisations obtaining access to novel weapons and devices. [6] also states the risk 
(from the defence and law-enforcements point of view) from “ethical scientists” who 
may reveal details of advanced programmes “in the interests of ensuring a ‘level 
playing field’ and balance of risk.” Risks of technology and information leakage are 
also discussed in the three scenarios (Appendix A) developed in partnership with a 
NATO Research Task Group. 
2.3.2 Insights from the scenarios 
A NATO Research Task Group on the Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies (IST-
048/RTG-020) has written a set of three scenarios of potential attacks against critical 
infrastructures. The task group was headed by Dan Craigen (University of Toronto, Canada), 
Ann Miller (University of Missouri-Rolla) and Robin Bloomfield (CSR, City University). A 
final report detailing the scenarios and the analysis performed is in preparation. Details of the 
scenarios and initial analysis performed are provided in Appendices A and B of this report. 
The “Terms of Reference” (ToR) for the Research Task Group (RTG), provides the historical 
background for the group as follows: 
“As a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, 
NATO and its member countries have been actively investigating means for combating 
terrorism. 
High Assurance Technologies (such as formal methods) have normally been used to develop 
systems requiring high degrees of assurance as to functionality, safety and security. One of 
the key benefits of such technologies is their ability to ferret out subtle problems with system 
requirements, design and implementation.” 
The ToR continues by justifying the RTG to NATO as follows:  
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“An important aspect of combating terrorism is the protection of NATO network-enabled 
systems from exploitation by terrorists and other foes.” 
The three scenarios are entitled: 
 Scenario 1: Medical and Financial Services Sector – (present time)  
 Scenario 2: Oil and Gas Sector – (present time) 
 Scenario 3: Electrical Power Sector – (Circa 2012) 
In what follows we will provide a brief analysis of Scenario 3 (developed by Robin 
Bloomfield at CSR, City University) with details of threat targets and the goals and intentions 
of the attackers. Details of how the attack in this scenario may unfold as well as details on the 
other two scenarios are given in Appendices A and B. 
2.3.2.1 Implications of Scenario 3: Electrical Power Sector 
The scenario in Appendix C provides a number of insights into the nature of potential 
incidents for SoS and implications for as security evaluation framework. The scenario 
describes an incident, initially from the point of view of a controller of the electricity network 
as he attempts to control and recover the electricity grid in the face of doubt and confusion 
caused by bad weather, possible attacks, heightened threat levels and malfunctioning 
information and control systems  
One immediate insight from the scenario is that in a complex SoS, such as the electrical 
power supply grid and supporting infrastructure, it is over simplistic to think of an attack 
being designed and executed by a single, identifiable agent. While this is of course possible, 
the scenario shows how a number of malicious, uncoordinated events together with stresses 
due to accidental events, environmental effects and opportunistic escalation challenge the 
resilience of the complex system: using a disease metaphor, there is no need for opportunistic 
infections to co-ordinate. Not only had the adversary absorbed the vocabulary of systems of 
systems and “boundary-less” systems but had developed an approach that broadened effects-
based planning to a more ecological or bio-inspired view. The incident described is just one 
of the many routes through to failures: it is not just a “security” event.   
The scenario uses a mixture of “attacks” that are un-coordinated in the normal sense of having 
short term communication between the actors but rather through a long term, decentralised 
understanding and intent. The use of markets and ownership may require large nation-state 
levels of resource to influence and to hide their intentions.  
The threat agents assumed that challenges to the power system were bound to occur so 
pursued tactics that would increase the magnitude of these effects, make their management 
more difficult and especially hamper recovery.  The adversary made significant use of system 
engineering and risk analysis skills to understand complex systems. They were aware of 
“normal accident” theory and had knowledge of complex systems and the relationship 
between topology and cascading effects. They had the ability to run simulations, picking up 
on published work and the availability of topological information. They had designed their 
approach so it did not rely on a single type of attack or a single vulnerability as these could be 
found. They had understood that consequences in interdependent infrastructures increase non-
linearly with time to repair2. 
The difficulty in operation caused by bad weather had been amplified by: 
 Behaviour of the protection devices; 
                                                     
2 So damage something like  = geographic impact*time^n. Would be interesting to run some models to 
investigate further. 
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 Incorrect risk information and Management Information System (MIS) problems had 
made recovery more difficult. 
However hampering recovery and causing losses would be possible without the sophisticated 
compromise of the protection devices. The adversary might have been satisfied with just 
prolonging the disruption or could initiate it with more conventional attacks (e.g. graphite on 
sub stations, fires etc). 
The adversaries had sown an easily detectable “bug” by using a friend in the contracting 
company to miss-set the trip levels in some of the protection devices. The malicious code they 
had inserted by intercepting the devices after manufacture had not been detected, despite the 
industry approved audits and assessments that had taken place, and some had been activated 
and tested in this incident. However once ran the code also self destructed3. They had made 
use of computer science tools for reverse engineering and mathematical modelling of the 
sensor code. The adversary had access to the code, unlike the industry assessors and auditors.  
They had also learnt about the forensic capability of the system, the times to restore, had cast 
doubt on the risk information system, learnt how to stimulate consequential social unrest and 
exploit the legal system. 
Another theme was the desire to escape detection, to have the incident seen as a conjunction 
of several unfortunate events. Part of the scenario was the doubt that it was hard to decide 
whether it was orchestrated or not. This was in part to avoid the massive retaliation that might 
follow an overt attack  but also as a learning exercise4 so as to retain the potential for future 
escalation and pave the way to a “shock and awe” variant. 
2.3.2.2 Threat Targets 
The scenario concerns a system of systems – the electricity generation and supply systems 
and its supporting control and maintenance systems and the people, organisations and 
institutions that are stakeholders. The “system” included the  
 Technical system of electricity supply and control; 
 The organisation and management of that system; 
 The legal and insurance system; 
 The supply chain; 
 The maintenance system. 
Also some abstract elements such as: 
 Situational awareness; 
 Doubt and confusion; 
 Confidence in the system. 
It should be noted that the consideration of threat targets as the more concrete concerns may 
result in missing some important points (e.g. an effective attack on an eVoting machine might 
be in the voters’ confidence in the accuracy and robustness of the system).  
                                                     
3 Might have inserted code to be date specific, or randomly start. Could be wiped by rebooting the OK 
version then reload it but would then need to control type of reboots. Would need to compromise 
checksum and fault detection measures. Could be inserted before shipments, as in this version, but the 
connectivity of the devices, albeit over a partially Government approved network, might lead to 
credible scenario with external attack. 
4 The adversaries were familiar with the High Reliability Organisation [HRO] literature. 
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2.3.2.3 Goals/intentions 
A variety of goals and intentions have been discussed for the immediate incident: 
 Challenge the state and corporations and show their vulnerability and fallibility; 
 Decrease confidence in the state’s competence; 
 Increase feelings of insecurity and under attack (prompting further measures); 
 Economic damage via loss of supply (secondary goal); 
 Learn how to mount a larger “shock and awe”. 
There were also goals with respect to their capabilities 
 To develop and prove stealth based disruption.  
 Insert vulnerabilities and sources of instability that then promote and allow instabilities 
to grow. 
2.4 Summary of evaluation challenges  
The technological developments mentioned so far have various cultural, societal, political and 
environmental implications. They will be embedded in a world that is coping with the impact 
of climate change, rapid modernisation of China and India, competition for food and natural 
resources and increased sophistication, strategy and multiplicity of adversaries. 
The discussion of the research challenges of assessing the dependability and security of these 
systems will take place later in the report. We will first summarise the main implications that 
arise from these technological advancements. We have touched upon some of these issues 
already in the report. Some of the main implications are in the fields of / due to:  
 Critical societal role – The technological advancements discussed in section 2.2 and 
2.3 show that an unprecedented reliance on technology may be created. Due to the 
increased access to advanced technology the future generations will become more 
vulnerable to either deliberate or unintentional disruption of the system implemented 
with these technologies. As mentioned in [6] countries with developed economies 
(where the adoption of these advanced technologies is likely to be more widespread) are 
likely to be more vulnerable to such disruption compared with less technologically 
advanced societies.  
 Concerns regarding privacy are likely to become especially important. The widespread 
data sharing and communication that will be required to make the new systems function 
may lead to serious infringements of privacy. Various infringements are possible such 
as identity theft, data laundering, disclosure of personal data, surveillance, risks from 
personalised profiling etc. 
 Trust / Assurance – The new technological advancements, especially those on ICT 
systems will require substantial level of trust to be placed on the new systems. Hence 
the new technology needs to be trustworthy. Building trustworthy systems (especially 
complex interconnected SoSs) will pose a significant challenge since current methods 
for both building and assuring a system that is sufficiently dependable or secure will 
most likely not scale well when applied to these complex systems. 
 Dependence and inter-dependence – The future socio-technical ICT systems, as 
discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, are likely to be complex inter-connected and inter-
dependent systems in a much greater scale than they are now. Hence, the assessment of 
the various security and reliability attributes cannot be done in isolation for each 
constituent component of the systems or SoS. 
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 Interoperability – There is likely to be an increased difficulty in building complex 
systems of systems. There might for example be: inconsistencies between architectures 
(including inconsistencies in the interfaces) of the different systems of an SoS; but also 
inconsistencies in the timescales (timebands) in which the different systems interact. 
 Socio-technical aspects – The future systems are expected to become increasingly 
socio-technical in nature, hence the role of the human users and operators within the 
system, and their fallibilities also need to be considered in the overall assessment of the 
system.   
 Complexity and System boundaries – The complexity of the future systems and the 
large inter-dependence and interconnectedness of the components will make it very 
difficult to define what the boundaries of a system or a SoS are, i.e. where one system 
ends and another one begins. This makes security and dependability assessment of a 
SoS very difficult. Assumptions may need to be made about the systems boundaries 
which may not hold in practice hence leading to wrong conclusions being drawn from 
the assessment. We envisage future blurring of boundaries between human/machines 
and between classes of devices. 
 Information explosion – The future systems, will deal with radically increased volume 
of information due to advance in sensor and networks technologies. There will also be 
greater pressure on both systems and human decision makers to deal with information 
in shorter response times. This will challenge effective decision-making progressively 
at all levels. As is stated in [6] “Greater personal, corporate and military dependence 
on ICT and commercial interconnectedness and applications will create greater 
vulnerabilities and fragility, magnifying the impact of information denial, failure or 
manipulation.” Continuing leakage and diffusion of sensitive information (which can 
have potentially dangerous national security implications if it concerns for example 
weapons systems) will continue to happen at potentially a greater rate.  
 Rapid obsolescence of technology – The predicted pace of new technological 
innovations, listed in section 2.2 and 2.3, is likely to render existing technologies 
obsolescent more quickly than at present [6] and also lead to heterogeneous systems 
composed on many generations of technology. 
 Tempo – There will be increasing tempo to operations and systems with dynamic and 
ad hoc coalitions being formed. Reconciling timing issues as systems and organisations 
are brought together to form larger SoSs also becomes an issue. There might be 
inconsistencies in the timescales in which the different systems interact and there might 
also be differences in the time domain in which two organisations, that form part of the 
same SoS, interact, e.g. which tasks/process are considered more urgent will depend on 
the organisation.  
These implications might seem very incremental in that they are just extending social and 
technological trends we can already see. However this hides the fact that they would apply to 
many different future scenarios. Even those in this report are quite disparate but one can 
imagine a wide range of futures of different economic wealth distribution, of relationships 
between the state and the individual, of levels of social cohesion and of conflict and threat. 
However we have not analysed extreme scenarios where we see anti-technology refusenik 
cultures, disenchantment with a technology (e.g. as a result of successful attack of key 
systems, their oppressive use by the state, breakdown of complex systems such as financial 
markets), or scenarios of extreme state control. Nor have we tested the robustness of the work 
to developments in quantum computing. 
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3 Part 2: Towards a security/resilience evaluation framework 
3.1  Trends in evaluation – the evaluation context 
The achievement of security is mediated by a complex interaction of politics, regulation, 
culture and markets. The products that are available, the trust and threats, the methodologies 
used, the incentives to co-operate or compete are all shaped by markets. If we ignore or 
misjudge markets, information assurance and security evaluation initiatives can be blunted or 
have widespread unintended consequences. 
For markets in security to operate effectively users and suppliers need to be able to evaluate 
the risks, costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Even if we are not concerned 
about markets as a whole, an individual, an SME or large corporate as well as vendors and 
system integrators and security policy makers all need to evaluate alternative courses of 
action5. There is value not only in being secure, but also in knowing that you are secure, i.e. 
value of confidence. If we could assess and communicate security risk in the same manner 
that other risks are handled then there is the potential for: 
 Awareness and discussion of appropriate risk based policies; 
 The ability to make trade offs between  different security risks and between different 
types of risks; 
 A more refined approach to the insurance of digital risks. 
Our current inability to make such risk assessments can be seen as contributing to a market 
and policy failure. We frame this failure as an inability to make informed risk-based decisions 
on the costs and benefits of security.  In terms of the interaction of economics and security, 
there is a strong interdisciplinary academic research community and we provide a brief 
review in section 3.2.2.  
However security is just one aspect of overall dependability that users and the market might 
be concerned with: typically users want an overall and comparable view of other identified 
risks. We therefore propose to consider this in terms of a risk based approach to resilience and 
introduce the concept in section 3.1.1. 
We also propose to draw on the work of other sectors in evaluation of communication of risks 
of computer based systems. While it would be false to present the work in other attributes 
(such as safety) as having solved the problems of achieving and evaluating risk there are both 
frameworks and detailed technical aspects that could be readily adapted or deployed in 
security. For example, in the use of “assurance cases” [20], barrier models, worst case 
reliability bounds etc. We therefore briefly review these approaches in section 4.2. 
It is not that risk assessment and security are strangers. The BS1779 2001 standard provides 
explicit normative guidance on risk assessment that is also extremely generic and could apply 
to any number of risks.  The problems arise because there are particular uncertainties in these 
risk assessments and any IA policy should be constructed with a view to how to deal with 
these uncertainties.6 One obvious candidate is some form of probabilistic risk assessment. 
One oft cited reason for the inapplicability of risk and probabilistic approaches is the very 
nature of security. The most obvious uncertainty concerns the behaviour of socio-technical 
systems: we cannot say with certainty when and how they will be attacked and whether they 
will fail and in what manner. The problem is not only predicting the behaviour of an 
                                                     
5 This is rather a simplification. Market failure and lack of information can benefit some in the market. 
Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD) is a recognised commercial strategy. 
6 We have in some sectors the problems caused by adopting goal, risk based, regulation without any 
technical basis for how this will be implemented. 
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intelligent, malicious adversary but also the overall complex dynamic system that they are 
attacking. There might also be some cultural aspects concerning the IT security community 
favouring deterministic rather than probabilistic reasoning - for example in the way risk and 
uncertainty is dealt with within security standards. The concept of risk underpins all of this, in 
both security and safety publications. The safety community seems more fluent in expressing 
this risk. Although risk is the combination of consequence and probability the security 
standards are very coy about mentioning probability. For example: BS 1779-200 has 114 
entries for risk and non for probability. HMG1 has 36 entries for risk and non for probability, 
1 for likelihood. HMG19 has 69 entries for risk and non for probability, 3 for likelihood. 
There are 133 “risks” in BS 7779-2:2002 and no entries for probability but 2 for likelihood 
It is now generally accepted that this uncertainty is best represented using a probability 
calculus. Whilst there are alternatives to probability as means of expressing this uncertainty, 
such as fuzzy/possibility theory, these do not have the power of probability, nor do they easily 
fit into a wider engineering framework, in particular for enabling quantitative risk assessment. 
The necessity for probabilistic formulation of security claims is elaborated in [21]. It is 
certainly true that predicting when a particular attack will occur is very difficult, but by 
analogy with insuring against crime, aggregation of behaviour can lead to the ability to 
predict probabilistically and can be seen as an emergent property.  
This kind of uncertainty has been called “aleatory” (or, sometimes, stochastic), and concerns 
uncertainty in the world. What is less well accepted is the uncertainty involved in the 
assessment of dependability. The uncertainty here e.g. uncertainty about the accuracy of 
claims for a system’s dependability arises from incompleteness and inaccuracy of evidence, 
doubt about the truth of assumptions, and other non-physical causes. This second kind of 
uncertainty has been called “epistemic” (or, sometimes, subjective, or state of knowledge) as 
it arises from incompleteness of knowledge [22]. This uncertainty impacts upon the 
confidence with which we can make information assurance claims. Although there is a clear 
need to deal with uncertainty formally, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work on 
fundamentals (although see some earlier work [23]).  Relevant work is work on economics 
and security (section 3.2.1) and the interdisciplinary work on confidence (section 3.2.2). 
While advocating a probabilistic approach this needs to be done with a mature appreciation of 
the benefits and pitfalls of such a policy. As with any policy there can be unintended 
consequences: in probabilistic risk assessment any quantification of the risk can be used and 
abused. In policy terms numbers can easily travel long social distances but the caveats and 
understandings surrounding them get left behind, so that bare figures of 10-n failure can be 
misleadingly quoted. There is already considerable Government guidance in [24] on risk 
communication in general, on risk management [25] and in the Information Assurance 
Governance Framework [26]. 
Additional policy risks of probabilistic approaches are the unintended redistribution or 
shifting of risks. A market might operate to reduce easily addressed risks at the expense of 
higher end risks that can not be so readily communicated and might even be increased by 
reducing the low end risk.  For example, if the lifetime cost of security products is low and 
the perceived threat high there might be the temptation to install myriad firewalls, virus 
checkers, IDS that might introduce some new but very unlikely routes of serious compromise.  
There are a variety of other issues that would have to be considered: 
 The result of risk assessment of socio-technical systems is very dependent on where the 
boundary is drawn (e.g. for e-voting [27]). 
 There are interesting balances between trustworthy and trusted: an intended 
consequence of making an e-voting system so secure that voters do not comprehend and 
so do not trust the system as much as a less secure one [28]. 
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 Risk communication is a well trodden path and any security work would need to take 
best practice into account (as we expect it does, see [24]). 
 Risk assessment relies heavily on expert judgment. 
These are general issues for risk assessment. Peculiar to security is the intelligent and well 
resourced adversary and any policy appraisal would have to consider the implications of the 
adversaries knowing the basis of policy and how this might manifest itself (e.g. manipulation 
of markets, introducing a new type of security attack on the confidence in the risk 
assessment). Hence the evaluation needs to be two-pronged: evaluation of the adversaries 
(their strategies etc.) and the evaluation of the system defences.  
3.1.1 Resilience 
One interesting trend in evaluation and policy is to consider an “all hazards” approach that 
addresses both malicious and accidental attacks on systems (e.g. in EU CIP Directives [29]). 
In addition the notion of dependability, or dependability and security, as an umbrella term to 
capture the need to address all attributes (safety, security, availability etc) rather than just a 
single one and the use of the term “resilience”. 
 
Figure 1 - Resilience 
Resilience has its common sense meaning but is used in a variety of ways. The US 
Department for Homeland Security (DHS) and UK resilience viewpoints consider the loss 
due to an incident as an indication of how resilient a system is. This is shown in Fig 1.  In [30] 
the emphasis is on the ability of a system to adapt and respond to changes in the environment. 
We propose to distinguish two types of resilience: 
 Type1: Resilience to design basis threats. This could be expressed in the usual terms of 
availability, robustness, etc. 
 Type 2: Resilience to beyond design basis threats. This might be split into those known 
threats that are considered incredible or ignored for some reason and other threats that 
are unknowns. (The Rumsfeld part of resilience) 
A security evaluation could then be seen as evaluation of resilience for certain threats (e.g. 
malicious ones) and for certain attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability). This 
evaluation of the security part of resilience would then address the different stages of Figure 
1. See Table 1 for some initial details for critical infrastructures. 
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Table 1 – Security assessment of threats to Critical Infrastructure Assurance  
Impact on resilience 
Security assessment of threats to Critical Infrastructure Assurance (CIA) during the following 
phases: 
 Reduce frequency of events 
♦ Warning, operator support 
 Increased robustness 
♦ Network design, topology, redundancy, diversity 
♦ Understanding of events and scenarios 
 Detection time 
♦ Communication between services 
♦ Variety of forecasting approaches 
♦ Detection of compromises 
 Decision time 
♦ Situational awareness 
♦ Planning and training (Scenarios) and use of synthetic environments 
 Recovery time 
♦ Resource deployment; dependent assets identified  
♦ Awareness state of other networks  
♦ Communication and co-ordination 
 Learning from experience 
3.1.2 Evaluation and cases 
For critical systems it is important to know whether the system is trustworthy and to be able 
to communicate, review and debate the level of trust achieved. In the safety domain, explicit 
Safety Cases are increasingly required by law, regulations and standards. Increasingly, the 
case is made using a goal-based approach, where claims (or goals) are made about the system 
and arguments and evidence are presented to support those claims. The need to understand 
risks is not just a safety issue: more and more organisations need to know their risks and to be 
able to communicate and address them to multiple stakeholders from the boardroom to back 
office and beyond. The type of argumentation used for safety cases is not specific to safety 
alone, but it can be used to justify the adequacy of systems in different applications, including 
security critical, business critical or service critical. An international community has begun to 
form around this issue of generalised assurance cases and the challenge of moving from the 
rhetoric to the reality of being able to implement convincing and valid cases [20], [31]. 
The “case” and associated supporting tools can be seen as having a number of roles: 
 Reasoning and argumentation: as an over-arching argumentation framework that allows 
us to reason as formally as necessary about all the claims being made. Here there are 
two very different viewpoints: the one that sees argumentation as primarily a narrative 
and the other where we seek to model judgements in a formal framework. There are 
some hybrid approaches where the case can be seen to integrate and communicate a 
selection of formal analyses and evidence, e.g. it would not seek to reason formally 
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about the timing of a component but leave that to a separate analysis. The balance 
between these two approaches should be part of on-going research. 
 Negotiation, communication, trust: as a boundary objective between the different 
stakeholders who have to agree (or not) the claims being made about the system. To 
this end it has to be detailed and rigorous enough to communicate the case effectively 
and allow challenges and the subsequent deepening of the case.7  
The assurance case contains a number of strategies that can be explained in terms of a 
“triangle” (see Fig. 2 below) of: 
 The use of accepted standards and guidelines. 
 Justification via a set of claims/goals about the system’s safety behaviour.  
 An investigation of known potential vulnerabilities of the system. 
 
Figure 2: Safety Case triangle 
The first approach is based on demonstrating compliance to a known standard—which is the 
approach that is normally used. The second approach is goal-based—where specific goals for 
the systems are supported by arguments and evidence at progressively more detailed levels. 
The final approach is a vulnerability-based argument, where it is demonstrated that potential 
vulnerabilities within a system do not constitute a problem—essentially a “bottom-up” 
approach as opposed to the “top-down” approach used in goal-based methods.  
These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and a combination can be used to support a 
safety justification, especially where the system consists of both off-the-shelf (OTS) 
components and application-specific elements. While there is considerable experience in 
other sectors with the claims-argument-evidence (CAE) structure for safety justification, this 
type of structuring is novel to the nuclear industry.  
There are perceived large benefits in developing and generalising the goal-based Assurance 
Case approach to security and critical infrastructure.  
3.1.3 COTS components 
Software systems are increasingly created through the utilisation of commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) components. COTS components are used due to financial pressures on system 
developers to reduce costs and shorten the systems’ development and delivery times. In this 
section we will briefly summarise the main characteristics of COTS components, problems 
with COTS components assessment, state-of-the-art in COTS assessment and the research 
challenges. We have provided a more detailed review of COTS assessment in Appendix C.  
                                                     
7  An engineering analogy is to see the case as part of a “signal processing system” – the 
licensing and certification process – that seeks to reject false claims and accept good ones. For critical 
systems the probability of false positives has to be very low (i.e., there must be a very low chance of 
accepting a flawed system). 
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COTS components come in a variety of forms [32], from components that form part of a 
program (e.g. various graphical, statistical or mathematical libraries of functions) to complete 
systems of integrated software and hardware components (alarm systems, Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLCs), medical devices, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, air-
traffic management systems etc). 
The main characteristics of COTS components are: 
 They already exist and cannot be re-engineered (exceptions are some open-source off-
the-shelf (OTS) with less restrictive license agreements for which the code is available 
for changing). 
 Due to their general-purpose use, most components may contain functions that are not 
necessary for a specific application. 
 COTS with a substantial user-base are subject to continuous change and evolution to 
meet users’ evolving requirements. 
Contrasted with bespoke systems, there are several challenges that assessors are faced with 
when dealing with COTS components (more details in Appendix C): 
 Non-compliance with standards 
 Establishing COTS provenance 
 Problems with unwanted/unneeded functionality in the component 
 Problems stemming from patches and updates to component 
 Difficulties with optimal COTS components selection 
Several assessment approaches are reported in literature for dealing with some of these 
problems. There is for example a vast literature on COTS component selection (see Appendix 
C for a review) which ranges from selection and assessment of components for use in 
commercial settings to safety-critical settings such as medical, nuclear power and military.  
Research challenges for COTS components closely mirror those for bespoke systems and 
SoSs - which will be presented in the next sub-section and in Section 4, even though there are 
some differences for COTS component assessment which we have highlighted in Appendix 
C. 
3.2 Current research trends 
3.2.1 Economics of security 
An important interdisciplinary research area is in the field of Economics of Security. Two 
recent reports [33], [34] provide extensive details of this field and references to other 
important works.  As stated in [34], “security failure is caused by bad incentives at least as 
often as by bad design. Systems are particularly prone to failure when the person guarding 
them does not suffer the full cost of failure.” Hence approaches such as microeconomics and 
Game theory for example, become important for engineers of computer security. Security 
mechanisms are used for such purposes as digital rights management and accessory control 
which introduces strategic issues. As stated in [34] “where the system owner’s interests 
conflict with those of her machine’s designer, economic analysis can shine light on policy 
options”. In [33], the authors provide a set of 15 recommendations about what information 
security issues should be handled at the EU Member State level and what issues should 
require harmonisation (or at least coordination) amongst the member states (see the Executive 
Summary of [33] for a listing of these recommendations). Some of the research challenges in 
Economics of Security, listed in [34], [35] and [36] are: 
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 Network topology and Information Security – [34] cites several recent works 
investigating the network security and the nature of spread of viruses and other security 
risks, as well as strategies for defending from their spread. The authors state that it 
remains a research challenge to reconcile the generated network models (which have 
been done using various simulations) and real computer networks to get more accurate 
measures of the various costs/gains (e.g. from the defenders point of view, the gain in 
security that can be gained from a malicious node (or a group of them) being brought 
down/removed). 
 Psychology and Security – Several issues are discussed in [34] and [36] as being at the 
crossroads of Security, Economics and  Psychology: 
♦ Inappropriate obedience – e.g. card thieves calling up cardholders and pretending to 
be from a bank and demanding the PIN number from customers – how many give the 
PIN numbers away and why does this happen? 
♦ Security usability [36] – how to design easy to use and easy to configure security 
devices and security systems (especially those that are to be used by the general 
public)? 
♦ Study of deception –why is phishing successful? 
Economics and security have been addressed at a series of academic workshops on the 
Economics of Information Security (WEIS) since 2002 and for CIIP there is a more recent 
Workshop on the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure [37]. Of particular 
relevance to security  risk assessment are those related to cyber insurance [20], covert conflict 
[38], costs of infrastructure failure [39] and empirical papers on justifying security 
investments [40], [41], [42]. In addition there are studies of the security market,  and 
economic models of vulnerability research [43],  the vulnerability black market [44] and 
forensics [45]. There is work that makes an analogy with the statistical value of life used in 
safety policy and proposes a similar measure for the Statistical Value of Information and there 
is other empirical work on the consequences of privacy breaches [46]. In the area of CIP a 
number of studies have adopted the Leontieff approach to model interdependencies and also 
economic impact [47] and this is related to military effect based operations where economic 
impacts are an important part of planning certain interventions short of war [48].  
The active multi-disciplinary research community in economics and security and the work on 
security and risk should, on the one hand, be encouraging but also underline the research 
challenged that is faced. 
3.2.2 Interdisciplinary approach to assessment of SoSs 
[6] states that “the breadth and depth of the application of innovation will generate an 
unprecedented reliance on technology. Increased access to and the rapid cultural 
assimilation of technology will render future generations increasingly vulnerable to the 
deliberate or unintentional disruption of technology-based utilities. Sophisticated societies 
are likely to be more vulnerable to such disruption as they increasingly exist in a virtual 
environment in contrast to less technologically advanced societies”. Hence the need to build 
dependable and secure systems will remain but the difficulty of assuring that deployed 
systems are sufficiently dependable will also increase. Due to the complexity of the envisaged 
systems discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, which are required to work in highly interoperable, 
interconnected and pervasive manner, it will remain a challenge to research how well the 
current approaches to security and dependability assessment can scale to these new systems. 
Clearly the assessment will need to be interdisciplinary, bringing in research from computer 
science, statistics, psychology, sociology and ethnography amongst others to assess the multi-
faceted nature of these emerging systems. At CSR, City University we have been involved in 
a large-scale long-term project called DIRC (Dependable Interdisciplinary Research 
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Collaboration) sponsored by the UK EPSRC which has investigated these issues for current 
technologies. This research is continuing in the successor project to DIRC called INDEED 
(INterdisciplinary DEsign and Evaluation of Dependability) which is also sponsored by 
EPSRC. We will discuss the inter-disciplinary approach to assessment in section 4 of this 
report according to the themes of:  
 Adaptation and diversity 
 Confidence in dependability cases  
 Responsibility and trust 
 Time and structure 
3.2.3 Emergent properties in complex and adaptive systems 
The research challenges outlined in sections 2.2 and 2.3 highlight the need to deal with 
assessment of complex and adaptive systems. As stated in [49] “As our world becomes a more 
interconnected place, so called “systems” ideas and perspectives become increasingly 
important. A central issue is the emergent behaviour of complex systems. In complex systems, 
non-linear interactions between component parts give rise to high-level “emergent” 
organisation that is not straightforward to explain.” In the same report [49], it is explained 
that a large class of natural complex systems (e.g. neural systems, ant colonies, animal 
matting habits, stock markets etc.) exhibit aggregate (emergent) properties that allow them to 
adapt to changing circumstances in an efficient and effective manner despite lacking central 
authority or control responsible for this ability. Therefore such systems can be very robust to 
perturbation and also behaviourally agile; ICT engineers would like to design both of these 
properties into their technical systems. A cognitive sciences perspective [50] outlines four 
approaches to pin down the notion of emergence, namely: 
 Collective self-organisation 
 Un-programmed functionality 
 Interactive complexity 
 Uncompressible unfolding (i.e. behaviour of a macrostate requires simulation of the 
microstate)  
Research challenges remain however to better define, understand and explain these notions of 
emergence in complex ICT systems. Often emergence is used loosely, and incorrectly, to 
describe behaviour that has been surprising. 
CSR has conducted research on evaluating the structure of COTS and applying some ideas 
from complexity theory to understand what might be general topological properties of certain 
classes of COTS [51]. A promising line of research would be to expand this to different 
classes of evolving COTS and to develop evaluation models based on it. There is also 
interesting work in the EC-funded IRRIIS (Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based 
Infrastructure Systems) project (see next section), of which CSR is a contributing partner, on 
applying complex systems style modelling to critical infrastructures [52]. 
3.2.4 Interdependencies 
The challenge of understanding the behaviour of critical infrastructures and particularly 
information infrastructures is well known and a variety of national, European and US research 
initiatives and workshops have been actively considering the research agenda posed by this 
challenge. In the UK, the emerging Government Information Assurance Strategy [53] and 
within Europe FP7 [54] have both identified the need for research on interdependencies. One 
important aspect of infrastructures is their interaction and interdependency. Unforeseen 
interdependency can be a source of threat to systems and a dominant factor in our ability to 
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understand risk. However interdependency is also central to providing tolerance to attack and 
failure, a means for adaptation and overall resilience.  
Interdependency analysis can be undertaken at a variety of phases: from planning and 
feasibility through to emergency or situational management.  Interdependencies are 
sometimes considered according to the different perceived layers (e.g. of physical, control and 
supervisory, management) and also in terms of abstraction such as effects, services and 
implementation. For each of these abstractions there are a wide range of possible modelling 
approaches and theories that can be deployed ranging from qualitative models, stochastic 
activity networks, complexity science style models and high-fidelity simulation. These can be 
deployed at a variety of abstraction levels e.g. to model the detailed implementation topology 
or to model the service topology and cascading effects. 
The interdependency analysis needs a sufficiently rich model for the analysis to discover and 
assess the risks: 
 Societal aspects need assessment as they provide possible hidden sources of 
commonality. 
 Modes of operation have to be rich enough. Degraded modes of operation can amplify 
risks as levels of redundancy assumed at design time become defeated. 
 Non-linearities in failure models (e.g. increased failure rates due to stress from nodes in 
the same locality) can lead to escalation and cascading effects. 
Some of the IRRIS results can be found at [52]. Of particular interest are the models of 
cascade and common mode failure arising from Task 2.1 of IRRIIS. Currently CSR is leading 
a study on interdependencies between critical infrastructures [55]. 
3.2.5 Formal methods and static analyses 
The contemporary static analysis and formal methods landscape is a rich one covering a range 
of approaches to the analysis of software code, designs and specifications, and it 
encompasses: 
 Theorem proving of proof obligations generated from comparing a safety or security 
property or specification with an implementation 
 Proof that unwanted behaviour such as deadlocks and divide by zero does not occur 
(this is  independent of specification)  
 Tools to extract and understand program structure 
 Approaches to guide generation of test cases and techniques that link static and 
dynamic analysis 
There have been tremendous advances in the capability of theorem provers and model 
checkers since the early industrial experiences (see for example Rushby papers [56], [57], 
[58]). There are a numerous tools for program slicing and flow analysis (Codesurfer and path 
inspector), model checkers (nuSMV, Spin, SAL), abstract interpreters (Polyspace, Astree), 
and integrity analysis tools (Coverity, ESC) and tools for verifying C programs (Spin, Why) 
(a list of useful links can be found in [59]). Microsoft has developed focused tools for 
attacking particular problems such as buffer overflow and in the embedded area there are 
tools such as SCADE which have plug-ins for model checking and other techniques [58].  
Although there are many tools available, their use is often not off-the-shelf and will require 
additional engineering to cope with language variants and the particular processors used in 
embedded systems. In addition they may not address all the attributes that are of interest e.g. 
some will address only integrity issues but not correctness. There is continuing work on 
correctness by constructions such as that within the RODIN and now DEPLOY projects. 
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The rich landscape of static analysis means that many approaches may now be cost 
effectively used at lower integrity levels and that recommendations in standards, if based on 
cost/benefit considerations, could be out of date and not accurate. Examples of such shifts in 
the costs are give by the US Department of Homeland security sponsored work on integrity 
checking of many open source programs8 [60] and the work done running proofs of the 
Mondex purse that showed that mechanical proof could now be added for an extra 10% of the 
overall effort on the less formal manual proof [61]. However, in part because of the rich 
landscape, we need to be clear how the techniques contribute to the safety argument being 
made e.g. removal of vulnerabilities, removal of all faults of a certain class, demonstration of 
absence of certain behaviour, proof of correctness properties. 
Progress in the development and deployment of these techniques will have impacts on various 
aspects of evaluations: 
 Existing security standards recommendations will be superseded as the techniques 
become cost-effective and their deployment appropriate and proportionate. 
 The claims made in the security cases might change (e.g. to all vulnerabilities of class X 
have been found, when tools and techniques for finding X have been deployed) and the 
evidence with it. 
 Threat models and likelihood need updating e.g. finding X now easier given the 
advance in tools. 
 More generally the “arms race” between deploying these tools on products and their use 
by adversaries needs assessing. 
3.2.6 Benchmarking and fault-injection related testing 
There has been a lot of previous work on fault injection, robustness testing and more recently 
on dependability benchmarking. A review of state of the art and current research trends in 
these fields are given in [62].  
Benchmarks for performance of computers systems (especially database management systems 
[63]) have existed for over twenty years. More recent attempts in the last decade have been 
made to define dependability benchmarks (see [64] for dependability benchmarking of 
operating systems, and [9] and [62] for a review of the dependability benchmarking field). 
Dependability benchmarking of a system involves the evaluation of dependability and/or 
performance attributes of a system either experimentally or with a combination of 
experimentation and modelling [64]. Dependability benchmarking combines the workload 
defined by existing performance benchmarks (e.g. TPC-C [63]) with a faultload. The 
faultload defines the types of faults that are used with the workload to derive dependability 
measures for the system.  
Fault injection also involves the definition of a faultload and can be used for several purposes, 
for example to: 
 Assess the fault coverage of implemented (either software or hardware) fault-handling 
mechanisms. 
 Assess the error propagation and error latency of a system. 
 Assess the response time of system recovery following a failure. 
 Assess and verify failure mode assumptions of systems, sub-systems and components. 
                                                     
8 Coverity found an average of 0.434 bugs per 1,000 lines of code in 17.5 million lines of C code from 
open source projects 
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The representativeness of both the workload and especially the faultload remains a key issue 
for both dependability benchmarking and fault injection as well as robustness testing, i.e. how 
well the faultload and workload represents the typical use of the target system (also referred 
to as “operational profile” [65] in reliability growth modelling). The definition and 
representativeness of the faultload is considered the most difficult part with these techniques. 
3.2.7 Modelling and model-based assessment 
[66] defines a model as “an abstraction of a system that highlights the important features of 
the system organisation and provides ways of quantifying its properties neglecting all those 
details that are relevant for the actual implementation, but that are marginal for the objective 
of the study.” Various modelling approaches to system dependability exist (non-state-space 
models such as reliability block diagrams, fault trees and reliability graphs; and state-space 
models such as homogeneous continuous time Markov chains) and the choice of a model for 
given system and a given context depends on many factors, such as the complexity of the 
system, the dependability attributes to be evaluated, the accuracy required, as well as the 
resources available for the study.  
As stated in [62] “the modelling and analysis of complex (large, dynamic, heterogeneous, 
ubiquitous) systems still needs continued research, both in model construction and in model 
solution. A crucial point in this context is also to assess the approximations introduced in the 
modelling and solution process to manage the system complexity, as well as their impact on 
the final results.” 
Regarding the largeness, dynamicity, heterogeneity and ubiquity that we have discussed in 
section 2 [62] states: “The role of modelling in a more comprehensive assessment process is, 
on the contrary, not well addressed in the literature. The largeness, dynamicity, heterogeneity 
and ubiquity of current computing systems actually calls for the development of a composite 
and trustable assessment framework including complementary evaluation techniques, 
covering modelling and experimental measurements. Mechanisms are needed to ensure the 
cooperation and the integration of these techniques, in order to provide realistic assessments 
of architectural solutions and of systems in their operational environments”. 
A thorough overview of modelling approaches, strategies for building them as well as tools 
supporting model-based assessment is given in [62]. 
3.2.7.1 Reliability and availability evaluation and modelling 
There is a wide variety of techniques for modelling the reliability and availability of systems. 
Guidance and lists can be found in IEC standards, NATO reports and elsewhere (see also 
Appendix B of this report). The handbook of Software Reliability Engineering [67] gives a 
comprehensive guide. 
The reliability of the system or product (both during its development and use) can be 
evaluated using various reliability modelling techniques, such as: 
 Reliability growth modelling – modelling the reliability of the system dynamically 
during the system development or use where faults are being fixed/removed from the 
system, hence the trend is usually that reliability will grow in the long term (but not 
always in the short term as a “fix” may introduce a new potentially more harmful bug in 
the system leading to reliability decay).  
 Statistical testing - which involves the creation of a test harness to perform the testing; 
an ‘oracle’ against which the results obtained from the system under test are compared; 
and an accurate definition of the ‘operation profile’, i.e. the profile under which the 
system is expected to be used. 
 Evaluation of field experience – using field data (tracking and recording faults and 
incidents in a product or system) to gain insights into the reliability of the product.  
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Difficulties with getting accurate measures stem from the difficulty in measuring the 
operational profile of the products in their given installation (however, some companies 
may offer incentives to users (such as cheaper products) if they are willing to allow the 
vending company to collect detailed data about the product usage, which can improve 
the quality of the data collected).   
 Reliability block diagrams – modelling, in a diagrammatic form, the chain of events 
that are necessary for the successful operation of a system. 
Reliability growth modelling is the most useful of the techniques listed above when arguing 
about software reliability as it allows an organisation to monitor and argue about the 
reliability of the system as it is being developed (or, if it is in operation, as it is used). 
Statistical testing is also a very useful technique to estimate the reliability before a system or 
component is deployed in operation (but the operational profile is crucial to the accuracy of 
the results obtained from statistical testing). A plethora of Reliability models exists (some 
better than others) and there are techniques (developed at CSR, City University [68]) which 
can help with recalibrating the results of the reliability growth models. 
The issue is how and whether these can be deployed in the security area. There is some 
research reported in the literature of trying to apply these to security vulnerabilities. Research 
challenges are in the following areas: 
 The conceptual aspects: definitions of vulnerability/defect; consideration of time and 
effort or other surrogate measures, consideration of appropriate measures and the need 
to partition the threat or risk space and then combine into an overall measure.  
 The applicability and scope of different models and how they might be developed to be 
applied to security vulnerabilities. 
 The problems of data and application of the models.  
There is some recent work reported in [69-71], [72], [73]. 
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4 Part 3: A Future Resilience Evaluation Framework  
In this section we first summarise the scope and design of the proposed security framework 
and then group the problems and research challenges based on the themes of: 
confidence/trust, diversity and heterogeneity, complexity and emergence, structure, resilience, 
adaptation and tempo, communication and markets. 
4.1 Introduction 
The challenges of current and future systems and the anticipated threats that they face leads us 
to propose an ambitious shift in perspective to a framework that attempts risk based, market 
sensitive, psychologically aware, evidence based approach to evaluation and communication 
of security as part of an overall resilience case. The approach must be capable of addressing 
the scale and complexity of adaptive systems of systems (p-e-s-t-systems) that have 
heterogeneous human and technical components and are deployed across a variety of 
organisational, political and legal boundaries. The framework should address the scale and 
tempo imposed by threats, operations and system evolution. 
4.2 Resilience and security cases 
We propose that resilience and security cases should form the overarching approach within 
which we would address: resilience requirements, claims decomposition, arguments, 
scalability and tempo. The argumentation will be about a service or system in a particular 
environment and should adopt a claim-argument-evidence assurance approach. 
The claims should be based on a coherent a set of underlying models and theories. These 
models would give meaning to and support the evaluation; these will be disparate, multi-
formalism models. We need to understand their interrelationships, the required abstractions 
and levels of fidelity. They will also include models of the system environment particularly 
economic and threat model - this is discussed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
A resilience case would be a structured argument based on assumptions and evidence, which 
supports a claim that a system meets its specified resilience requirements at a particular level 
of confidence.  We propose that a flexible assurance approach should be adopted based on 
strategies that justify claims of behaviour, the absence or adequate mitigation of 
vulnerabilities and sufficient compliance with standards. This should build on current 
research emerging in safety cases, especially from the nuclear industry.  
As noted above, the concept of safety cases has existed as a core requirement of safety 
standards for several years. Consolidation and applications of “cases” to security are still in 
their infancy and there are even research challenges to apply them to present systems and 
even more so to the systems envisaged in this report. Some of these research challenges are: 
 Claim definition and decomposition. The first problem faced by someone building a 
dependability case is to decide exactly what is to be claimed, and the detail of how such 
claims should be expressed. There is a need to develop a core claims language for 
expressing dependability, security and resilience claims and a method for structuring 
the assurance case. Mechanisms are need in the claims language to support scalability 
and modularity of viewpoints and security policies. Claims need to address both 
technical and non-technical attributes of the system. 
 Resilience and security policies. The evaluation will also require developments in 
dynamic, adaptive security and resilience policies that can form the basis of the top-
level claims about the system. 
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 Cascade failures. There is a need to extend claims to complex systems properties and 
be able to express claims about cascade, common mode failures and interdependencies 
and define and evaluate credible supporting technical arguments usable for SoSs. 
 Confidence. There is inherent uncertainty that needs to be handled in resilience cases: 
we cannot claim that dependability claims are true with certainty. Such uncertainty 
arises from many sources: doubts about assumptions upon which a dependability case 
will be founded (e.g. correctness of an oracle for a case based upon testing); strength of 
evidence (e.g. number of test cases, and number of these that are correct) etc. Central to 
this is the uncertainty of "knowledge about the world". Typically this involves an 
inevitable subjectivity and is harder to handle than "natural" uncertainty or randomness 
(such as that involved, for example, in a dependability claim itself). There is a need for 
a formal, rigorous (claim, confidence) calculus that supports quantitative and qualitative 
dependability arguments and supports the description and propagation of confidence in 
claims. 
 Robust and diverse arguments. Similar to the concept of design diversity for fault 
tolerance, diverse arguments [74] are an approach to gain confidence in dependability 
claims by using multiple diverse ‘legs’ to reason about the dependability of a system 
(e.g. formal verification and testing). Further research is needed on the applicability of 
these tools and the complex dependencies that will exist between the uncertainties in 
the argument legs: for example, a dependability claim supported by two arguments legs, 
each of which singly incurs 10% doubt in the truth of the claim, does not directly 
translate into a 99% confidence from the two legged argument. The applicability of 
diverse arguments to complex systems of the future needs to be further investigated. 
 Dynamic cases. Current approaches to cases are static, can take a long time to develop 
and could not cope with the tempo envisaged. Research is needed to how this will 
impact the cases approach, the drivers for more automated reasoning and the balance 
between the analyst and the advisory systems. As stated in [7], the assessment should 
most probably move from off-line and pre-deployment, to continuous and automated 
operational assessment. The assessment should include validation and verification 
approaches as well as quantitative and probabilistic approaches. This is related to 
benchmarking and obtaining good metrics which are discussed in the next two 
subsections. 
 Scalable cases. While there are examples of safety cases for very large systems it 
remains a challenge to develop convincing rigorous cases with a surrounding process of 
challenge and evaluation of complex systems. Progress is required in the models used 
to support the evaluation and in methods of composition of system cases into a SoS 
case.  
 Communicable cases. Security should be evaluated in user or stakeholder terms and this 
could be either with respect to some expected service (e.g. a service is available but 
respects confidentiality of assets) or with respect to the integrity and confidentiality of 
assets. The framework will operate with different level of security attached to different 
parts of it: the reasoning of one part to another needs to be sufficiently exposed to be 
communicated and used but so that security itself is not compromised. This will require 
advances in security policies for cases themselves. 
 Standards. The framework should recognise the importance and limitations of 
standards. It should build on existing standards and frameworks that cover the conduct 
of evaluations and the gathering and trustworthiness of evidence. 
 Information and meta-data will be important assets to be addressed by an assurance 
case and sources of threats and vulnerabilities.  
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Explicit in the idea of resilience is the need to allow security to be evaluated and 
communicated for the following phases of the resilience lifecycle: 
 Pre-event 
 Gestation 
 Initiation 
 Detection 
 Recovery 
 Learning and adaptation 
There need to be appropriate measures and methods for describing the risk requirements 
during these phases. There is a need to understand how to formulate the security and 
resilience requirements and how they might change with threat levels (societal state), and how 
to address the multiple tradeoffs (e.g. between attributes, between phases of the resilience 
curve) and uncertainties. 
The framework must provide timely and valid judgements to inform decision makers in terms 
of confidence in security claims. Timeliness is especially important in the recovery phase (for 
example, in the power grid scenario presented in Appendix A of this report, uncertainties 
about responsibilities within the organisation caused confusion and delays in the recovery 
phase following the breach).  
Risk communication should allow informed discussion of security requirements between the 
myriad of stakeholders and the trade offs between different aspects of the resilience curve in 
both evaluation and design activities. We envisage a need for pubic debate, as there has been 
for tolerability of safety risks, to determine and articulate acceptability of risks from the 
emerging p-e-s-t systems. There may be a role for concepts such as ALARP (i.e. risk has been 
reduced to “As Low As Reasonably Practicable) to be applied to resilience (for instance 
ARARP - As Resilient As Reasonably Practicable). 
The design and deployment of such a framework should be aware of how economics of 
security can be made to support the approach, and how markets may inhibit it. There is a need 
to understand how markets do/don’t deliver resilience (e.g. how they might optimise the 
ability to defend against mild attacks), how the common good might be served by maintaining 
more resources for recovery but is not optimal for a single organisation, and how insurance 
might help or hinder resilience. This should feed into both the design of the evaluation 
scheme itself and into analyses that should support regulatory or resilience policies. 
4.3 System and environment models and theories 
A coherent set of underlying models and theories is needed to add meaning to and support the 
evaluation: these will be disparate, multi-formalism models. Security is a property of the 
wider socio-technical system and the supporting modelling will need to take into account: 
 The boundaryless and fluid nature of the socio-technical systems. 
 That while a services-based view provides a good abstraction for describing 
requirements, faults and vulnerabilities break that abstraction. 
 The need to address a variety of interfaces – technical, organisational, contractual, 
political, legal – and provide convincing stopping rules that somehow limit the analysis 
yet recognises the scale of the system. 
 The heterogeneous nature of the socio-technical systems (systems of systems, nano, 
bio, human systems, different organisations, legal systems, provenance). 
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 The inevitable epistemic and aleatory uncertainties in structure and behaviour. The need 
to cope with an uncertain supply chain of uncertain provenance. 
These are challenging and hard requirements to satisfy for systems of today. The evaluation 
approach has implications for architectures and middleware and for design for assurance 
(which is outside the scope of the present discussion). 
4.3.1 Models for evaluation - complexity and fidelity 
Applying model-based dependability and security evaluation to increasingly complex systems 
will lead to proportionally complex and large models. Model complexity is a general term 
which indicates that the model construction process and/or the model solution process are 
"difficult" to perform [7]. These difficulties come from the characteristics of a system, such as 
heterogeneity and largeness, which result in problems like state-space explosion, stiffness for 
the analytical model solution, rare event problem for simulation and intrusiveness of the 
monitoring system for the experimental evaluation methods. Hence continued research is 
needed in methods for both model construction and model validation. The models need to be 
able to assess the impact of accidental as well as deliberate threats to a system. 
The strategy for handling the scale of the systems envisaged is quite straightforward: 
1. Build larger models and run them for longer, enabled by advances in processing and 
software engineering 
2. Use abstraction to capture the essential properties 
3. Use composition and federation to combine models together 
4. Use real-time data for calibration and validation 
All parts of this strategy face challenges for the multi-domain, multi-attribute nature of the 
models. The response to scale and uncertainty in boundaries and structure can not just be to 
build bigger models but needs research to address how stopping rules and the factoring of  the 
problem can be determined and justified. 
The evaluation of resilience should be supported by a range of disparate models. The next few 
sub-sections discuss some of these modelling issues. 
4.3.1.1 Selecting the most appropriate model and fidelity level for a given assessment task 
Dealing with very large scale SoSs would make “observability” of the entire system 
problematic for any assessor. Simplified models of the system (e.g. in the form "my part of 
the system is modelled in detail, the rest of the system as a monolithic whole") are likely to be 
used. We already touched on the problems of dependence between the sub-systems earlier 
and the model complexity. Additionally, when several simplified models are applicable, 
selecting the best one is not easy. E.g. in software reliability growth modelling (see section 
3.2.7.1 for a summary) it is known [68] that the best predictive model is impossible to know 
with certainty in advance: which of the available models is best (i.e. which one will give the 
most accurate predictions of the system’s reliability) depends on the model itself and on the 
data to which the prediction is applied. Objectively assessing the model’s predictive quality in 
the context of large systems operating in a changing environment is a particularly important 
and hard problem to solve.  
There is a need to address a variety of interfaces – technical, organisational, human, 
contractual, political, legal – and provide convincing stopping rules that somehow limits the 
analysis yet recognises the scale of the system.  
4.3.1.2 Modelling adaptation 
Human behaviour is an inherent part of socio-technical systems. We need to develop 
approaches that allow us to factor what is the socio-technical part form the purely socio and 
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so bound and limit the analyses required.  We need to understand the myriad of psychological 
aspects of human adaptive behaviour. The malicious aspects of this are addressed in the threat 
modelling, the macro-behaviour in terms of economics and markets but we also need to 
address the user or stakeholder adaptation to systems. 
As we mentioned before, there is a growing awareness that (almost) all systems are socio-
technical in nature. The role of humans in the overall dependability and security of systems 
needs much more sophisticated modelling than it has received so far, especially in the area of 
confidence in claims that are made (see Resilience and security cases section 4.2 above). 
Early results [75] suggest that there may be interesting aspects of diversity between humans 
and "computers" – e.g. they may differ usefully in what they find "difficult" in certain 
problems. 
4.3.1.3 Inter-organisation boundary models 
Many failures, especially for complex socio-technical systems are caused by inappropriate 
responses to communications across the boundaries between organisations (or between 
different departments within an organisation). Messages may be misunderstood and cause 
behaviours (through either action or inaction) that may be correct in the view of the recipient 
of the message but different from that which the message was meant to elicit.  
Some of these failures fall in the category of "responsibility failures" (the term was coined in 
the  U.K. DIRC project [76], of which CSR, City University was a partner). Responsibility 
failures are bound to get even more prevalent in the complex systems of the future where 
boundaries between the systems may be very blurred. Hence it remains a research challenge 
to study responsibility modelling for the future systems with the aim of reducing 
responsibility failures. 
Inter-organisational models and theories are needed to assess recovery in multi-stakeholder, 
multi-jurisprudence situations. 
4.3.1.4 Interdependencies and cascade failures 
The resilience case should be able to express claims about cascade, common mode failures 
and interdependencies and define and evaluate credible supporting technical arguments usable 
for SoSs. There is a need for supporting theories and models that address: 
 the nature, mitigation and recovery from cascade failures and interdependencies and 
how “coincidence” and large variations can occur (c.f.  the debate from Mandelbrot and 
others on markets and “fat tailed” distributions9) 
 the balance between the key role that redundancy and diversity has in achieving 
resilience and the side effect of introducing unwanted vulnerabilities through 
interdependencies between systems and components 
4.3.1.5 Interaction of markets, policy and security evaluation 
Any evaluation framework that is deployed will have an impact on, and can exploit the 
interaction of markets, policy and individual behaviour. This needs to be understood to 
prevent unintended side effects of the policy and to identify effective methods for deployment 
(see section 4.2 for some details of what is required.) 
The interactions could be:  
 Impact on individual behaviours (intersection of psychology and security). 
 Market behaviour (aggregated impact of the risk communication).  
                                                     
9 Not to be confused with markets and fat cats ☺ 
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 Implications for distribution of trust and security within a population for different 
scenarios (e.g. is there an analogy between wealth and trust distribution in a population? 
Can we adapt these economic models to trust and confidence?). 
4.3.1.6 Threat models 
The evaluation will only be valid with respect to certain threat models. The so called Design 
Basis Threats (DBT) should address: 
 long term, informed, capable and patient adversaries throughout the supply chain. 
 co-ordinated attacks and simultaneous attacks that may be spontaneous, opportunistic 
and loosely coupled through ideology. 
 multiple events; recognising that events are not necessarily independent and beware of 
“fat tails” i.e. ignoring low frequency large events as judge erroneously improbable. 
 the importance of non-physical assets and associated attacks, e.g. on confidence, 
situational awareness etc. 
 the continuing role of insiders. 
The threat model is closely related to the assurance strategy. For example an assurance 
strategy might make pessimistic assumptions that allow a relatively coarse threat model to be 
used. It may also argue levels of protection that are not dependent on any particular threat but 
rely on detection and recovery. 
The threat models need to be consistent with and interwork with other environment models 
that are part of an all hazards approach. For example the credible environment challenges and 
resulting degraded modes and stresses on the system will impact the threats and attacker 
behaviour. 
4.3.2 Defining the evidence base and obtaining good metrics  
It is not that we are short of security metrics ([77] has some 900) but we are short of those 
that allow us to measure and predict operational measures of risk with a known confidence 
that the stakeholder can use to make informed decisions. Obtaining good metrics which 
would allow for a more dynamic real time view and assessment of security and dependability 
of the emerging and future systems or SoSs remains a challenge. Examples of the type of 
metrics which would be useful include: the lag between the release of a patch and its 
installation; the lag between new viruses and matching detection capabilities etc.  
Automatic tools for data collection would help with providing high quality data which would 
allow for more dynamic online assessment of the dependability or security of a running 
component or sub-system. A difficulty will be to detect and collect “non-self-evident” (i.e. 
non-crash) failures. Recent work we have done with SQL database servers [78] suggest that a 
large proportion of known bugs of these servers cause non-self-evident failures (more than 
50% for most servers in our study). For these types of failures our study showed that design 
diversity (using more than one diverse database server) or data diversity (sending 
syntactically diverse but semantically equivalent requests to the servers) has very good 
potential for improving fault tolerance (both failure detection and diagnosis of the failed 
component). 
Obtaining good quality data may also support the development of efficient early warning 
intrusion detection systems, which will help the administrators to react efficiently to attacks. 
4.4 Evaluation of the approach 
The framework should have properties, such as:  
 It should be justified and validated (unlike many current standards). 
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 It should be repeatable and trustworthy but recognising the importance of human 
judgements. 
 It should be adapted as threats adapt to how the evaluation works. 
 It should be applicable in a graduated manner. 
In fact the assurance case approach can be applied reflectively to justify the framework itself. 
4.4.1.1 Experimentation and benchmarking 
Measurement and benchmarking of dependability and security of computer systems for their 
comparative evaluation is also an important research area. Performance benchmarks, such as 
TPC-C [63] benchmark for transactional database systems, are well established. Definition of 
dependability and security benchmarks on the other hand is still in its infancy (some initial 
work on dependability benchmarking is reported in [64]) and more research will be required 
to establish: to what extent are dependability and security benchmarks of SoS usable and what 
are their limitations; what are the limitations on applying them to large scale systems of the 
future. CSR, City University is a partner in a EU-funded Assessment Measurement and 
Benchmarking of Resilience (AMBER) [10]  project which, amongst other aims, is 
researching the issues of benchmarking. 
Work is required on the interaction between field experience, experimental evaluation, 
synthetic environments and simulation. It is closely related to the need for model validation 
and justification for the compositions that will be required to justify SoS. 
4.5 Issues not addressed 
There are two important issues that we have not addressed and their implications for the 
framework should be considered further. They are: extreme scenarios and quantum 
computing. 
4.5.1 Extreme Scenarios 
We have not analysed in this report extreme scenarios where we see anti-technology refusenik 
cultures, disenchantment with a technology (e.g. as a result of successful attack of key 
systems, their oppressive use by the state, breakdown of complex systems such as financial 
markets), or scenarios of extreme state control. We propose that the impact of these on the 
design and implementation of the framework should be assessed and the role such a 
framework may have in preventing or mitigating such scenarios should be considered. 
4.5.2 Quantum computing  
As noted above we have not tested the robustness of the work to developments in quantum 
computing. The possible impact of quantum computing should be assessed in terms of the 
new threats it might pose, the disruption to design bases assumptions, the new forms of 
evidence and argument that might be used in assurance and the new forms of attack from 
credible claims of an adversary in having such a capability. 
4.6 A thematic view 
4.6.1 Problems/challenges per INDEED theme 
The table below groups the problems and research challenges based on an adapted set of main 
themes from the UK EPSRC-funded DIRC and INDEED projects, discussed previously. The 
themes are: confidence/trust, diversity and heterogeneity, complexity and emergence, 
structure, resilience, adaptation and tempo, communication, markets and longer term 
adaptations. 
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Table 2 – A thematic view of research problems and challenges 
Themes Problems / Challenges (section 
number where discussed in more 
detail in this document) 
Research directions and potential 
solutions  
Confidence / 
Trust 
 Difficulties with defining nature 
of claims to be made. 
 Difficulties with expressing 
uncertainty in the values of the 
dependability and security 
attributes. 
 Difficulties with handling the 
dependence between the sub-
system dependability and 
security values. 
 Difficulties with handling the 
dependence between various 
dependability and security 
attribute values. 
 Difficulties with decomposing 
claims of dependability, i.e. 
what is to be claimed, and the 
detail of how such claims 
should be expressed (4.2). 
 Difficulties with expressing 
confidence in the claims that are 
made for dependability or 
security of a system or SoS 
(4.2). 
 Difficulties with establishing 
system or sub-system 
provenance, especially when 
SoSs are build with COTS 
components (Appendix C).  
 Difficulties with ensuring 
effective communication 
between the myriad of 
stakeholders and of risks and 
the trade offs between different 
aspects of resilience curve in 
evaluation and design (see 
section 4.2). 
 Difficulties with ensuring 
timeliness properties in risk and 
responsibility communications 
in the recovery phase (for 
example, in the power grid 
scenario (depicted in Appendix 
A of this report), uncertainties 
about responsibilities within the 
 See resilience theme below. 
 Assurance case approach to 
assessing dependability and 
security. As discussed in 
section 4.2, claim-argument-
evidence assurance 
approach should be adopted 
based on strategies that 
justify claims of behaviour, 
the absence or adequate 
mitigation of vulnerabilities 
and sufficient compliance 
with standards. This should 
build on current research 
emerging in safety cases, 
especially from the nuclear 
industry.  
 Probabilistic approach to 
allow assessors to express 
their doubts in the values of 
the dependability and 
security attributes and hence 
provide a mechanism for 
quantifying the uncertainty 
in the values of the 
dependability and security 
attributes. Some solutions 
which can be used with 
smaller systems are 
presented in Appendix C. 
But further research is 
required for their 
applicability to larger 
systems. 
 The approaches and models 
of the previous bullet points 
will clearly depend on the 
quality of the data and the 
metrics that are collected. 
Hence there is a need for 
good data to be obtained to 
allow for more objective 
evidence-driven assessment 
(see discussion in section 
4.3.2). 
 The elements of the 
framework defined in 
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organisation caused confusion 
and delays in the recovery 
phase following the breach). 
section 4.2 should provide 
for both the communication 
and evaluation of risk:  
♦ Security cases by their 
nature provide a boundary 
object between 
stakeholders and promote 
communication 
♦ These will be augmented 
with synthetic 
environments (via 
improvements in 
simulation, reasoning and 
information visualisation) 
to provide the tempo 
required. 
 
Diversity and 
heterogeneity 
 Difficulties with handling the 
dependence between the sub-
system dependability and 
security values, unless strong 
independence assumptions for 
coincident failures of dependent 
components or sub-systems are 
made. 
 Difficulty with dealing with 
heterogeneous SoSs made up of 
different constituent 
components of different levels 
of provenance (see section 
2.2.4). 
 Need to assess the balance 
between the key role that 
redundancy and diversity has in 
achieving resilience and the 
side effect of introducing 
unwanted vulnerabilities 
through interdependencies 
between systems and 
components 
 
 Various models for 
modelling diversity have 
been proposed (with CSR, 
City University being a 
leading contributor). A 
review of these approaches 
can be found in [79]. 
 The evaluation framework 
will need to deal with issues 
of heterogeneity as stated in 
section 4.3. 
Complexity 
and Emergent 
properties  
 Difficulties with assessing 
complex inter-connected and 
inter-dependent systems (3.2.3, 
3.2.4). As mentioned under the 
Trust / Confidence heading, the 
assessment of the various 
security and reliability attributes 
cannot be done in isolation for 
 Studying models and 
approaches developed for 
natural complex system in 
Biology and Physical 
sciences might help to gain 
a better understanding of 
complex ICT systems and 
the emergent behaviour that 
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each constituent component of 
the systems or SoS. 
 Difficulties with establishing 
system boundaries due to the 
complexity of the future 
systems and the large inter-
dependence and 
interconnectedness of the 
components, i.e. where does 
one system end and another one 
begin (section 3.2.4). This 
makes security and 
dependability assessment of a 
SoS very difficult as 
assumptions may need to be 
made about the systems 
boundaries which may not hold 
in practice hence leading to 
wrong conclusions being drawn 
from the assessment. 
is derived from this 
complexity. Some work has 
been done in this area and 
there is a need to challenge 
this to see whether one can 
move from a useful 
metaphor to applicable 
results. This will also help 
the assessor chose the right 
level of complexity of a 
given model to assess the 
dependability and security 
of these systems (also 
discussed in section 4.3.1.1). 
 One part of this work might 
be to expand the work done 
on the structure of COTS 
outlined in [51] which we 
summarised in section 3.2.3. 
 
Structure  Similar to the issues discussed 
under complexity above, the 
structure and organisation of 
SoSs of the future are highly 
likely to become a major cause 
for concern for the developers 
and assessors alike (see also 
section 2.2). 
 There are difficulties stemming 
from the lack of clear 
definitions of sub-system 
boundaries in a complex SoS 
(2.2.3).  
 The need to address a variety of 
interfaces – technical, 
organisational, contractual, 
political, legal – and provide 
convincing stopping rules that 
somehow limits the analysis yet 
recognises the scale of the 
system (4.3.1.1). 
 Difficulties stemming from the 
increased pervasiveness and 
ubiquity of future SoSs (see 
section 2.2.1).   
 Difficulties with establishing 
what the roles of human 
operators and users of the 
complex ICT system systems 
 As we discussed in section 
3.2.2 the assessment of 
future SoS will need to be 
interdisciplinary, bringing 
in research from computer 
science, statistics, 
psychology, sociology and 
ethnography amongst others 
to assess the multi-faceted 
nature of these emerging 
systems. 
 Develop stopping rules to 
prevent cases escalating to 
become the assurance of 
everything (4.3.1.1). 
 Inter-organisational failures 
and modelling the roles of 
humans in the future 
systems will require 
responsibility modelling to 
be incorporated in the 
interdisciplinary approach 
(see sections 4.3.1.2 and 
4.3.1.3).  
 Extend complex systems 
approaches to investigate 
how to deal with uncertainty 
in structure (section 4.2 
(scalable cases part) and 
section 4.3). 
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are (4.3.1.2). 
 New challenges for both 
dependability and security 
assessment may be posed from 
the growing use of 
virtualisation to organise the 
computing resources of ICT 
SoSs (see section 2.2.2) as well 
as nanotechnology and 
biotechnology (see section 
2.2.4) 
 Investigate scalable 
approaches to composing 
non-functional properties of 
systems and dealing with 
lack of independence. 
Related to calculus of 
confidence (see section 4.2 
(confidence part) for a 
discussion). 
Resilience  Difficulty with definition of top 
level claims and sub-claims to 
be made for a system (section 
4.2 Claim definition and 
decomposition part). 
 Difficulty with considering “all 
hazards” in system assessment 
that addresses both malicious 
and accidental attacks on 
systems (see section 3.1.1). 
 Security evaluation should 
be part of a holistic 
assessment of resilience 
addressing type I and type II 
resilience (see section 
3.1.1). 
Adaptation and 
tempo 
 Difficulties with assessing 
systems in changing 
environments, i.e. as systems 
evolve due to patches, upgrades 
and new releases as well as 
change in the operational use of 
the system (see section 2.2.2).  
 Difficulties with selecting the 
most appropriate model for 
assessing a given dependability 
or security attribute at runtime 
(see section 4.3.1.1) 
 As stated in section 4.2: The 
framework should address 
the scale and tempo required 
of both events and 
operations and system 
evolution. There will be a 
need for: 
♦ Approaches that can 
compose security of 
components or mitigate 
the impact of components 
or subsystems via 
wrappers or middleware. 
♦ Approaches that can 
quickly deploy strategies 
e.g. worst case 
assumptions or some 
bounding assumptions 
♦ Dynamic, real-time, 
assurance cases that 
provide decision-making 
support, or even 
autonomy, for parts of 
living or dynamic cases. 
This will require an 
understanding of 
human/computer trade 
offs in decision making 
and defined delegation 
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policies. 
 Related to the last bullet 
point above, online 
assessment is one way of 
getting accurate and up to 
date measures of 
dependability and security 
(see section 4.3.2 for more 
details). At CSR, City 
University we are involved 
in an EU funded project 
ReSIST [7], as part of which 
we will develop an online 
assessment engine for 
reliability of a small 
application. It remains 
research challenge to study 
how well online assessment 
scales in larger systems and 
SoSs.  
Markets and 
longer term 
adaptations 
 Difficulties with assessing 
security failures which may be 
caused by bad incentives (see 
section 3.2.1 on Economics of 
security). 
 Difficulties with assessing 
issues which lie at the cross 
roads of psychology, economics 
and security (such as deception, 
inappropriate obedience, 
security usability etc., see 
section 3.2.1 for more details). 
 The design and deployment 
of framework should be 
aware of how economics of 
security can be made to 
support the approach, and 
how markets may inhibit it. 
There is a need to 
understand how markets 
do/don’t deliver resilience 
e.g. how markets might 
optimise ability to defend 
against mild attacks; how 
the common good might be 
served by maintaining more 
resources for recovery but is 
not optimal for a single 
organisation and how 
insurance might help or 
hinder resilience (see 
section 4.3.1.5). 
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5 Summary and further work 
This report described the research we have conducted on identifying the technological 
advancements envisaged in the period 2007-2027, the research challenges that will be faced 
for the assessment of dependability and security of these complex systems and systems of 
systems (SoSs), and the assessment framework envisaged for these systems.  
The research challenges, from the context we and others envisage, were summarised as: 
 Critical societal role – The technological advancements predicted in the reviewed 
literature show that an unprecedented reliance on technology may be created.  
 There is likely to be unprecedented increase in scale and complexity coming from the 
ubiquity and pervasiveness of systems that are driven by adaptation and evolution, 
ambition and requirements, the blurring of boundaries and the increased tempo of 
threats and operations. 
 Concerns regarding privacy are likely to increase due to the widespread data sharing 
and communication that will be required to make the new systems function. Various 
privacy infringements are possible such as identity theft, data laundering, disclosure of 
personal data, surveillance, risks from personalised profiling etc. 
 The new technological advancements, especially those on ICT systems will require 
substantial level of trust to be placed on the new systems. Hence there will be increased 
pressure on building trustworthy systems and SoSs. 
 The future socio-technical ICT systems, are likely to be complex inter-connected and 
inter-dependent systems in a much greater scale than they are now, increasing the 
difficulty in performing holistic assessment of the various security and reliability 
attributes of complex SoSs and their constituent parts.  
 There is likely to be an increased difficulty in building complex SoSs due to problems 
with interoperability of the constituent systems and components (e.g. inconsistencies in 
the interfaces of the different systems of an SoS; inconsistencies in the timescales 
(timebands) in which the different systems interact etc.). 
 The future systems are expected to become increasingly socio-technical in nature, 
hence the role of the human users and operators within the system, and their fallibilities 
also need to be considered in the overall assessment of the system.   
 The complexity of the future systems and the large inter-dependence and 
interconnectedness of the components will make it very difficult to define what the 
boundaries of a system or a SoS are, i.e. where does one system end and another one 
begin. 
 The future systems will deal with radically increased volume of information due to 
advance in sensor and networks technologies. There will also be greater pressure on 
both systems and human decision makers to deal with information in shorter response 
times.  
 The predicted pace of new technological innovations is likely to render existing 
technologies obsolescent more quickly than at present and also lead to heterogeneous 
systems composed on many generations of technology. 
 There will be increasing tempo to operations and systems with dynamic and ad hoc 
coalitions being formed. Reconciling timing issues as systems and organisations are 
brought together to form larger SoSs also becomes an issue.  
The challenges posed by current and future systems and threats lead us to propose an 
ambitious shift in perspective to an evaluation framework that attempts risk based, market 
Summary and further work  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 42  
sensitive, psychologically aware, evidence based approach to the assessment and 
communication of security (and dependability, resilience).  The approach must be capable of 
addressing the scale and complexity of adaptive systems of systems (p-e-s-t systems) that 
have heterogeneous human and technical components and are deployed across a variety of 
organisational, political and legal boundaries.  
The proposed framework would be composed of: 
 Evaluation and communication of risk-based resilience. 
 The definition of the evaluation target and the assumed threat model. 
 A claim-argument-evidence assurance case approach. 
 Methods for addressing scale and tempo required of both events and operations and 
system evolution. 
We then elaborated some of the research directions along these themes into two inter-related 
broad areas: 
 Resilience and security cases as an overarching approach within which we address: 
resilience models, claims decomposition, arguments, scalability and tempo. The 
argumentation will be about a service or system in an environment. To give meaning to 
the claims and to understand them they should be based on a coherent set of underlying 
models. 
 Models for giving meaning to and supporting the evaluation. These will be disparate, 
multi-formalism models. We need to understand the interrelationships, the required 
abstractions and levels of fidelity. They will include models of the system environment 
and particular economic and threat models. 
We also point out that an evaluation framework is not a neutral, technical object. It will have 
an impact on society and as with any risk based approach there will be those that benefit and 
those that suffer the costs of the framework. There may be unintended side effects and the 
market may operate to deliver certain levels of resilience but not necessarily the required level 
of resilience required for society critical systems (and occasionally the market may even 
hinder / prevent the delivery of security/resilience). The need for supporting policy and 
regulation should be born in mind and the research on the evaluation framework should feed 
into and enable research underpinning any emerging political initiatives. For example, on the 
tradeoffs between and conflicts of interest that may arise between the government, society 
and individuals, such as issues regarding intellectual property rights and privacy, human 
rights issues, individual liberty etc.   
There are number areas to be considered for extending the analysis in this report:  
 Consideration of extreme scenarios where we see anti-technology refusenik cultures, 
disenchantment with a technology (e.g. as a result of successful attack of key systems, 
their oppressive use by the state, breakdown of complex systems such as financial 
markets), or scenarios of extreme state control. 
 The impacts of quantum computing should be assessed in terms of the new threats it 
might pose, the disruption to design bases assumptions, the new forms of evidence and 
argument that might be used in assurance and the new forms of attack from credible 
claims of an adversary in having such a capability. 
 More detailed analysis on the assessment issues that arise from potentially conflicting 
expectations of the different stakeholders (e.g. curtailment of some individual privacy 
for the wider good of the society). 
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 Periodic revisions of this document to update the research questions that may have been 
solved and addition of new ones, especially in the light of new reports and roadmaps 
(e.g. the upcoming NATO NEC Security Research Strategy report [80]). 
Overall further work is envisaged to address and prioritise the research challenges 
summarised in this report and develop the evaluation framework presented in Part 3 of this 
report. This remains to be discussed further with DSTL and other interested stakeholders. 
 
Acknowledgements   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 44  
6 Acknowledgements 
This work has been sponsored by the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
(DSTL) via the “EMR (Extra Mural Research) proposal SoSoS Development Methodologies 
for Secure System Evolution”. The work has also been partially supported by Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under the INterdisciplinary DEsign and 
Evaluation of Dependability (INDEED) project. We would like to thank Victoria Page, Helen 
Philips, John Yesberg and Lisa Hamilton from DSTL for useful discussions and suggestions. 
We would also like to thank Dan Craigen and Ann Miller for allowing us to use the scenarios 
developed as part of the NATO Research Task Group RTG-020 on the Dual Use of High 
Assurance Technologies (IST-048/RTG-020). We would also like to Thanks Nick Chozos of 
Adelard for reviewing an earlier version of this report. And finally we would like to thank our 
colleagues at CSR for discussions and useful suggestions on improving the report and 
especially Professor Bev Littlewood who reviewed an earlier version of this report.    
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 45  
7 References 
1. House-of-Commons-Committee-of-Public-Accounts, "Department of Health: The 
National Programme for IT in the NHS",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/390/390.pdf. 
2. AMSD, "A Dependability Roadmap for the Information Society in Europe: Part 1 - 
An Insight into the Future", 2003  
3. Curry, A., T. Hodgson, et al., "Intelligent Infrastructure Futures The Scenarios – 
Towards 2055", UK Office of Science and Technology, 2005. 
4. Antonio, D., H. Seppo, et al., "D1.2.1 Scenario analysis", IRRIIS( Integrated Risk 
Reduction of Informationbased Infrastructure Systems), 2006. 
5. Alahuhta, P., P.D. Hert, et al., "D2: Dark scenarios in ambient intelligence: 
Highlighting risks and vulnerabilities", SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient 
Intelligence), 2006. 
6. DCDC, "Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036", 2007. 
7. ReSIST, "D13: From Resilience-Building to Resilience-Scaling Technologies: 
Directions ", 2007. 
8. US-Department-Of-Defense, "Joint Vision 2020", 2005. 
9. ReSIST, "D12: Resilience-Building Technologies: State of Knowledge ", 2006. 
10. AMBER, "AMBER - Assessing, Measuring, and Benchmarking Resilience",  2008; 
Available from: http://amber.dei.uc.pt/. 
11. MoD (2008), "Joint Service Publication 777 - Network Enabled Capability",   
12. DoD, "Global Information Grid Architectural Vision",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/docs/GIGArchVision.pdf. 
13. Littlewood, B., "The Use of Computers in Safety-Critical Applications, Final Report 
of the Study Group on the Safety of Operational Computer Systems constituted by the 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, HSE Books London",  
1998; Available from: http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/computers.pdf. 
14. Gligor, V.D., T. Haigh, et al., "Information Assurance Technology  Forecast 2005", 
IEEE Security and Privacy, 2006. 4(1): p. 62-69. 
15. European-Commission, "ICT - INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES: Work Programme 2007-08". 2007. 
16. W3C, "W3C Semantic Web Activity",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/. 
17. Bellovin, S.M., T.V. Benzel, et al., "Information Assurance Technology  Forecast 
2008", IEEE Security and Privacy, 2008. 6(1): p. 16-23. 
18. Aaviksoo, J., "Statesmen's Forum: Jaak Aaviksoo, Minister of Defense, Republic of 
Estonia ",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1440/. 
19. Wikipedia, "2007 cyberattacks on Estonia",  2008; Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberattacks_on_Estonia_2007. 
20. Bloomfield, R.E., S. Guerra, et al., "International Working Group on Assurance 
Cases (for Security)", IEEE Security & Privacy, 2006. 4(3): p. 66-68. 
21. Littlewood, B. and L. Strigini, "Redundancy and diversity in security", in ESORICS 
(European Symposium on Research in Computer Security). 2004. Sophia Antipolis, 
France: Springer. 
22. Helton, J.C. and W.L. Oberkampf, "Special Issue: Alternative representations of 
epistemic uncertainty", Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2004. 85(1-3). 
23. Littlewood, B., S. Brocklehurst, et al., "Towards operational measures of computer 
security", Journal of Computer Security, 1993. 2(3): p. 211-229. 
24. UK-Resilience, "Communicating Risk",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.ukresilience.info/publications.aspx. 
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 46  
25. "Risk Management Assessment Framework",  2008; Available from: http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/6/6/17A8166B-BCDC-D4B3-16668DC702198931.pdf. 
26. Cabinet-Office, "Information Assurance Governance Framework",  2008; Available 
from: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/ia_governance/content/~/media/assets/www.cab
inetoffice.gov.uk/csia/ia_governance_app1%20doc.ashx. 
27. Bryans, J., B. Littlewood, et al., "E-voting: Dependability Requirements and Design 
for Dependability", in Workshop on Dependability and Security in e-Government 
(DeSeGov 2006), at at First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security (ARES 2006). 2006. Vienna, Austria: IEEE Computer Society Press, p. 988-
995. 
28. Randell, B. and P. Ryan, "Voting Technologies and Trust", IEEE Security & Privacy, 
2006. 4(5): p. 50-56. 
29. EPCIP, "The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)",  
2006; Available from: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/477&format=D
OC&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
30. Hollnagel, E., D.D. Woods, and N. Leveson, eds, "Resilience engineering : concepts 
and precepts". 2006, Ashgate Pub Co. 
31. DHS-Build-Security-In, "Assurance Cases",  2008; Available from: 
https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/articles/knowledge/assurance.html. 
32. Jones, C., R. Bloomfield, et al., "Methods for assessing the safety integrity of safety-
related software of unceratin pedigree (SOUP)",  2001; Available from: 
http://www.adelard.com/web/hnav/resources/reports/hse_soup.html. 
33. Anderson, R., R. Böhme, et al., "Security Economics and the Internal Market". 2008. 
34. Anderson, R. and T. Moore, "Information Security Economics – and Beyond", 
Information Security Summit 2008, 2008. 
35. Anderson, R., "Security Engineering - : A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed 
Systems", 2nd ed. 2008, Indianapolis: John Wiley & Sons. 
36. Cranor, L., "Security Usability". 2005: O’Reilly  
37. "The Workshop on the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure"; 
Available from: http://wesii.econinfosec.org/workshop/. 
38. Nagaraja, S. and R. Anderson, "The Topology of Covert Conflict", in Workshop on 
the Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 2006. Cambridge, UK. 
39. Dynes, S., E. Andrijicic, and M.E. Johnson, "Costs to the U.S. Economy of 
Information Infrastructure Failures: Estimates from Field Studies and Economic 
Data", in Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 2006. 
Cambridge, UK. 
40. Rowe, B.R. and M.P. Gallaher, "Private Sector Cyber Security Investment: An 
Empirical Analysis ", in Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 
2006. Cambridge, UK. 
41. Liu, W., H. Tanaka, and K. Matsuura, "An Empirical Analysis of Security Investment 
in Countermeasures Based on an Enterprise Survey in Japan", in Workshop on the 
Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 2006. Cambridge, UK. 
42. Herath, H. and T. Herath, "Justifying Spam and E-mail Virus Security Investments: A 
Case Study ", in Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 2006. 
Cambridge, UK. 
43. Sutton, M. and F. Nagle, "Emerging Economic Models for Vulnerability Research ", 
in Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS). 2006. Cambridge, 
UK. 
44. Radianti, J. and J.J. Gonzalez, "Toward A Dynamic Modeling Of The Vulnerability 
Black Market", in The Workshop on the Economics of Securing the Information 
Infrastructure. 2006. 
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 47  
45. Moore, T., "The Economics of Digital Forensics", in Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security (WEIS). 2006. Cambridge, UK. 
46. Hasan, R. and W. Yurcik, "Beyond Media Hype: Empirical Analysis of Disclosed 
Privacy Breaches 2005-2006 and a DataSet/Database Foundation for Future Work", 
in The Workshop on the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure. 2006. 
47. Santos, J.R., Y.Y. Haimes, and C. Lian, "A Framework for linking oil and gas 
cybersecurity metrics to the inoperability input-output model", in Western Economics 
Association (WEA) Annual Conference. 2006. San Diego, CA, USA. 
48. Gallagher, M.A., A.W. Snodgrass, and G.J. Ehlers, "Input-Output Modeling for 
Assessing Cascading Effects", Military Operations Research Society 2005. 10(2). 
49. Bullock, S. and D. Cliff, "Complexity and Emergent Behaviour in ICT systems",  
2004; Available from: http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/11478/1/HPL-2004-187.pdf. 
50. Clark, A., "Mindware: an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science". 2001: 
Oxford University Press. 
51. Bloomfield, R., "A descriptive model of failures in complex systems", in Supplemental 
Volume of Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN'03). 2003. San Francisco, CA, 
USA: IEEE Computer Society, p. B76-77. 
52. IRRIIS, "Integrated Risk Reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems",  
2008; Available from: http://www.irriis.org/. 
53. Cabinet-Office, "A National Information Assurance Strategy",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/~/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/csia/
nia_strategy%20pdf.ashx. 
54. EU, "Seventh Research Framework Programme",  2008; Available from: 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/home_en.html. 
55. CETIFS, "Interdependency Feasibility Study",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.csr.city.ac.uk/projects/cetifs.html. 
56. Rushby, J., "Just-in-Time Certification, Auckland, New Zealand." in IEEE 
International Conference on the Engineering of Complex Computer Systems 
(ICECCS). 2007. Auckland, New Zealand: IEEE, p. 15-24. 
57. Rushby, J., "What Use Is Verified Software - Invited paper presented in a special 
session on the Verified Software Initiative", in IEEE International Conference on the 
Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS). 2007. Auckland, New 
Zealand: IEEE. 
58. Rushby, J., "Automated Formal Methods Enter the Mainstream", Communications of 
the Computer Society of India: Formal Methods Special Theme Issue, 2007. 31(2): p. 
28-32. 
59. "Static Source Code Analysis Tools for C",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.spinroot.com/static/. 
60. ScanCoverity, "265 PROJECTS ON THE LADDER",  2008; Available from: 
http://scan.coverity.com/rungAll.html. 
61. Woodcock, J. and L. Freitas, "Z/Eves and the Mondex electronic purse", in invited 
talk to ITCAC 2006. 
62. Moorsel, A.v., A. Bondavalli, et al., "D2.1 - State of the Art",  2008; Available from: 
http://www.amber-
project.eu/documents/md_$HTTP_POST_VARS[editbin]_amber_d2.1_stateoftheart_
v1.0.pdf. 
63. TPC, "TPC Benchmark C, Standard Specification, Version 5.0."  2002; Available 
from: http://www.tpc.org/tpcc/. 
64. Kanoun, K. and Y. Crouzet, "Dependability Benchmarks for Operating Systems", 
International Journal of Performability Engineering, 2006. 2(3): p. 277 - 289. 
65. Musa, J.D., "Operational Profiles in Software-Reliability Engineering", IEEE 
Software, 1993. (March): p. 14-32. 
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 48  
66. Balbo, G., "Introduction to stochastic petri nets", in Lectures on Formal Methods and 
Performance Analysis, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 2001, Springer Verlag. p. 
84-155. 
67. Lyu, M.R., ed. "Handbook of Software Reliability Engineering". 1996, McGraw-Hill 
and IEEE Computer Society Press. 
68. Brocklehurst, S., P.Y. Chan, et al., "Recalibrating software reliability models", IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, 1990. 16: p. 458-470. 
69. Alhazmi, O.H., Y.K. Malaiy, and I. Ray, "Security vulnerabilities in software 
systems: A quantitative perspective", in IFIP WG 11.3 Working Conference on Data 
and Applications Security. 2005, p. 281-294. 
70. Alhazmi, O.H. and Y.K. Malaiya, "Modeling the vulnerability discovery process", in 
16th IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE'05). 
2005. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society Press, p. 129-138. 
71. Alhazmi, O.H. and Y.K. Malaiya, "Quantitative vulnerability assessment of systems 
software", in IEEE Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS'05). 2005. 
USA: IEEE Computer Society, p. 615. 
72. Woo, S.-W., O.H. Alhazmi, and Y.K. Malaiya, "Assessing vulnerabilities in Apache 
and IIS HTTP servers", in IEEE International Symposium on Dependable, Autonomic 
and Secure Computing. 2006: IEEE Computer Society, p. 103-110. 
73. Ozment, A., "Vulnerability Discovery & Software Security",  2007; Available from: 
PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge. 
74. Bloomfield, R. and B. Littlewodd, "Multi-legged arguments: the impact of diversity 
upon confidence in dependability arguments", in Dependable Systems and Networks 
(DSN-03). 2003. San Francisco, USA: IEEE Computer Society, p. 25-34. 
75. Alberdi, E., A.A. Povyakalo, et al., "Effects of incorrect CAD output on human 
decision making in mammography", Academic Radiology, 2004. 11(8): p. 909-918. 
76. DIRC, "Dependability Interdiciplinary Research Collaboration project",  2004; 
Available from: http://www.dirc.org.uk. 
77. Herrmann, D.S., "Complete Guide to Security and Privacy Metrics". 2007: Auerbach. 
78. Gashi, I., P. Popov, and L. Strigini, "Fault tolerance via diversity for off-the-shelf 
products: a study with SQL database servers", IEEE Transactions on Dependable and 
Secure Computing, 2007. 4(4): p. 280-294. 
79. Littlewood, B., P. Popov, and L. Strigini, "Modelling software design diversity - a 
review", ACM Computing Surveys, 2001. 33(2): p. 177-208. 
80. "NEC Security Research Strategy", Pre-released RTO Technical report - NATO, 
2008. 
81. Francis, R., "B.C. plans province-wide electronic medical record system",  2007; 
Available from: 
http://www.itbusiness.ca/it/client/en/home/News.asp?id=42429&cid=3. 
82. Gonsalves, A., "McKesson Offers Health Care Apps On Red Hat Linux ",  2007; 
Available from: 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19
7008898. 
83. Tippu, S., "Indian offshorers move offshore ",  2006; Available from: 
http://www.itwire.com/content/view/5870/945/. 
84. Trent, W., "Offshorers to Offshore?" 2006. 
85. Associated-Press, "LexisNexis theft much worse than thought", 2005. 
86. Givens, B., "The ChoicePoint Data Security Breach (Feb. '05): What It Means for 
You",  2005; Available from: http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/CPResponse.htm. 
87. Privacy-Rights-ClearingHouse, "A Chronology of Data Breaches ",  2008; Available 
from: http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm. 
88. Bächer, P., T. Holz, et al., "Know your Enemy: Tracking Botnets",  2005; Available 
from: http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots/. 
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 49  
89. Lemos, R., ""Data storm" blamed for nuclear-plant shutdown",  2007; Available 
from: http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11465. 
90. Ballard, M., "UK Treasury knew of US hunt through British bank data",  2007; 
Available from: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/02/16/swift_hm_treasury/. 
91. Ballard, M., "Europe demands say on US data trawling",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/02/15/eu_grabon_us/. 
92. Gaudin, S., "Homeland Security Creates National Computer Forensics Institute ",  
2007; Available from: 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/management/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=19
8000260. 
93. Reed, T., "At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War ". 2004: Presidio Press. 
94. Prevelakis, V. and D. Spinellis, "The Athens Affair",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jul07/5280. 
95. Ramalingam, A., A. Miller, and K.T. Erickson, "SCADA System Vulnerability 
Analysis", in Working together: R&D Partnerships in Homeland Security 
Conference. 2005. Boston, MA. 
96. Strom, D., "Six steps to a wireless site survey",  2006; Available from: 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articl
eId=9004641&source=NLT_PM&nlid=8. 
97. Poulsen, K., "Slammer worm crashed Ohio nuke plant network",  2003; Available 
from: http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767. 
98. Gellman, B., "U.S. Fears Al Qaeda Cyber Attacks ",  2002; Available from: 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/502. 
99. McMillan, R., "Hackers break into water system network",  2006; Available from: 
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articl
eId=9004659. 
100. Goodin, D., "Electrical supe charged with damaging California canal system",  2007; 
Available from: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/30/canal_system_hack/. 
101. "Ems powerline crossing",  2008; Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/380kV-Ems-Overhead_Powerline_Crossing. 
102. "Power outage",  2008; Available from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_outage. 
103. Ivey, M., A. Akhil, et al., "Grid of the Future White Paper on Accommodating 
Uncertainty in Planning and Operations",  1999; Available from: 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/certs/pdf/certs-uncertainty.pdf. 
104. OMG, "Unified Modeling Language (UML), version 2.1.1",  2007; Available from: 
http://www.omg.org/technology/documents/formal/uml.htm. 
105. Yang, Y., Jesal Bhuta, et al., "Value-based processes for COTS-based applications", 
IEEE Software, 2005. 22(4): p. 54-62. 
106. Dean, J., "An Evaluation Method for COTS Software Products". 2000. 
107. Lewis, P., P. Hyle, et al., "Lessons Learned in Developing Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) Intensive Software Systems",  2000; Available from: 
http://www.cebase.org/www/researchActivities/COTS/LessonsLearned.pdf. 
108. Kontio, J., S.Y. Chen, et al., "A COTS Selection Method and Experiences of Its Use", 
in Twentieth Annual Software Engineering Workshop,NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center. 1995. Greenbelt, Maryland. 
109. Phillips, B.C. and S.M. Polen, "Add Decision Analysis to Your COTS Selection 
Process", in CroosTalk -The Journal of Defence Software Engineering. 2002. 
110. Boehm, B., D. Port, et al., "Composable Process Elements for Developing COTS-
Based Applications", in Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering. (ISESE'03). 
2003: ACM-IEEE, p. 8-17. 
111. Ochs, M., D. Pfahl, et al., "A Method for Efficient Measurement-based COTS 
Assessment and Selection -Method Description and Evaluation Results", in 7th 
Symposium on Software Metrics. 2001. London, England: IEEE Computer Society, p. 
285-294. 
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 50  
112. Comella-Dorda, S., J. Dean, et al., "A Process for COTS Software Product 
Evaluation", in International Conference on COTS-Based Software Systems 
(ICCBSS'02). 2002. Florida, USA: Springer-Verlag, p. 86-92. 
113. Ncube, C. and N. Maiden, "PORE:Procurement Oriented Requirements Engineering 
Method for the Component-Based Systems Engineering Development Paradigm", in 
International Workshop on Component-Based Software Engineering. 1999. 
114. Alves, C. and J. Castro, "CRE: A Systematic Method for COTS Components 
Selection", in XV Brazilian Symposium on Software Engineering (SBES). 2001. Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil. 
115. Gregor, S., J. Hutson, and C. Oresky, "Storyboard Process to Assist in Requirements 
Verification and Adaptation to Capabilities Inherent in COTS", in International 
Conference on COTS-Based Software Systems (ICCBSS'02). 2002. Florida, USA: 
Springer-Verlag, p. 132-141. 
116. Burgués, X., C. Estay, et al., "Combined Selection of COTS Components", in 
International Conference on COTS-Based Software Systems (ICCBSS'02). 2002. 
Florida, USA: Springer-Verlag, p. 54-64. 
117. Ruhe, G., "Intelligent Support for Selection of COTS Products", in Web, Web-
Services, and Database Systems. 2003: Springer, p. 34-45. 
118. Tran, V. and D.-B. Liu, "A Risk Mitigating Model for the Development of Reliable 
and Maintainable Large-Scale Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Integrated Software 
Systems", in Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS'97). 1997: IEEE 
Print, p. 361-367. 
119. Jeanrenaud, J. and P. Romanazzi, "Software Product Evaluation: A Methodological 
Approach", in Software Quality Management II: Building Software into Quality. 
1994, p. 55-69. 
120. Kunda, D. and L. Brooks, "Applying Social-Technical Approach for COTS 
Selection", in UK Academy for Information Systems (UKAIS'99). 1999. University of 
York, England. 
121. Likert, R., "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes". 1932, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
122. Gashi, I., P. Popov, and V. Stankovic, "Uncertainty Conscious Assessment of Off-
The-Shelf Software: a Baysian Approach", Elsevier Information ad Software 
Technology Journal, 2008: p. Accepted for publication. 
123. Littlewood, B., P. Popov, and L. Strigini, "Assessment of the Reliability of Fault-
Tolerant Software: a Bayesian Approach", in SAFECOMP-2000. 2000. Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands: Springer, p. 294-308. 
124. FDA, "Guidance for Industry, FDA Reviewers and Compliance on Off-The-Shelf 
Software Use in Medical Devices",  1999; Available from: 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/585.pdf. 
125. IEC, "IEC 60880 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and control systems 
important to safety - Software aspects for computer-based systems performing 
category A functions ",  2006; Available from: 
http://webstore.iec.ch/webstore/webstore.nsf/artnum/036058. 
126. DS, "Requirments for safety related software in defence equipment",  1997; Available 
from: http://www.dstan.mod.uk/data/00/055/01000200.pdf. 
127. Bloomfield, R., J. Cazin, et al., "Validation, verification and certification of 
embedded systems". 2004, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR. 
128. Bloomfield, R., S. Guerra, and D. Sheridan, "Evaluation of Integrity and Availability 
in Safety-Related Applications". 2006, Adelard LLP. 
129. Avizienis, A., J.-C. Laprie, et al., "Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and 
Secure Computing", IEEE Transactions on Dependable And Secure Computing, 
2004. 1(1): p. 11-33. 
130. Dewsbury, G. and J. Dobson, eds, "Responsibility and Dependable Systems 
(Hardcover)". 2007, Springer-Verlag  
References   Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 51  
131. Bhuta, J. and B. Boehm, "Attribute-Based COTS Product Interoperability 
Assessment", in International Conference in COTS-Based Software Systems 
(ICCBSS'07). 2007. Banff, Alberta, Canada: IEEE Computer Society, p. 163 - 171. 
 
Appendix A  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 52  
Appendix A  
This appendix contains details of three scenarios which have been developed by a NATO 
Research Task Group on the Dual Use of High Assurance Technologies (IST-048/RTG-020). 
The task group was headed by Dan Craigen (University of Toronto, Canada), Ann Miller 
(University of Missouri-Rolla) and Robin Bloomfield (CSR, City University). A final report 
detailing the scenarios and the analysis performed is in preparation. 
The “Terms of Reference” (ToR) for the Research Task Group (RTG), provides the historical 
background for the group as follows: 
“As a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001, 
NATO and its member countries have been actively investigating means for combating 
terrorism. 
High Assurance Technologies (such as formal methods) have normally been used to develop 
systems requiring high degrees of assurance as to functionality, safety and security. One of 
the key benefits of such technologies is their ability to ferret out subtle problems with system 
requirements, design and implementation. 
However, experience has also been obtained in which such technologies can be used to 
identify effectively weaknesses in NATO network-enabled systems, thereby allowing for 
enhanced defence. From a formal methods perspective, the phrase "formal methods-based 
tiger teaming" is meant to capture the idea of using formal methods to help drive the 
identification of weaknesses in such systems. The interaction of mathematical modelling with 
experimental testing of such systems has been shown to be very effective, but not widely 
known, in identifying weaknesses and thereby being a first step in defending such systems.” 
The ToR continues by justifying the RTG to NATO as follows:  
“An important aspect of combating terrorism is the protection of NATO network-enabled 
systems from exploitation by terrorists and other foes.” 
The three scenarios, discussed in turn, are entitled: 
 Scenario 1: Medical and Financial Services Sector – (present time)  
 Scenario 2: Oil and Gas Sector – (present time)  
 Scenario 3: Electrical Power Sector – (Circa 2012) 
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Scenario 1: Medical and Financial Services Sector – (present time) 
Author: Dan Craigen (University of Toronto) 
 
1. Isabelle had felt unwell for some days and that fateful morning she fainted. An ambulance 
was dispatched and she was taken to the nearby HMO Acme Hospital. There she was 
given an RFID identity bracelet. Her medical records were “securely” downloaded from 
the medical IT and records data collecting/storing company MedRecsOnly.10 The doctors 
quickly identified the problem, admitted her, and put her on a course of medication that 
was expected to take 3-4 days to have full effect. MedRecsOnly had obtained licenses in a 
number of countries to provide such records to properly authenticated medical 
institutions; they were also able to provide data analysis to pharmaceutical and marketing 
companies – at least in the aggregate.  
2. HMO Acme Hospital was one of a handful of hospitals world-wide on the vanguard of 
adopting an enterprise-wide IT services infrastructure that covered everything from 
classic inventory control through to the new PDAs all medical staff carried to access a 
patient’s medical records.11 The system had been developed by Medirixx, one of a 
number of new (and established) companies that entered the burgeoning health field in 
which the value propositions for enhanced sharing of information and enhanced 
automation were compelling. For example, it was now much easier to share the results of 
tests, MRIs and X-Rays between the various medical institutions (including palliative 
care facilities, emergency hospitals, walk-in clinics and regular doctors’ offices); this 
greatly reduced the need for repetitive testing and examination. It also helped 
substantially when patients were unconscious or otherwise unable to speak for 
themselves. Medirixx interoperated with the MedRecsOnly databases. 
3. The PDAs were able to link to the RFID identity bracelets and in conjunction with a 
secure wireless connection to the hospital routers were able to alert staff as to when 
patients’ medication was due (amongst other services). Significant design effort had been 
directed at the security architecture with specific considerations for confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication. Medication was now routinely mixed in an automated 
pharmacy that accepted downloaded instructions from the Medirixx hospital enterprise 
system and “securely” entered into the dispensation units, which were labelled with a 
unique patient identifier (equal to that on the RFID identify bracelet – thereby allowing 
for confirmation). 
4. On the evening of Isabelle’s admission the new shift arrived. Hillary had been in the 
nursing profession for years and was well regarded by her colleagues. On activating her 
PDA and putting on her RFID identity bracelet (so her whereabouts in the hospital was 
known) she received a notice that Isabelle was due her next intake of medicine. Hillary, 
as was her common practice, visually inspected the medications and the accompanying 
documentation and found that everything seemed to be in order – there were no 
observable abnormalities. So, after talking briefly with Isabelle, gave her the prescribed 
medication.  
                                                     
10 See http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/admin/books/chapterfiles/Feb07ffAtherley.pdf for a discussion. 
One particular observation made in the Fraser Institute paper is as follows: “The vulnerabilities of 
information technology beset the financial services industry. The industry can insure 
consumers and reimburse them for losses that it is unable to protect them against. But in 
health care, the same vulnerabilities can result in irretrievable losses of the health and even 
the life of patients.” 
11 See, for example, [81] and also “[82]. 
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5. Two hours later Isabelle went into Anaphylactic shock and died. Just as troubling was 
that another ten patients all died that evening – some due to Anaphylaxis; some due to 
cardiac arrest; others, the cause was not immediately clear. Given that HMO Acme was 
one of the smaller hospitals, this was clearly anomalous, especially given that all the 
patients were not in the Extensive/Emergency Care wing. 
6. The next day turned out to be just as bad, with another fifteen patients succumbing. The 
hospital was locked down and autopsies fast tracked. Early results showed that some 
patients had been given medication to which they were lethally allergic. Others had, in 
effect, been poisoned, by unexpected combinations of medication. Yet others, had died 
since the applied medications were given at inappropriate doses. 
7. Disturbingly, though not fully recognized for another day, numerous other hospitals were 
faced with unexpected mortalities. Over all, thousands died – a number comparable to 
those who died during the 9/11 attacks. 
8. Investigators hypothesized that the patients were not receiving their proper medication, 
yet an initial review of the security logs indicated that the patients were being treated 
properly. Not knowing of the events in the other hospitals, HMO Acme investigators 
immediately shifted their attention to the possibility that one of the medical caregivers 
was responsible; this avenue, however, was rapidly rejected.  Gradually, the global reach 
of the problem became known. 
9. Fortuitously, it was noted that a non-Medirixx audit log of the chemicals being used by 
the automated pharmacy was not consistent with the Medirixx database. Forensics experts 
finally proved that the instructions being sent to the automated pharmacy by the Medirixx 
system was inconsistent with the Medirixx logs. Somehow, the integrity of the system 
had been compromised. 
10. Identification of the compromise meant that the HMO Acme had to stop using Medirixx 
and revert to their emergency paper backup procedures; thereby severely impacting 
efficiencies. All elective surgeries were cancelled and even some critical patients were 
moved to other nearby hospitals. HMO Acme had to bring in extra staff and, at least 
initially, shut down the automated pharmacy. Though the hospital did its best, patients 
were ill-served. 
11. It became apparent that the heightened mortalities in the other Medirixx supported 
hospitals were also due to an integrity failure with the Medirixx system.  
12. Medirixx commenced a full review of their systems, but corporate disaster loomed. They 
were one of the leading IT firms on NASDAQ and they saw a substantial decline in what 
had been a NASDAQ darling for some years. Other firms in the IT sector also saw their 
stock prices depressed. NASDAQ had its worst few days since the Telecom/IT collapse 
of the early 2000s. 
13. Medirixx was a well regarded firm, which took seriously the concerns arising from their 
life-critical software. Substantial design effort went into developing a highly trusted 
system. Medirixx, however, like other firms, felt the pressures of the competitive market 
place and decided to offshore the coding. SafelyC was hired after a due diligence review 
by Medirixx and some early trials. 
14. SafelyC, however, also felt commercial pressures, and unbeknownst to Medirixx, 
subcontracted out portions of the work (to OnwardsC) and, to make sure that full 
interoperability was maintained, included overall design information of the Medirixx 
system.12 
                                                     
12 See [83] and [84] as indications of the offshorers offshoring trend. 
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15. OnwardsC, however, was a front company for a terrorist/crime gang (TC), which 
evaporated on completion of the attacks. TC was known to western intelligence and 
policing agencies, but many aspects of their organization remained a mystery; though it 
seemed they ran profitable criminal enterprises and had been making some headway with 
their terrorist objectives. Increasing resources were being directed by the intelligence and 
policing agencies to roll back the advances and to depress their criminal enterprises. TC 
was beginning to feel the pressure. 
16. A core group of OnwardsC employees also belonged to TC and were extremely well 
trained; mostly in western universities. These employees were experts at information 
technology, including data mining, secure technologies, and other cutting edge 
technologies. OnwardsC also had access to medical expertise. While being extremely 
careful to meet their contractual obligations to SafelyC, including satisfying an exhaustive 
set of test cases, they also inserted Trojan horse software that included analytical 
techniques and means for working around the Medirixx designed system. (The simple 
analytical techniques were inserted so that the medical records could be analyzed for 
allergies or for patients taking medication where slight changes of dosage could result in 
mortality.) 
17. Like much software, the Medirixx software was patchable over the Internet. OnwardsC 
designed their Crimeware so that it could be activated by a carefully selected 
communication. Since all the firewalls would allow for Medirixx updates to pass through, 
OnwardsC had no problem having their carefully crafted message sent out by a 
compromised Botnet to the thirty-one hospitals. 
18. Other members of the TC gang shorted Medirixx on the NASDAQ, along with some 
other related medical IT stocks and waited. Medirixx trading was stopped for a few days, 
but once trading commenced, it continued its free fall. TC apparently made millions. 
19. But, this was only part of the story. TC had greater plans than an apparent financial 
motivation. Through their expertise and contacts with the black hat ecosystem, TC had 
successfully penetrated Lemangtrix – a huge player in the burgeoning space of world-
wide personnel data acquisition and analysis, with significant contacts into government 
and intelligence agencies.13 Lemangtrix had information on over a billion individuals, 
with terabytes of data. Lemangtrix made use of state-of-the art hardware, software and 
networking technology. They were fully aware that penetration of their database, similar 
say to the problems that TJX had in 2007 and previous years,14 could cripple their 
business.  
20. TC and their black hat associates had carefully acquired tens of millions individual 
records from Lemangtrix and had made use of their own Botnets (and peer-to-peer 
technologies) to distribute the data “securely” on compromised PCs globally. (The data 
was acquired through various means including social engineering, improper backup 
procedures, and penetration of the Lemangtrix databases.)  
21. Three days after they activated their Meditrixx Crimeware, TC activated their Botnets.15 
Emails containing data from the compromised Lemangtrix data base were sent out by the 
PCs – essentially as SPAM. The refinement was that where ever they had the email 
address for a specific individual, the private information was sent to that individual and to 
thousands of others. In addition, the email noted that the information had been sent by 
                                                     
13 See [85] and [86].  Visit [87] for a chronology of data breaches since 2005. Over 100 million records 
containing sensitive personal information have been compromised. 
14 “The TJX Breach: It’s even worse than they thought,” Briony Smith, itbusiness.ca, 21 February 
2007. 
15 “[88] provides an excellent synopsis of Botnets and how a “honeynet” was used to acquire 
information. 
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MegaBank for confirmation and that MegaBank on receiving confirmation would open 
accounts for the individual. Furthermore, a “distributed denial of service” attack was 
launched on both MegaBank’s web presence and on their VOIP network; essentially 
isolating the bank.16  
22. Again, TC had shorted stock – this time in MegaBank and other finance related stocks. 
As news of the apparent MegaBank penetration hit, there was, to say the least, a public 
uproar. MegaBank was in a state of crisis. After collapsing by 30% the stock was frozen, 
but other financial stocks continued to trade, to a detriment. Worldwide, stock markets 
were in significant decline. 
23. It was days before investigators determined that Lemangtrix had been the source of 
information (though the experts did not identify all of the channels) and that MegaBank 
had nothing to do with the event.  
24. The political and economic costs were profound. MegaBank never fully recovered. 
Lemangtrix was essentially put out of business. Though governments had made use of the 
intelligence that firms such as Lemangtrix provided, the reality of the public revolution 
and revulsion was that all the major data acquisition and analysis firms came under 
substantial scrutiny and the public became fully aware of the information being acquired. 
Substantial regulation was in the offing. 
25. The combination of the Lemangtrix-MegaBank fiasco and the Medirixx software failure 
severely undercut the public’s perception of the benefits of Information Technology and 
Electronic Commerce.  A neo-Luddite movement formed throughout the West and high 
technology, science and rationalism was under attack. It might not have been societal 
collapse but the events were disruptive to the existing technological foundations. 
Compelling value propositions were now primarily related with privacy and security 
rather than with gee-whiz innovations. Firms with complex legacy systems, which formed 
much of the world’s network and IT infrastructure, were under particular legislative and 
public pressure.  
26. Internationally, Intelligence and Police agencies spent substantial effort at analyzing what 
actually happened. Following the money,17 investigators determined that there had been 
substantial short ordering of Lemangtrix, MegaBank and Medirixx. Fortunately, 
international agreements regarding financial activities, simplified the process of 
determining the cash flow. It was determined and certified that the profits (in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars) had been sent to four specific banks. Each of these four 
banks was associated with the TCTarget crime organization, which had a global reach and 
was, amongst other activities, involved with both the drug trade and arms smuggling. 
Under severe political and public pressure, the intelligence and policing agencies, along 
with substantial military support, was directed towards the crippling of the TCTarget 
organization. 
27. How was it that TCTarget became the target? The TCTarget arms smuggling had 
“irritated” TC since TCTarget had been sending arms to a splinter group opposed to TC; 
this splinter group were of the opinion that TC was too moderate. Further, TC, while 
merging terror and crime, was led by a certain group of fanatics. They had enough money 
to fund their efforts, but they were coming under increasing pressure from Western 
intelligence, police and military. By directing the profits of their short selling to TCTarget 
they significantly removed that pressure, allowing them much more room to manoeuvre 
                                                     
16 For a recent possible DDOS on a nuclear plant see [89]. 
 
17 [90] and [91]. Note also that US Homeland Security has created a national computer forensics 
institute as reported in [92]. 
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and speed up attaining their objectives, while significantly weakening the economic and 
technological strength of their adversaries. 
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Scenario 2: Oil and Gas Sector – (present time)  
Author: Ann Miller (University of Missouri-Rolla) 
 
1. The oil slick was miles long when the tourist fishing boat “Keys” came across it. The 
Keys, centred out of Key West, catered to wealthy tourists who went trophy fishing for 
tuna. It was early morning and there had been no notification overnight. The Keys captain 
called in the spill to the US Coast Guard and an investigation was launched as to the 
extent and reason for the occurrence. 
2. The spill was clearly massive and it became immediately apparent, especially with the 
choppy waters and the expectation of sub-hurricane winds and rain in the next few days, 
that it would be extremely difficult to contain and, in fact, there would need to be a 
massive cleanup along the Gulf States shores. Massive loss of fowl and marine life 
accrued. This would be expensive and difficult. 
3. Millions of barrels of oil were estimated to be involved, but there had been no reported 
major breaches of oil tankers in the area. 
4. Investigations led to the source of the oil leak as one of the feeder lines of a deep-sea well 
which had ruptured, spilling millions of gallons of oil and natural gas into the gulf. 
5. The well is owned and operated by Oil4U, a mid-size oil and natural gas provider, with a 
typical network-centric system for their operations. Their network consisted of corporate 
intranet for accounting, billing, payroll, yield rate calculations, etc, and a SCADA system 
for Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition of their deep-sea wells located in the Gulf 
of Mexico. 
6. Inter-agency and Oil4U investigators noted that the rupture on the feeder line was 
consistent with an internally generated rupture. It was concluded that the pressure on the 
feeder line was too great for the joints and welds at the rupture location. 
7. As the investigations proceeded, three alternative scenarios were prioritized. 
8. Alternative Scenario 1: Was there a malicious modification of the SCADA control 
software, which was programmed to slowly increase the maximum allowable pressure of 
oil and gas which flowed through the feeder line? If true, such an attack would have been 
pre-meditated and performed either by the original vendor or an intermediary third party 
who had access to the original software and made the malicious modifications. This was 
realistic given that spyware has been found embedded in COTS software. It was also 
possible that there had been third party intervention on the part of an adversary 
intelligence agency, terrorist group, or organized crime.18 
9. Alternative Scenario 2: Oil4U acknowledged that their SCADA system failed for a 
relatively short time due to an accidental error when a maintenance technician brought a 
laptop infected with a computer virus into the on-shore control room.  The virus infected 
the PCs in the system, turning them into “zombies,” which continually flooded the 
controllers with nuisance messages. While Oil4U operators responded rapidly, rebooting 
the controllers within minutes, the DoS attack continued, shutting down the controllers 
every time they re-booted. Unfortunately, during the attack, one of the controllers could 
                                                     
18 This allegedly occurred above ground in June 1982 when “the pipeline software that ran the pumps, 
turbines, and valve settings was programmed to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the 
pipeline joints and welds.” The changes are alleged to have been implanted in the host software by a 
foreign intelligence service (see [93]).  Further, a recent digital forensics examination detailed an actual 
case of modified telephone switch software [94]. 
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not read data from a pressure sensor which indicated increasing pressures in one of the 
feeder lines. Though the operators realized that there was a problem in the SCADA 
network, there was still a time lag until a manual override was executed and while there 
was indication of a lower than expected pressure on one of the feeder lines this was not 
viewed as being particularly abnormal, since some operators ignore or under-set Pressure 
Sensitive Low (PSL) alarms. Ultimately, the virus was removed, but only after extensive 
environmental and economic damage.19 
10. Alternative Scenario 3: Oil4U had always claimed that their SCADA network was 
securely separated from their enterprise network.  Communication between the two 
networks was only allowed through a properly configured, state-of-the-art firewall and 
routinely followed regular auditing of their SCADA network. Thus, they were surprised 
when it seemed that the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) of their SCADA network 
seemed to have been breached. Within ten minutes, OIL4U’s automated auditing and 
analysis tools confirmed their suspicion that an attacker had invaded the SCADA HMI. 
The operators reacted professionally and diligently worked to mitigate the risk. Within a 
further twenty minutes the system was restored to normal. However, the operators were 
unaware that within the first ten minutes the attacker had sent a command to one of the 
controllers to modify the maximum allowable pressure on its feeder line – to a value in 
excess of its rated limits. The operators were unaware of the spill due to the PSL settings 
and only later confirmed the rupture. Their initial focus was to identify how the 
penetration occurred. Oil4U’s control network is only connected to the corporate network 
and requires passing through a state-of-the-art firewall. The firewall is configured to only 
allow the billing server to communicate with the control network so as to permit the 
gathering of billing data in near real time. The billing server had been compromised. To 
compromise the billing server, there were three entry points: the Wireless LAN, the 
Modem Bank and the Internet firewall. However, the billing server had no 
communication with the wireless LAN or modem bank, implying that access had 
occurred through the Internet firewall. The only traffic allowed through the Internet 
firewall is the web server and this server is located in the DMZ. The web server passes 
through the firewall to retrieve billing information allowing Oil4U’s corporate customers 
and contractors access to their account status. The web server had also been compromised 
and the IP address of the attacker was identified. Oil4U determined that the attacker had 
compromised a corporate customer’s account and that the customer’s computer had been 
turned into a zombie.20 
11. What actually happened? While all of the above scenarios were all valid, what in fact 
happened was that a disgruntled employee decided to cause serious financial loss to 
Oil4U as well as damage to their reputation.  She used the wireless hub to log in from 
home and change the parameters on the feeder line.  
                                                     
19 That a scenario along these lines is feasible consider the Harrisburg, PA water treatment plant event 
[95] and, in a self-contained process control lab, see [96]. 
20 In January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm began attacking computer networks.  Users of the business 
network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant began to notice a network slowdown.  Investigation 
revealed the worm had spread from the plant's business network to its operations network, causing 
enough congestion to crash the computerized panel used to monitor the plant's most crucial safety 
indicators.  Minutes later, the Plant Process Computer, another monitoring system, crashed as well.  
The plant's firewall had initially blocked Slammer, but the worm still managed to reach the plant 
through a high-speed connection from a contractor's network. Had the plant's operations network been 
properly protected from either the contractor's network or the plant's own business network, the 
infiltration would not have happened. (See [97].) It has also been demonstrated in a self-contained 
process control lab. (Paper submitted for publication by Trent and Miller.) 
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12. That this form of attack is possible, consider the following, extracted from a European 
Union briefing paper:21 “In Queensland, Australia, on April 23, 2000, police stopped a car 
on the road and found a stolen computer and radio transmitter inside. Using commercially 
available technology, Vitek Boden, had turned his vehicle into a pirate command centre 
for sewage treatment along Australia's Sunshine Coast. Boden's arrest solved a mystery 
that had troubled the Maroochy Shire wastewater system for two months. Somehow the 
system was leaking hundreds of thousands of gallons of putrid sludge into parks, rivers 
and the manicured grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. Janelle Bryant of the Australian 
Environmental Protection Agency said "marine life died, the creek water turned black and 
the stench was unbearable for residents." Until Boden's capture - during his 46th 
successful intrusion - the utility's managers did not know why. Details of Boden's 
intrusion, not disclosed before, show how easily Boden broke in - and how restrained he 
was with his power. Boden had quit his job at Hunter Watertech, the supplier of 
Maroochy Shire's remote control and telemetry equipment. Evidence at his trial suggested 
that he was angling for a consulting contract to solve the problems he had caused. To 
sabotage the system, he set the software on his laptop to identify itself as "pumping 
station 4," then suppressed all alarms. Hunter Watertech's chief executive admitted that 
Boden "was the central control system" during his intrusions, with unlimited command of 
300 control nodes governing sewage and drinking water alike. "He could have done 
anything he liked to the fresh water", the chief executive said. Like thousands of utilities 
around the world, Maroochy Shire allowed technicians operating remotely to manipulate 
its digital controls. Boden learned how to use those controls as an insider, but the 
software he used conforms to international standards and the manuals are available on the 
Web. He faced virtually no obstacles to breaking in.”22 
                                                     
21 Text extracted from [98]. 
22 Another incident was reported by Computer World Security in [99].  Yet another incident in 
November 2007 [100]. 
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Scenario 3: Electrical Power Sector – (Circa 2012)  
Author: Robin Bloomfield (CSR, City University) 
Background 
 
1. Karl Wilhelm stretched his arms over his head, logged-off and got out of his operator’s 
chair. It had been a difficult 24 hours.  
2. Over the past few years erratic weather had been causing insecurity (lack of robustness) 
in the electricity supply. In the winter a combination of extreme cold snaps increasing 
demands and high winds often caused some local damage to distribution and transmission 
lines that challenged the European network. In the summer, the increasing use of air 
conditioning and seasonal variation in alternative generation methods presented their own 
challenges. 
3. The market in electricity was also showing some turbulence. The prices had been widely 
varying over the past 5 years in part due to changing perceptions in the security of gas 
and oil supplies. This had lead to a number of takeovers in the deregulated markets 
covering both the transmission companies and the generating companies. There was a still 
a proliferation of companies (and also individuals thanks to success of micro-generation 
is some parts of Europe) that owned generation and transmission network. In the past few 
years there had been consolidation in the market with considerable investment and 
ownership from outside Europe.  
4. The electricity sector was seen as an example of successful deregulation. Market forces 
and the political threat of a unified regulatory and control regime across Europe had 
motivated the industry to improve its investment in control and management systems and 
to improve overall risk assessment and co-ordination.   
5. There had been significant investment in SCADA and control systems following 
awareness in the mid2000s of the vulnerability to cyber attacks of the previous generation 
of systems. The new generation of PLCs and smart protection devices had been 
engineered to remove the egregious problems that were at first suspected in incidents in 
the Gulf of Mexico (see Scenario1), Australia, etc. Long standing European engineering 
companies had supplied the equipment but many of the components had been developed 
and manufactured in the Far East allowing much cheaper and more extensive 
refurbishment. 
6. The new generation of systems relied on one or two Government certified operating 
systems, and although these were an improvement over previous designs they had gained 
features and connectivity and lost any remaining security by obscurity that the old 
propriety systems used to have. However the design was thought to be a great 
improvement over previous systems particularly in the way it allowed suppliers to build a 
number of levels of access control to network and remote devices.  
7. Not the entire power network was controlled by this next generation of equipment but a 
sizable part of Europe was controlled PwrProm23 who had invested in a modernised core 
business. Their refurbished control (and simulation) centres had allowed for improved 
training but also a reduction in staffing levels. To address the workload in adverse 
conditions special co-ordination and evaluation teams had been set up. In part building on 
the nuclear industry practice of separate teams (because of the different knowledge sets) 
to improve incident diagnosis and also the nuclear practice to rely on automatic controls 
                                                     
23 A fictitious French/Russian joint venture. 
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for 25 minutes following an incident. However this level of reliance on automation had 
not been possible to achieve due to the coupling and fast dynamics of the grid and the 
many possible network configurations that could be presented to the operators. 
8. This change in ownership had led to the “rationalisation” of many of the corporate 
networks and information systems and the migration towards more modern international 
corporate Enterprise standards. This has enabled a more integrated approach but careful 
best practices had been followed to separate the control and management systems using 
diverse and multiple firewalls. This was in part a result of a number of CI penetration 
scares in 2005-2010 (e.g., Oil and Gas Services scenario). 
9. Although the control and stability of the network had improved in recent years, not all 
physical interactions were understood or predicted beforehand. The growth of the 
network and the success of micro-generation had led to some surprises. Although the 
2007 Polish- Portugal oscillation in the frequency of the supply was now well understood 
there were still transient flows that surprised the power experts.24 The increased in 
decentralised generation (wind farms, micro-generation) remained a modelling and 
control challenge and this was compounded by the more recent Service Level Agreements 
(SLAs) not requiring such quality of control e.g. during a frequency excursion25 the wind 
generators often disconnected more rapidly then fossil fired plant. This protected the 
generators’ investment at the expense of the overall network. 
10. Risk analysis and sharing of information made for a more resilient and aware operation. 
While there was no centralised control of the European grid, these proposals having 
faltered in the success of the distributed market driven approach, long gone were the days 
when each distribution controller could only phone or fax the controllers of management 
centres around Europe. More modern information sharing had been put in place following 
the European problems of early 2000s and there was some real-time risk assessment of 
security supply and external threats.26 Control centres had displays – risk “dash-boards” - 
that included a summarised traffic light status of interdependent networks (e.g. so the 
telecoms operators could see some limited operational information on the energy supply 
status). 
 
The incident develops 
 
11. Although the winter had seen some severe challenges to the interconnected grid and to the 
local distribution to supplies, these had been resolved quickly. There had been some rural 
areas where damage to mobile phone transmission systems and a shortage of skilled 
maintainers had increased the outage beyond what was anticipated most people had been 
reconnected within days rather than weeks. Power engineers were still studying the 
performance of the grid over the winter as there had been some unusual oscillations in the 
power that were not understood, (nor were they serious). 
                                                     
24 For example, in trying to match analysis with the Nov 2006 German incident. See [101] and links 
thereof. 
25 The frequency and phase of the electricity supply has to be controlled. The frequency is held 
around 50Hz in Europe and as more power is demanded it will dip and then be restored as generation 
increases. Power stations and the control systems, governors, on their turbines try and maintain the 
frequency but if this fails there is a frequency collapse, disconnection and subsequent blackout. More 
details on power systems can be found at [102]  
26 See for example the goals of IRRIIS [52]. 
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12. It was now March a cold, but not an unseasonably, cold day. The operating margin for the 
central sector of the grid was lower than usual but the single failure27 criterion was still 
nominally satisfied and the contingency analysis tools did not indicate any unsatisfactory 
risks. Karl Wilhelm surveyed his computer screen as saw the usual minor alarms and 
status messages. Across the control room the relatively new display that showed the risk 
status of neighbouring electricity operators and the national Telco was at their normally 
constant green/ok. His experienced colleague, Helmut Boch, was behind him in the shift 
office filling in paperwork, or perhaps taking a break. 
13. Further south, severe weather was affecting the Alps. Although there had been a scarcity 
of snow this winter the winds and storms had been quite intense. He had heard on the 
news the possible problems that this was causing and some orange alert message popped 
up on his screen advising him of a possible request for greater transmission across his 
area. He acknowledged this and began to watch carefully as the market requests went in 
for increased power from northern Europe and the plants slowly began to respond. 
14. He soon began to see an escalating demand for power and began to urgently consider the 
routing options before him. Two of his small links were repeatedly tripping out and the 
main X-Y line was operating above its normal conditions. This was perfectly allowed 
from time to time but only gave him about 40 minutes to find alternatives. 
15. The phone rang and Helmut came across to say that the management information system 
had just gone down. It was not “patch Tuesday” but the system had been under 
maintenance and there had been some difficulty bringing it back up. They were having to 
role back to a previous configuration, an activity they often rehearsed, but this would take 
30 minutes to reboot. The screen across the room that provided some overall management 
information began to grey out indicating that their data was stale. The “risk status” of the 
other infrastructure went out at the same time and both wondered out loud how they were 
connected to the management IT but they started to flick again soon afterwards indicating 
they were coming back up28. 
16. They soon begun to notice abnormal flows in the network, however much of the control 
was now automated and the protection could be seen working causing transmission lines 
to trip out and then reconnect. The system configuration and dynamics was complex and 
fast moving and Karl had no way of checking that the protection was working as 
specified. A few of the disturbances propagated and began to challenge the anti-cascading 
technology.  This was playing havoc with the system dynamics and the frequency was 
fluctuating close to the limits. The operators attempted to stabilise the situation but the 
problems developed further leading to isolation of part of the transmission network.  
17. While Karl was attempting to reconnect part of the network he noticed that the “risk 
status” of Belgium had turned red and was flashing indicating as serious security incident 
was predicted imminently or in progress. This was confirmed by a barrage of messages 
they were getting alerting them to unspecified but malicious disruption. They were also 
seeing news feeds from CNN where a previously unknown organisation, x’HFS, was 
posting claimed exploits on the web confirming the threats. Following the operating 
procedures, and as a precaution, they put a call out for extra staff to come in from their 
holiday. They shifted their attention to following the procedure to reduce their 
dependence on part of the network under attack by reducing the north-south flows. 
Unfortunately the unusual operating configuration caused by the bad weather in the south 
and the already difficult situation led to some clumsy disconnections. They worked hard 
                                                     
27 Industry currently plans for loss of any single element (N-1 contingencies) or, less frequently, for the 
loss of multiple elements (N-X). In practice this contingency risk analysis is quite complex. See [103]. 
 
28  A recent UK financial infrastructure system had (unrelated but confusing) problems and at the same 
the MIS went down.  
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to stabilise the remaining network but much was in the hands of the automation that 
seemed to do what it was designed to do, shedding load, isolating the network and 
shutting regions. They of course made some mistakes as they working under extreme 
pressure. The networks stabilised and a series of islands but significant urban centres 
were left disconnected. 
18. Some long range indicators worked giving operators in Spain and Italy enough 
information to isolate their systems in time and some of the long range anti-cascading 
technology worked but the indication from the control centre was that 50% of the lights 
had gone out in Europe. 
19. The control room team now paused their control actions to assess the situation. Training 
in incident recovery had identified special roles for the recovery team and they sought to 
stabilise the worst effected areas and establish the priority for reconnection based on the 
contingency plans and models. It soon became clear to then there was a serious security 
incident taking place. The security threat level had increased and the control and 
protection systems demanded the highest levels of authentication through trusted 
connections before they would obey any restart or reconfiguration commands. This 
security lock down also affected the black start capability of some of the power stations 
further prolonging the blackout. 
20. These problems were compounded by the fact that many companies used the same 
outsourced IT security expertise that was in demand elsewhere. Chaos in transport and the 
need to help friends and family put further pressure on staffing levels.  This was 
exacerbated by increasing rumour and an external claim, that Europe faced an escalating 
cyber attack. Having lost trust in their own information systems the operators improvised 
using ad hoc mobile networks and informal internet connections to verify the system data 
and to maintain contact with their families. Luckily operators also had personal and 
professional ties having trained with each other and the control centres and stations begun 
to work out a co-ordinated picture of what the situation was and worked steadily to 
restore supply. The weather began to moderate and after a difficult 24 hours most urban 
centres had been reconnected to the main grid but the there were continuing problem at a 
local level. 
21. Some of the local centres required manual intervention to reset and replace failed 
protection devices. In a few urban areas there had been some what appears to be 
spontaneous, locally organised, unrest hampering restitution by burning cars in the street 
and threatening repair crews and causing confusion and overload for the emergency 
services. 
22. Restitution was also being hampered from an unexpected quarter.29 The control rooms 
soon had the CEO and company lawyers on the phone asking strangely detailed questions 
about what had been effected, how much was due to their action and how much was 
automated. They began to feel uneasy about the attitudes and being treated as if they were 
responsible. Of course they had made some a few mistakes while operating under 
pressure but they felt the management interest was misplaced. What was happening was 
the supply chain had sought legal redress for the damage caused and there were legal 
actions to secure evidence even at the expense of restoring operation. The need for 
evidence collection and uncertainty of the legal situation had paralysed some of the senior 
management.30 There were suggestions that operators were personally liable for the 
priorities of the decisions made in reconnection and the subsequent, often implicit,  trade-
offs that (e.g. that company X lost more than Y, distress to person X increased but not to 
Y as couldn’t get to hospital in time). 31 
                                                     
29 Might also like to add that MIS problems lead to leakage of billing and bank account data causing 
yet more management distractions. 
30 We worked with some insurers who alerted us to these issues of restitution. 
31 Responsibility modelling might have been deployed. This looks for vulnerabilities in certain 
alignments and patterns of responsibilities. 
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23. Luckily the telecoms were largely unaffected although there was some loss of local loops 
due to power problems. The mobile operator has secured supplies so that for the first 
responders. They continued to operate but as the power remained down they began to 
reduce their service to those with the “essential service” phones in the few urban centres 
affected. There had been some rural areas where damage to mobile phone transmission 
systems and a shortage of skilled maintainers had increased the outage beyond what was 
planned most people had been reconnected within days rather than weeks.  
24. The official reports into the incident found that the claims of exploits made by x’HFS 
were not credible and they were just seeking publicity. The root cause of the incident was 
the difficulties in controlling the power system following the bad weather and some of the 
malfunctioning protection devices. This had been attributed to some mis-calibration of 
trip thresholds by outsourced contractors and this was being remedied32. Some protection 
devices had been found to have failed with memory problems and this was attributed to 
the problems in manufacture and test (a consequence of cheap components). QA 
procedures and acceptance testing had been tightened and there had been checks on the 
protection devices concerned.33 
25. The MIS had in fact been attacked and it seemed some “script-kiddies” – not exactly 
“kiddies” but recreational and hobbyist hackers – had got lucky replaying some of the 
tactics used in the Oil and Gas Sector scenario to access and disrupt the risk status 
warning system. This unexpected interconnectivity that the “kiddies” stumbled across 
was somewhat surprising as the system design came from a research project focused on 
interdependencies but the product had rather quickly transitioned from research into 
deployment on the basis that it was not directly operational and could not worsen the 
situation as there would be external confirmation of its messages. 
26. The lack of MIS and the security lock down meant that only limited local forensic 
information had been captured. The stock market movements had not been investigated as 
this was not considered a large security incident. 
27. However the most likely explanation offered by the incident investigators is not 
necessarily the most accurate one. Someone somewhere was considering their next step. 
 
Postscript 
Adversary strategy  
In this complex system it is over simplistic to think of an attack being designed and executed 
by a single, identifiable agent. While this is of course possible, the scenario shows how a 
number of malicious, uncoordinated events together with stresses due to accidental events, 
environmental effects and opportunistic escalation challenge the resilience of the complex 
system: using a disease metaphor, there is no need for opportunistic infections to co-ordinate. 
Not only had the adversary absorbed the vocabulary of systems of systems and 
“boundaryless” systems but had developed an approach that broadened effects-based planning 
to a more ecological or bio-inspired view. The incident described is just one of the many 
routes through to failures: it is not just a “security” event.   
The scenario uses a mixture of “attacks” that are uncoordinated in the normal sense of having 
short term communication between the actors but rather through a long term, decentralised 
understanding and intent. The use of markets and ownership may require large nation-state 
levels of resource to influence and to hide their intentions.  
                                                     
32 Know of an incident was caused by a misconceived modification of smart device and was propagated 
by modification in a piece of CI 
33 Restoration under pressure, mixed teams from everywhere could spread bad component, put things 
in place for next time. 
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The threat agents assumed that challenges to the power system were bound to occur so 
pursued tactics that would increase the magnitude of these effects, make their management 
more difficult and especially hamper recovery.  The adversary made significant use of system 
engineering and risk analysis skills to understand complex systems. They were aware of 
“normal accident” theory and had knowledge of complex systems and the relationship 
between topology and cascading effects. They had the ability to run simulations, picking up 
on published work and the availability of topological information. They had designed their 
approach so it did not rely on a single type of attack or a single vulnerability as these could be 
found:  their approach is n-1 secure. They had understood that consequences in 
interdependent infrastructures increase non-linear with time to repair. 34 
The difficulty in operation caused by bad weather had been amplified by: 
 Behaviour of the protection devices 
 Incorrect risk information and MIS problems  had made recovery more difficult 
However hampering recovery and causing losses would be possible without the sophisticated 
compromise of the protection devices. The adversary might have been satisfied with just 
prolonging the disruption or could initiate it with more conventional attacks (e.g graphite on 
sub stations, fires etc). 
They had sown an easily detectable “bug” by using a friend in the contracting company to 
improperly set the trip levels in some of the protection devices. The malicious code they had 
inserted by intercepting the devices after manufacture had not been detected, despite the 
industry approved audits and assessments that had taken place and some had been activated 
and tested in this incident. However once run it also self destructed.35 They had made use of 
computer science tools for reverse engineering and mathematical modelling of the sensor 
code. The adversary had access to the code, unlike the industry assessors and auditors.  
They had also learnt about the forensic capability of the system, the times to restore, had cast 
doubt on the risk information system, learnt how to stimulate consequential social unrest and 
exploit the legal system. 
Another theme was the desire to escape detection, to have the incident seen as a conjunction 
of several unfortunate events. Part of the scenario was the doubt that it was hard to decide 
whether it was orchestrated or not. This was in part to avoid the massive retaliation that might 
follow an overt attack  but also as a learning exercise36  so retain the potential for future 
escalation and pave the way to a “shock and awe” variant. 
Threat Targets  
The scenario concerns a system of systems – the electricity generation and supply systems 
and its supporting control and maintenance systems and the people, organisations and 
institutions that are stakeholders. The “system” included the  
 Technical system of electricity supply and control 
 The organisation and management of that system 
 The legal and insurance system 
                                                     
34 So damage something like  = geographic impact*time^n. Would be interesting to run some models to 
investigate further. 
35 Might have inserted code to be date specific, or randomly start. Could be wiped by rebooting where 
OK version then reloaded but would then need to control type of reboots. Would need to compromise 
checksum and fault detection measures. Could be inserted before shipments, as in this version, but the 
connectivity of the devices, albeit over a partially Government approved network, might lead to 
credible scenario with external attack. 
36 The adversaries were familiar with the High Reliability Organisation [HRO] literature. 
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 The supply chain 
 The maintenance system 
Also some abstract things such as 
 Situational awareness 
 Doubt and confusion  
 Confidence in the system 
In fact thinking of threat targets as the more concrete concerns misses important points (e.g. a 
good attack on an eVoting machine might be in the voters’ confidence in the accuracy and 
robustness of the system).  
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Appendix B 
The purpose of this appendix is to show how the various evaluation, validation and 
verification techniques, listed in Appendix C of this report, may be used to assess a complex 
ICT system. We will use three scenarios developed by a NATO Research Task Group (RTG) 
to illustrate how the different techniques outlined in the report could be used to reduce the 
probability of occurrence of incidents and shortcomings outlined in the scenarios.  
The next three subsections will present a bottom-up analysis of each of the scenarios. The 
structure of the table for each sub-section is the same. The columns   
 The first (left-most) column contains a sequential numbering of the analysis for easier 
cross-referencing  
 The second column lists main parts of the scenario from the Security point of view 
 The third column lists and explains which existing or emergent validation and 
verification techniques could be used to best address the scenario’s security problems 
identified in the first column  
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Analysis of Scenario 1: Medical and Financial Services Sector – 
(present time) 
No. Specific issue in the 
Scenario 
How we might address it with existing or emergent 
V&V techniques  
1 In points 13 and 14 of the 
scenario it is stated “13. … 
Substantial design effort 
went into developing a 
highly trusted system. 
Medirixx, however, like 
other firms, felt the pressures 
of the competitive market 
place and decided to 
offshore the coding.  SafelyC 
was hired after a due 
diligence review by 
Medirixx and some early 
trials. 14. SafelyC, however, 
also felt commercial 
pressures, and unbeknownst 
to Medirixx, subcontracted 
out portions of the work (to 
OnwardsC) and, to make 
sure that full interoperability 
was maintained, included 
overall design information of 
the Medirixx system.” 
 
In this scenario the outsourcing company further 
outsourced their development and it was OnwardC 
which was run by a criminal/terrorist group. It is very 
difficult to defend against these types of deliberate 
vulnerabilities by outsourced companies, but both 
SafelyC and Medirixx could have reduced the 
probability of the vulnerability being present on the 
system by using the following techniques: 
 Checking and vetting procedures for components 
developed by contractors (these may include 
static techniques such as: 
♦ Inspections 
♦ Walkthroughs 
♦ Code Reviews 
♦ Compliance with standards 
 ) as well as 
♦ Review of Quality of supply 
♦ Supplier competency 
♦ Supplier process assessment 
 Security cases   
 
Validation and verification techniques (both at SafelyC 
and at Medirixx) would complement the above 
techniques  to improve the product security against 
hacking attacks in general are: 
 
 Use of Static analysis  and formal methods for 
the developed code to minimise the risk of 
security vulnerabilities left in.   
 Testing (including hiring special “tiger” teams of 
hackers) to do penetration testing on the 
delivered system and check for vulnerabilities. 
 Review of compliance with best practice 
documents for configuration of defence devices 
such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 
Access Control Rights etc. 
 
The last bullet point, with respect to configuration of 
the firewall, is much more difficult in this scenario as 
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the incorrect dosage levels were downloaded during 
‘legitimate’ patching of the system and hence these 
connections would have been allowed to proceed in the 
firewall.  Hence in these cases the most likely defence 
would have been some from of architectural diversity 
in the system: 
 Redundancy and /or  Diversity in the system 
deployed (i.e. the deployment of more than one 
version of drug dosage control developed from a 
contractor other than SafelyC). However the 
presence of diversity complicates the architecture 
and may lead to performance penalties (hence a 
more thorough assessment is required to assess 
the tradeoffs between functionality, reliability, 
security and performance)  
 Wrappers (could plausibility checks have been 
written for acceptable limits of dosage given to 
patients)  
 Watchdogs 
 
2 In point 19 of the scenario it 
is stated:  “19. But, this was 
only part of the story. TC 
had greater plans than an 
apparent financial 
motivation. Through their 
expertise and contacts with 
the black hat ecosystem, TC 
had successfully penetrated 
Lemangtrix – a huge player 
in the burgeoning space of 
world-wide personnel data 
acquisition and analysis, 
with significant contacts into 
government and intelligence 
agencies.  Lemangtrix had 
information on over a billion 
individuals, with terabytes of 
data. Lemangtrix made use 
of state-of-the art hardware, 
software and networking 
technology. They were fully 
aware that penetration of 
their database, similar say to 
the problems that TJX had in 
2007 and previous years,  
could cripple their business.” 
TC had managed to penetrate the Lemangtrix 
personnel database via social engineering and insiders 
in the company. Very difficult to protect against these 
types of attacks. Possibilities for reducing the 
probability of this type of attack include: 
 Review of security policy to ensure that rules for 
higher privilege access rights are tightened 
 Responsibility modelling so that roles and 
responsibilities within an organisation are 
properly understood and any gaps are identified. 
This may also help with the definition of a sound 
security policy. 
 
As a defence against penetration attacks from outside 
then  the following review should also be done: 
 Review of compliance with best practice 
documents for configuration of defence devices 
such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 
Access Control Rights etc. 
 
Data backup procedures also should be checked to 
ensure that backup files are securely stored and proper 
access rights are in place (which should be defined in 
the Security Policy). 
 
3 Security economics issues 
pertinent in the scenario. 
Even though the end aims of TC were proved to be the 
elimination of the rival organisation TCTarget and 
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creation of panic and confusion in the pubic of the 
enemy governments, the intermediate steps that TC 
used to get to its final aims are also related to the area 
of Security economics (see a recent report on this field 
[33]). Several recommendations have been made in the 
aforementioned report about changes in legislation to 
improve the security of systems. Even though most of 
the recommendations within them contain the 
assessment techniques we have listed in Appendix C, 
the architects of systems and solutions ought to be 
aware of the complex economic and financial 
incentives behind the attackers’ actions. This insight 
may help the architects to better understand the threats 
and the motivations and therefore lead them to the 
building of more effective defence mechanisms in their 
systems.  
      
4 In point 20 of the scenario it 
is stated: “20. TC and their 
black hat associates had 
carefully acquired tens of 
millions individual records 
from Lemangtrix and had 
made use of their own 
Botnets (and peer-to-peer 
technologies) to distribute 
the data “securely” on 
compromised PCs globally. 
(The data was acquired 
through various means 
including social engineering, 
improper backup procedures, 
and penetration of the 
Lemangtrix databases.)”. 
The compromise on the system and the techniques 
available to reduce the probability of the compromise 
occurring were covered in 2 above. Point 20 of the 
scenario details the methods used by the company to 
distribute the compromised data and therefore reduce 
the public trust (and hence the share price) of 
Lemangtrix and MegaBank.  The response by 
MegaBank and Lemagtrix following the divulgence of 
the data will have to be largely defensive aiming to 
reduce the uncertainty and panic of their customers.  
5 Forensic aspects to do with 
“following the money” 
issues raised in point 26: 
“Internationally, Intelligence 
and Police agencies spent 
substantial effort at 
analyzing what actually 
happened. Following the 
money,  investigators 
determined that there had 
been substantial short 
ordering of Lemangtrix, 
MegaBank and Meditrixx. 
Fortunately, international 
agreements regarding 
financial activities, 
simplified the process of 
determining the cash flow. It 
was determined and certified 
This point of the scenario raises important issues with 
respect to the forensic investigation aspects used by 
law enforcement and high-tech crime investigation 
units. TC in this case have been quite successful in 
covering their tracks and shifting the responsibility to 
the rival organisation TCTarget which suffered the 
brunt of the retaliation.  
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that the profits (in the 
hundreds of millions of 
dollars) had been sent to four 
specific banks. Each of these 
four banks was associated 
with the TCTarget crime 
organization, which had a 
global reach and was, 
amongst other activities, 
involved with both the drug 
trade and arms smuggling. 
Under severe political and 
public pressure, the 
intelligence and policing 
agencies, along with 
substantial military support, 
was directed towards the 
crippling of the TCTarget 
organization”   
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Analysis of Scenario 2: Oil and Gas Sector – (present time) 
No. Specific issue in the 
Scenario 
How we might address it with existing or emergent 
V&V techniques  
1 The scenario first describes 
that an oil spill has happened 
at an offshore Oil extraction 
platform in the Gulf of 
Mexico. It then proposes 
three alternative 
explanations of what could 
have caused the oil spill. 
Alternative explanation 1: 
“Was there a malicious 
modification of the SCADA 
control software, which was 
programmed to slowly 
increase the maximum 
allowable pressure of oil and 
gas which flowed through 
the feeder line.” Description 
continues in the next row …  
 
Regardless of whether the modification was malicious 
or not, better testing of the product (either by the 
original vendor of the COTS component or in-house 
once the system was delivered) would have increased 
the probability of the fault being detected and fixed. 
Therefore some of the testing techniques, listed in 
Appendix C of this report, would have helped with 
increasing the probability of preventing the fault from 
remaining undetected in the COTS component before it 
was made operational. A recommendation would be to 
use the Boundary value analysis technique to check 
how the system reacts to extreme values. 
In more detail the following evaluation would help 
here: 
 Black box and white box testing (the latter, if the 
COTS code is available) 
 Static analysis 
 Formal method techniques 
 Checking and vetting procedures for components 
developed by off-the-shelf component suppliers  
 
2 The scenario continues from 
the sentence in 1 above: “If 
true, such an attack would 
have been pre-meditated and 
performed either by the 
original vendor or an 
intermediary third party who 
had access to the original 
software and made the 
malicious modifications. 
This was realistic given that 
spyware has been found 
embedded in COTS 
software. It was also 
possible that there had been 
third party intervention on 
the part of an adversary 
intelligence agency, terrorist 
group, or organized crime.” 
If the product vendor has left a backdoor on the COTS 
software then it is very difficult to protect against 
them. Continued monitoring of the system from human 
administrators is a possibility but this may be 
expensive and not clear whether it would have had an 
effect in this case. When COTS components are used 
in safety critical environments more thorough testing is 
required as mentioned in 1 above.  
But high assurance may be difficult to obtain without 
using of some form of diversity in the system 
architecture: 
 Redundancy and /or  Diversity in the system 
deployed (i.e. the deployment of more than one 
version the COTS component). As mentioned in 
the earlier scenarios, there are tradeoffs between 
functionality, reliability, security and 
performance when diverse components are 
employed as complexity of the system 
architecture is increased.   
 Wrappers (could plausibility checks have been 
written to check for maximum allowable 
pressure of oil and gas which flowed through the 
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feeder line?) 
  Watchdogs  
 
3 The 2nd alternative 
explanation for the cause of 
the oil spill: “Oil4U 
acknowledged that their 
SCADA system failed for a 
relatively short time due to 
an accidental error when a 
maintenance technician 
brought a laptop infected 
with a computer virus into 
the on-shore control room.  
The virus infected the PCs in 
the system, turning them into 
“zombies,” which 
continually flooded the 
controllers with nuisance 
messages.” 
Continues in the next row… 
Possibilities for reducing the probability of this type of 
attack include: 
 Review of security policy to ensure that a 
sandboxed environment is created for new 
machines (or even known machines with an 
uncertain security status since last connection in 
the system) until they are deemed safe to be 
reconnected to the network. This should be done 
automatically for all machines, and 
circumventing this restriction should only be 
allowed to a restricted number of individuals and 
only for a well-defined set of tasks.  
 Responsibility modelling so that roles and 
responsibilities within an organisation are 
properly understood and any gaps are identified. 
This may also help with the definition of a sound 
security policy. 
 
As a defence against penetration attacks from outside 
then  the following review should also be done: 
 Review of compliance with best practice 
documents for configuration of defence devices 
such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 
Access Control Rights etc. 
 
4 Continues from previous 
row: “While Oil4U operators 
responded rapidly, rebooting 
the controllers within 
minutes, the DoS attack 
continued, shutting down the 
controllers every time they 
re-booted. Unfortunately, 
during the attack, one of the 
controllers could not read 
data from a pressure sensor 
which indicated increasing 
pressures in one of the 
feeder lines. Though the 
operators realized that there 
was a problem in the 
SCADA network, there was 
still a time lag until a manual 
override was executed and 
while there was indication of 
The scenario illustrates the importance of human factor 
analysis during system design especially the 
consideration of: 
 the level of human intervention required by the 
system 
 the complexity of operator actions required 
 the potential for operator error to directly lead to 
a system failure 
 the level of training available to the operator 
Risk assessment would also help for assessing and 
quantifying the risk of failure both from safety as well 
as reliability or security point of view: 
 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS). 
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 Event Tree analysis 
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a lower than expected 
pressure on one of the feeder 
lines this was not viewed as 
being particularly abnormal, 
since some operators ignore 
or under-set Pressure 
Sensitive Low (PSL) alarms. 
Ultimately, the virus was 
removed, but only after 
extensive environmental and 
economic damage.” 
  Fault tree analysis and dependence diagrams 
5 The 3rd alternative 
explanation for the cause of 
the oil spill: “Oil4U had 
always claimed that their 
SCADA network was 
securely separated from their 
enterprise network.  
Communication between the 
two networks was only 
allowed through a properly 
configured, state-of-the-art 
firewall and routinely 
followed regular auditing of 
their SCADA network. 
Thus, they were surprised 
when it seemed that the 
Human-Machine Interface 
(HMI) of their SCADA 
network seemed to have 
been breached. Within ten 
minutes, OIL4U’s automated 
auditing and analysis tools 
confirmed their suspicion 
that an attacker had invaded 
the SCADA HMI. The 
operators reacted 
professionally and diligently 
worked to mitigate the risk. 
Within a further twenty 
minutes the system was 
restored to normal. 
However, the operators were 
unaware that within the first 
ten minutes the attacker had 
sent a command to one of 
the controllers to modify the 
maximum allowable 
pressure on its feeder line – 
to a value in excess of its 
rated limits. The operators 
were unaware of the spill 
due to the PSL settings and 
This is yet another “access via the backdoor due to a 
compromised trusted source” case (in this instance a 
trusted corporate customer account is the trusted 
source). Similar to recommendation in row 3 above, 
the Security policy needs to be reviewed especially 
with regard to:   
 
 Review of compliance with best practice 
documents for configuration of defence devices 
such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 
Access Control Rights etc. This would ensure a 
better separation of the safety critical SCADA 
parts of the system from the billing and 
management parts. 
 
If sufficient assurance cannot be obtained about the 
effectiveness of the protection devices (firewalls IDS 
etc) then a review of the architectural design of the 
protection systems out to be done. Diversity in the 
protection devices deployed (such as diverse Firewalls, 
diverse IDSs) may bring higher assurances about the 
secure separation of SCADA sub-system from the 
billing and management sub-system    
Appendix B  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 76  
only later confirmed the 
rupture. Their initial focus 
was to identify how the 
penetration occurred. 
Oil4U’s control network is 
only connected to the 
corporate network and 
requires passing through a 
state-of-the-art firewall. The 
firewall is configured to only 
allow the billing server to 
communicate with the 
control network so as to 
permit the gathering of 
billing data in near real time. 
The billing server had been 
compromised. To 
compromise the billing 
server, there were three entry 
points: the Wireless LAN, 
the Modem Bank and the 
Internet firewall. However, 
the billing server had no 
communication with the 
wireless LAN or modem 
bank, implying that access 
had occurred through the 
Internet firewall. The only 
traffic allowed through the 
Internet firewall is the web 
server and this server is 
located in the DMZ. The 
web server passes through 
the firewall to retrieve 
billing information allowing 
Oil4U’s corporate customers 
and contractors access to 
their account status. The web 
server had also been 
compromised and the IP 
address of the attacker was 
identified. Oil4U determined 
that the attacker had 
compromised a corporate 
customer’s account and that 
the customer’s computer had 
been turned into a zombie.”  
6 The scenario description 
then divulges that the actual 
cause of the oil spill was “… 
a disgruntled employee 
decided to cause serious 
financial loss to Oil4U as 
The assessment, verification and validation techniques 
to reduce the probability of this event are similar to 
those described in 2, 3 and 5. 
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well as damage to their 
reputation.  She used the 
wireless hub to log in from 
home and change the 
parameters on the feeder 
line.”  
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Analysis of Scenario 3: Electrical Power Sector – (Circa 2012) 
    
No. 
Specific issue in the Scenario How we might address it with existing or emergent 
V&V techniques  
1 Malfunctioning of the 
protection devices due to 
mis-calibration of trip 
thresholds by out-sourced 
contractors 
 
Regardless of whether mis-calibration was deliberate 
or not, better testing of the product (either by the out-
sourced contractors or in house once the system was 
delivered) would have increased the probability of the 
fault being detected and fixed. Therefore the testing 
techniques listed above would have helped with 
increasing the probability of preventing the fault from 
remaining undetected. A recommendation would be to 
use the Boundary value analysis technique to check 
how the system reacts to extreme values. 
In more detail the following evaluation would help 
here: 
 Black box and white box testing 
 Static analysis 
 Formal method techniques 
 Checking and vetting procedures for 
components developed by contractors (such as 
static analysis techniques as well as review of 
quality of suppliers): 
♦ Inspections 
♦ Walkthroughs 
♦ Code Reviews 
♦ Compliance with standards 
♦ Review of Quality of supply 
♦ Supplier competency 
♦ Supplier process assessment 
 Security cases   
 
2 Malfunctioning of the 
protection devices due to 
memory problems caused by 
poor testing and quality 
assurance after the use of 
cheap third party components 
Same recommendation as for 1 above.   
3 In the running commentary 
of the scenario  we have the 
following claim: “The 
attackers had sown an easily 
detectable ‘bug’ by using a 
friend in the contracting 
company to miss-set the trip 
The attackers had used an insider in the company to 
insert malicious code. Very difficult to protect against 
these types of attacks. Possibilities for reducing the 
probability of this type of attack include: 
 Review of security policy to ensure that rules for 
higher privilege access rights are tightened 
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levels in some of the 
protection devices. The 
malicious code they had 
inserted by intercepting the 
devices after manufacture 
had not been detected, 
despite the industry approved 
audits and assessments that 
had taken place, and some 
had been activated and tested 
in this incident. However 
once run it also self 
destructed.” 
 Responsibility modelling so that roles and 
responsibilities within an organisation are 
properly understood and any gaps are identified. 
This may also help with the definition of a 
sound security policy.  
4 Script kiddy programs were 
used to access and disrupt the 
risk status warning system 
(part of the management 
system) 
Even though the scenario does not specify which script 
kiddy programs in particular were used, there is a 
danger from the growing number of automated 
malicious tools which allow even inexperienced users 
to launch sophisticated attacks with little training. 
Validation and verification techniques that will help to 
improve the product security against hacking attacks 
in general are: 
 Use of Static analysis  and formal methods for 
the developed code to minimise the risk of 
security vulnerabilities left in.   
 Testing (including hiring special “tiger” teams 
of hackers) to do penetration testing on the 
system and check for vulnerabilities. 
 Review of compliance with best practice 
documents for configuration of defence devices 
such as Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 
Access Control Rights etc. 
  Review of the architectural design of the 
system. The presence of architectural controls: 
♦ Redundancy and /or  Diversity in the 
protection devices deployed (such as diverse 
Firewalls, diverse IDSs), 
♦ Wrappers 
♦ Watchdogs 
 After the product is released, then regular 
patching of the product will be the needed to 
maintain continued security. 
5 The following claim is made 
on the scenario: “The attack 
on the management system 
may be a coordinated attack 
with the attack on the control 
system or it may be a 
separate attack from another 
From the validation and verification point of view 
techniques to improve the system security are similar 
to those mentioned in 4 above. Additionally, for 
coordinated attacks, extensive data collection and use 
of real time alerting tools (such as the firewalls, IDS 
and IPS tools mentioned in 4) may allow a system 
administrator to anticipate attacks against one sub-
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terrorist / criminal group.” system (in this case the management sub-system) 
based on knowledge of attacks against another sub-
system (in this case the control sub-system). Tradeoffs 
in configuration will exist though between increasing 
the detection (reducing the false negative rate) and 
reducing the false alarms (reducing the false positive 
rate).   
6 Operation and ownership of 
the market had reduced 
safety margins. Market 
mechanisms were efficient at 
aggregating some properties 
(efficiency) but not others 
(resilience, redundancy).  
Several layers of operation and ownership may be 
involved:  
 those that regulate the market, 
 ownership of the generator and  
 transmission companies. 
There is a need for proper regulations both in the 
industry and imposed by national governments and/or 
EU commission to ensure that those that regulate and 
evaluate the market are independent from the 
contractors, owners and transmission companies, to 
guarantee impartiality and reduce the conflicts of 
interest. This strategy is practiced in the British 
Nuclear industry. 
7 A lack of security from 
obscurity, diversity of 
technology, operation and 
ownership.  
The availability of open-standards has many benefits 
from the viewpoint of reliability and ease of 
development (due to the possibility of tapping talents 
from many countries and across different cultures) but 
this brings difficulties with the loss of security from 
obscurity.  
System designers and critical infrastructure regulators 
need to be aware of the open standards and incorporate 
this in the security policy. One strategy would be to 
have extensive security evaluation by the open 
standards community to identify the potential flaws in 
the system architecture. In this the lack of obscurity 
can be turned into an advantage rather than a 
drawback.  
8 High risk of cascading 
failures to other critical 
infrastructures (telecoms). 
The scenario depicts an 
incident in which the telecom 
service in badly affected 
areas was reduced to only 
emergency/essential 
communications. 
In complex systems of systems it may become difficult 
to place the boundaries of the system. The power grid 
has implication on the telecom network and 
breakdown in the power supply may lead to social 
unrests as was seen in the scenario. Various Risk 
Analysis techniques should be used to assess the risks 
of major power failures and ensure that sufficient 
contingency plans are put in place. This may also 
require long term public policy initiatives from the 
national governments to diversify the source of 
electricity supplies and ensure that enough redundancy 
and diversity is present in the network infrastructure to 
reduce the risk of major failures that propagate and 
cascade through the network.  
9 The scenario contains the One of the reasons reported for the mid-air collision of 
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following text:  “The phone 
rang and Helmut came across 
to say that the management 
information system had just 
gone down. It was not “patch 
Tuesday” but the system had 
been under maintenance and 
there had been some 
difficulty bringing it back up. 
They were having to role 
back to a previous 
configuration, an activity 
they often rehearsed, but this 
would take 30 mins to 
reboot.” 
two aircrafts over Uberlingen in 2002 was that the 
main radar system was being backed-up and was 
unavailable to the air-traffic controller who (having to 
manage two workstations at the same time) gave the 
wrong/delayed advice to Flight 2937 leading to the 
collision. The issues of having a critical part of the 
system down for a period of time (even if very short) 
needs to be carefully studied and ensure that sufficient 
redundancy and diversity (either in the form of 
redundant/diverse systems or additional human 
personnel) are in place to mitigate and shorten the at-
risk-time. 
10 The scenario contains the 
following text regarding 
cascading failures: “The 
system configuration and 
dynamics was complex and 
fast moving and Karl had no 
way of checking that the 
protection was working as 
specified. A few of the 
disturbances propagated and 
began to challenge the anti-
cascading technology.  This 
was playing havoc with the 
system dynamics and the 
frequency was fluctuating 
close to the limits. The 
operators attempted to 
stabilise the situation but the 
problems developed further 
leading to isolation of part of 
the transmission network.” 
The cascading failures problem depicted here is a 
serious issue in complex and seemingly boundaryless 
systems as the Power grid depicted in the scenario. 
Risk analysis (such as  Event-tree-analysis) may help 
to flesh out the sequence of events that may happen if 
there is a failure and hence identify in advance to 
which parts of the system will the failure propagate to. 
11 The scenario contains the 
following text: 
“Unfortunately the unusual 
operating configuration 
caused by the bad weather in 
the south and the already 
difficult situation led to some 
clumsy disconnections. They 
worked hard to stabilise the 
remaining network but much 
was in the hands of the 
automation that’ seemed to 
do what it was designed to 
do, shedding load, isolating 
the network and shutting 
regions. They of course made 
some mistakes as they 
The text highlights the important role the humans play 
in these complex socio-technical systems. Hence 
Human factor analysis and Responsibility modelling 
are very important both prior to the deployment as 
well as during the operational use of the system. All 
parts of Human factor analysis listed in Appendix C of 
the report (e.g.availability and quality of operation and 
maintenance instructions; the level of human 
intervention required by the system; the complexity of 
operator actions required; etc) would have helped 
mitigate the risk depicted in the scenario. 
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working under extreme 
pressure. The networks 
stabilised and a series of 
islands but significant urban 
centres were left 
disconnected.” 
12 The following text exists in 
the scenario: “The control 
rooms soon had the CEO and 
company lawyers on the 
phone asking strangely 
detailed questions about what 
had been effected, how much 
was due to their action and 
how much was automated. 
They began to feel uneasy 
about the attitudes and being 
treated as if they were 
responsible. Of course they 
had made some a few 
mistakes while operating 
under pressure but they felt 
the management interest was 
misplaced. What was 
happening was the supply 
chain had sought legal 
redress for the damage 
caused and there were legal 
actions to secure evidence 
even at the expense of 
restoring operation. The need 
for evidence collection and 
uncertainty of the legal 
situation had paralysed some 
of the senior management. 
There were suggestions that 
operators were personally 
liable for the priorities of the 
decisions made in 
reconnection and the 
subsequent, often implicit,  
trade-offs that (e.g. that 
company X lost more than Y, 
distress to person X 
increased but not to Y as 
couldn’t get to hospital in 
time). 
The problems depicted here stems from unclear 
Responsibility modelling. As listed in section 
Appendix C of the report, responsibility modelling 
makes a clear distinction between Causal 
responsibility -  the obligation to ensure that some 
state of affairs comes about or is/is not maintained; 
and Consequential responsibility -  the obligation to 
take the blame if some state of affairs does not come 
about or is/is not maintained.  
A clear definition of the responsibilities would reduce 
the need of interfering with operators during peak 
hours, which undoubtedly affects morale.   
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Applicability of techniques to general SoSs and their constituent 
components (including COTS)   
This section lists list the techniques (described in Appendix C of the report) in a table and 
discusses whether they apply for the assessment of complex Systems of Systems, or their 
constituent parts (including COTS components) in general.  
The table is structured as follows: 
 The first column numbers the technique for easier cross referencing. 
 The second column specifies the type of the assessment technique. 
 The third column lists the assessment technique (in cases where the technique could b e 
further sub-grouped then we give the technique name as, for example,  Sub-group: sub-
sub-group: technique name.  
 The fourth column asks, in simpler terms whether the technique can be applied for 
assessment of SoSs. 
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No. 
Technique 
family 
Technique name Can the technique be used for 
assessment of SoSs? 
1 System 
development 
Life-cycle 
methods 
Compliance with processes 
defined in standards 
Yes: compliance with standards 
(either for the whole SoS or for 
parts of the SoS) will most 
probably be required for most 
future SoSs   
2 Audit of specific aspects of a 
lifecycle 
Yes: however the lifecycle of the 
SoS is likely to be much more 
complicated as different parts of the 
SoS may be developed by different 
suppliers before they are integrated 
in the main system.  
3 Use of iterative development 
processes 
Yes: but due to the complex and 
compartmentalised nature of the 
SoSs the iterative process will need 
to be done at lower levels of 
granularity (at component or sub-
system level)   
4 Competence management  Yes: this will be required at many 
levels especially in the SoSs 
integration and the subsequent 
running.  
5 Review of the requirements 
process 
Yes: for the global set of 
requirements that the SoS is 
required to fulfil as well as the 
requirements of each individual 
component or Sub-system.  
6 Review of 
Quality of 
supply 
Supplier competency  
 
Yes: if the different parts of the 
SoS are to be developed by a third 
or eternal party there needs to be a 
proper review of the competency of 
the suppliers (especially for safety-, 
security-, or mission-critical SoSs. 
7 Supplier process assessment Yes: same reason as for 6 above. 
8 Architecture Redundancy    Yes: redundancy in the different 
parts of the SoS (especially the 
safety critical ones) will be required 
to reduce the likelihood of 
complete systems failures 
(especially those due to hardware). 
9 Diversity: Design diversity Yes: diversity of suppliers may also 
lead to a lot of heterogeneity in the 
system (i.e. different parts of the 
system are constructed with 
different programming 
languages/development 
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methodologies). Additionally more 
than one diverse instance of a 
component or sub-system  may 
need to be developed to increase 
the probability of a 
safe/secure/reliable/available SoS 
(especially for safety-critical SoSs). 
However the introduction of 
diversity for these, already very 
complex, SoSs could have a 
detrimental effect on the 
manageability, hence possibly 
reducing the dependability of the 
SoS. 
10 Diversity: Data diversity Yes: SoSs are likely to be 
constructed to enable multiple 
modes of interaction with the 
system (or for the interaction of the 
different sub-systems between 
them). 
11 Diversity: Functional 
diversity 
Yes: the SOS could have 
functionally diverse  components or 
sub-systems 
12 Wrappers   Note for the whole SoS:  probably 
wrapping will only be possible at 
the lower level of granularity (of 
components or sub-systems) 
13 Watchdogs   Yes: same as for 12 above.  
14 Validation and 
verification 
techniques 
Testing: Black Box 
(functional)Testing:  
Equivalence Classes and 
Input partitioning Testing 
Not for the whole SoS: testing the 
whole SoS may be very difficult if 
not impossible (hence some form of 
simulation may to be done). 
Therefore only sub-systems can be 
black-box tested. 
15 Testing: Black Box 
(functional)Testing: 
Boundary value analysis 
Not for the whole SoS: same as for 
14 above. 
16 Testing: Black Box 
(functional)Testing: Error 
Guessing 
Not for the whole SoS: same as for 
14 above. 
17 Testing: Black Box 
(functional)Testing: Stress 
testing 
Not for the whole SoS: same as for 
14 above. 
18 Testing: Black Box 
(functional)Testing: 
Statistical testing (see the 
Reliability evaluation section 
below) 
Not for the whole SoS: same as for 
14 above. 
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19 Testing: White Box 
(Structure-based) Testing: 
Control Flow Analysis 
Not for the whole SoS: control flow 
analysis may have to be done at 
even lower levels of granularity 
than for Black box testing above. 
Hence the feasibility of this 
technique for the large SoSs may 
have to be questioned 
20 Testing: White Box 
(Structure-based) Testing: 
Data Flow Analysis 
Not for the whole SoS: same as for 
19 above.  
21 Testing: White Box 
(Structure-based) Testing: 
Cause Consequence 
Diagrams 
Yes: in theory it is possible, but in 
practice may be infeasible due to 
the extremely high number of 
cause-consequence combinations 
and trees.  
22 Testing: White Box 
(Structure-based) Testing: 
Unit testing 
Yes. 
23 Testing: White Box 
(Structure-based) Testing: 
Integration testing 
Yes: this will be very important for 
SoSs as, by definition, an SoS is 
made up of many components or 
sub-systems which need to be 
integrated together in one large 
SoS.  
24 Static Analysis Yes: even though it is possible to do 
static analysis for the whole system, 
likely budgetary, time and 
complexity constraints may limit 
their use to a smaller number of 
safety-, mission-critical 
components within the SoS.  
25 Common-mistake Analysis Yes. 
26 Formal methods and 
semantic analysis 
Yes: similar to 24 above. 
27 Human factors analysis:  the 
consideration placed on 
human factors in each phase 
of the lifecycle 
Yes: especially important for SoSs 
to have a socio-technical viewpoint 
of the system during its 
construction and assessment. 
28 Human factors analysis: 
availability and quality of 
operation and maintenance 
instructions 
Yes: of very high importance for 
SoSs. Because the SoSs are 
complex by definition the location 
if instructions and documents for 
each component and sub-system 
part need to be made available.  
29 Human factors analysis: the 
level of human intervention 
required by the system 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
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30 Human factors analysis: the 
complexity of operator 
actions required 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
31 Human factors analysis: the 
potential for operator error 
to directly lead to a system 
failure 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
32 Human factors analysis: the 
simplicity and intuitiveness of 
the user interface 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
33 Human factors analysis: the 
stress placed on the operator 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
34 Human factors analysis: the 
level of training available to 
the operator 
Yes: similar to 28 above. 
35 Risk 
assessment 
Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOPS) 
Yes.  
36 Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) 
Yes: but due to the complexity of 
the system enumerating the 
complete failures of the system will 
be infeasible. Likely to be more 
useful at the component or sub-
system level.  
37 Event Tree analysis  Yes: similar to 36 above. 
38 Fault tree analysis and 
dependence diagrams 
Yes: similar to 36 above. 
39 Reliability 
evaluation 
Reliability block diagrams Yes: likely to be useful for 
modelling the reliability of the 
hardware parts of the SoS. The 
‘blocks’ could be constructed at 
several layers of abstraction, e.g. at 
a coarser level of granularity the 
components or subsystems of the 
SoS could form a block. 
40 Reliability growth modelling Yes: possible if the execution time 
of the SoS can be estimated well. 
But due to the complexity of the 
system and the many types of 
failures that can happen 
(correctness, security, safety etc.) 
strong and maybe unrealistic 
assumptions will need to be made 
in order to use a reliability growth 
model for an SoS 
41 Evaluation of field 
experience 
Yes: for a large SoS it is likely that 
a lot of dependability data will be 
collected (fault and failure reports, 
vulnerabilities, security breach 
Appendix B  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 88  
attempts etc). The large amount of 
data is likely to overwhelm the 
administrators though and 
techniques are needed to utilise this 
data properly for dependability 
modelling and predictions.  
42 Dependability 
cases 
Security cases Unknown: the development of this 
evaluation mechanism is still in its 
infancy and not clear yet how well 
it can be used in practice for large 
SoSs  
43 Safety cases Yes: likely to be mandatory for 
safety critical SoSs. Most likely to 
be useful at the component and sub-
system level. Likely to get very 
complex at the SoS level unless 
simplifying assumptions are made.   
44 Diverse arguments Unknown: similar to 42 above.   
45 Responsibility 
modelling 
Causal responsibility Yes: in large SoS it is very 
important to be clear about the 
responsibilities of humans in the 
SoS. For the Causal responsibility: 
important to make clear throughout 
the SoS who is responsible for 
carrying out a task or action.      
46 Consequential responsibility Yes: similar to 45 above. For 
consequential responsibility, 
important to make clear who has 
the responsibility of dealing with 
the consequences of a failure?  
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Appendix C - Task 2: State of the Art in the Assessment of 
SoS of COTS Components 
Introduction 
This section presents a review of frameworks and processes for assessment of COTS 
components, as well as evaluation, validation and verification techniques that can be used to 
assess the dependability and security of complex SoSs, including those built out of COTS 
components. It also presents research challenges in the assessment of SoSs made up of COTS 
components stemming from the limitations of the current state of the art. Hence this section 
addresses Task 2 of the proposal which states “characterise the present state of the art in 
assessment of SoS of COTS based components and in particular explain and understand why 
existing methods do not either scale or otherwise translate to the SoSoS context”. 
In the rest of this section we will first summarise the nature and characteristics of COTS 
components. We then provide a review of the assessment processes, frameworks and methods 
proposed in the literature for COTS components, including in safety critical domains such as 
the medical, nuclear and defence sectors. We also provide a summary of evaluation, 
validation and verification techniques for both systems and SoSs in general as well as for 
constituent components of SoSs (including COTS components). In Appendices A and B of 
this report we provide guidelines on how these techniques can be applied for the assessment 
of SoSs and their components by using as examples the SoSs depicted in the three scenarios 
that have been developed by a NATO research task group (of which CSR, City University is a 
contributing partner). And finally we summarise the research challenges of COTS assessment 
in large SoS context. 
Nature of COTS components 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software components (or simply Off-The-Shelf (OTS) 
software components) come in a variety of forms [32], such as: 
 Components that form part of a program (e.g. various graphical, statistical or 
mathematical libraries of functions used to perform specific tasks; device drivers such 
as, for example, a JDBC (Java DataBase Connectivity) which provide implementations 
of Java interfaces for connecting to a database). 
 Standalone programs and utilities (e.g. compilers) 
 High level service programs (operating system kernels, database management systems 
programs, web servers, applications servers, office applications etc.) 
 Complete systems of integrated software and hardware components (alarm systems, 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), medical devices, Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) systems, air-traffic management systems etc.) 
The main characteristics of COTS are: 
 The components already exist and cannot be re-engineered (exceptions are some open-
source OTS with less restrictive license agreements for which the code is available for 
changing) 
 Due to their general-purpose use, most components may contain functions that are not 
necessary for a specific application. 
 COTS with a substantial user-base are subject to continuous change and evolution to 
meet users’ evolving requirements. 
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COTS-based development 
Development of COTS-based systems (i.e. systems which will primarily be constructed from 
COTS components, “glue-code” and/or component “wrapping” (the wrapping may especially 
be required in defence and other safety–critical environments)) differs from the conventional 
system development. With COTS-based systems the emphasis shifts from conventional 
specification, design and implementation to COTS component selection, configuration (or 
tailoring) and integration.  There will need to be an initial statement of requirements which 
clearly states what the system should do, and a high level design (especially if the COTS-
based system requires the integration of several COTS components) to get an overall picture 
of the new system (UML Component Diagrams [104] could be one mechanism of showing 
the high level design). The COTS selection stage can then begin. During this stage 
conventional assessment techniques can be used and/or adapted to assess the most optimal 
COTS components to be used in a given system. The selection will need to be done from 
various functional as well as non-functional requirements and dependability attributes 
(reliability, performance, security etc). During the configuration stage the COTS 
component(s) are then tailored and configured to work optimally and consistently in the wider 
system in which they will be integrated (it is not uncommon for some complex COTS 
components such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems to take up to 18 months to 
configure). The final stage will be the system integration. The integration stage may require 
development of “glue-code”/middleware as well as component “wrapping”. This whole 
process will most likely need to be iterative (see Fig. 1 for details). For example the 
Configuration phase may tell us that some of the COTS components cannot be configured to 
run consistently with other components in the wider system hence the requirements may have 
to be revised and the selection process needs to be redone using the for the revised 
requirements. A similar process for the last three stages of development (selection, 
configuration and integration) is proposed in [105], which also gives finer level process 
elements for each of these three stages. 
In this report we will be mainly concerned with COTS assessment issues. However in 
Appendix D we present a table which offers an outline of the various assessment and 
architectural techniques for these three main COTS-based system development phases.         
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Figure 3 – COTS-based development iterative system life cycle. 
 
Problems with COTS component assessment 
The main characteristics of COTS components highlighted in the previous sections lead to 
novel assessment problems compared with assessment of conventional bespoke systems, or 
similar assessment problems which may be more highlighted when assessing COTS 
components. In this section we will discuss some of these problems. 
Non-compliance to standards and best practice documents 
For safety- or business-critical applications, in particular, purpose-built products traditionally 
would come with extensive documentation, evidence of good development practice, 
compliance to standards and of extensive verification and validation. With mass-distributed 
COTS products on the other hand, users (system designers or end users) invariably find not 
only a lack of this documentation, but anecdotal evidence of serious failures and/or bugs that 
undermines trust in the product. As mentioned before, COTS components are usually 
developed for general-purpose use hence they may not comply with standards of a specific 
application.  
Establishing COTS provenance 
Since evidence about how the COTS component was developed may not be available, it is 
difficult for assessors to establish what the COTS component contains (e.g. whether any 
accidental / or malicious backdoor exists in the system). Additionally, evidence from testing 
prior to the release of the COTS component is rarely made available by the vendors. Hence, 
without extensive black-box testing it is difficult for assessors to assess key functionality, 
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reliability and performance requirements that may be dictated by the target application, 
system or SoS, e.g.: 
 whether the COTS component fulfils its functional requirements; 
 whether the COTS component performs its functions within a sufficient level of 
reliability required by the target application (especially important when the COTS 
component is to be integrated in larger system or SoS) 
 whether the COTS component responds within an acceptable time-delay as required by 
the target application. 
Problems from unwanted/unneeded functionality 
As mentioned before, COTS components often come with functionality that is unneeded for a 
given application. In some cases this unneeded functionality may also be dangerous in the 
new system or SoS, e.g. allowing unencrypted remote connections to the COTS component 
by default. In most cases the COTS component can be configured to tailor the need of the 
target application, but some unwanted behaviour may not have been documented well enough 
(or at all) by the vendor hence leaving the target application vulnerable.  
Problems stemming from patches and updates 
With bespoke software, updates and patches come from one source and hence their effects on 
the system are easier to control and predict. In large systems or SoSs built with large number 
of COTS components from many different vendors, patches and updates may cause serious 
system stability problems. The updates and patches for one COTS component may be 
inconsistent with those of other COTS components in the system or the application as a whole 
and hence lead to new failures. Since COTS components may themselves be composed of 
other COTS components, some of these changes and updates may not be self-evident (i.e. the 
higher level COTS may contain the same release version number even though it is made up of 
updated/patched COTS components).  
On the other hand, simply refusing to allow patches to COTS components is dangerous as the 
patches and updates may contain important security problem fixes, hence leaving the COTS 
component unfixed may leave the whole system vulnerable to attacks. Patching and update 
issues are also discussed in [33] (a recommendation given in [33] is to separate the security 
patches from functionality patches and updates: the first kind should be mandatory: the 
vulnerabilities posse a security risk to the application and others (if the application is online); 
whereas the second kind should be optional and it should be left to the users to decided 
whether applying the update will lead to system stability problems and hence may not be 
worth updating, at least in the short term).   
Difficulties with optimal COTS component selection  
For any given family of COTS components there may be a plethora of available solutions 
available from various vendors. For example, there are a multitude of available database 
management system (DBMS) products available in the market (both commercial closed-
development and free open-source).  For any given application, it is important to choose the 
most suitable component(s). The suitability of the component needs to be assessed from 
several different dependability attributes (safety, security, reliability, performance etc.). Since 
any assessment is conducted with limited resources and under various assumptions, which 
may not hold true in real operation, the outcome of the assessment is subject to uncertainty – 
the assessor may never be 100% sure that what they concluded during the assessment (both 
about the values of the attributes as well as the choice of a COTS component) will be 
confirmed when the COTS component is used in operation. Most of the existing approaches 
for COTS selection do not explicitly deal with uncertainty in the assessment, which may lead 
to sub-optimal COTS products being chosen.  
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Dependence Among Attributes 
COTS component assessment requires dealing with multiple attributes of the COTS 
components being compared. For example reliability, performance, security, safety etc., as 
mentioned previously. The selection of a particular COTS component, thus, is a multi-criteria 
decision which taken under uncertain values of the attributes naturally leads to the question 
about the dependence between the uncertainties associated with the individual attributes. 
Ignoring the possible dependence between the attributes represents a particular form of belief: 
that assessing attribute X one can learn nothing about another attribute, Y. For example, 
performance of a COTS component will hardly tell anything about the quality of its 
documentation and vice versa. It is quite obvious, however, that not all COTS component 
attributes are like that. In many cases while assessing an attribute X the assessor may infer 
something about another set of attributes. For instance if we devise a prototype in order to 
assess the functionality of a COTS component in the process we will learn something about 
the performance (how quickly this COTS component responds to requests) and how reliable 
the COTS component is. A more subtle, but very useful concept, as we will see later, is that 
the uncertainties associated with the assessed attributes may be dependent. Informally, 
assume that we want to assess the reliability and performance of a COTS component. We 
may assume that the uncertainties associated with these two attributes are independent, in the 
statistical sense. Under this assumption learning something about reliability will tell us 
nothing about performance and vice versa. Now suppose that we have run a very long testing 
campaign and have repeatedly observed that whenever the response was late it was also 
incorrect and no other incorrect response has been observed. With such evidence of a strong 
positive correlation between the failures (incorrect responses) and the responses being late, 
we may accept that any change of our belief about the rate of failure should also be translated 
into a change in our belief about the rate of late responses. Current approaches for COTS 
assessment and selection invariably assume that the attributes are independent and do not 
allow for dependencies between their uncertain values to be captured adequately. 
Current approaches to assessing COTS components 
There exists a plethora of approaches for assessment of COTS components. The approaches 
differ amongst themselves based on which dependability attributes they consider (safety, 
reliability, security, performance etc.) as well as for which domains they were developed 
(defence, medical, nuclear, non-safety critical commercial, etc.). 
In the next few sections we will provide: a brief survey of COTS component selection 
approaches; a summary of standards for COTS assessment in three safety-critical domains, 
namely health-care, nuclear power sector and the defence domain; and finally we summarise 
a list of evaluation, validation and verification techniques available for assessment of COTS 
components.   
Overview of COTS selection approaches 
Summary of main approaches 
There is a wide variety of COTS component assessment approaches available. All of them 
start with an initial statement of requirements, which defines what is being sought. It has been 
proposed that the requirements initially should not be too stringent, since this would discard 
potentially appropriate COTS component candidates at a very early stage [106], [107]. It has 
even been suggested [107] that if the requirements are not flexible then the COTS-based 
development may not be appropriate and bespoke development could be more cost-effective. 
So initially [107] suggests distinguishing between essential requirements and those that are 
negotiable. The selection criteria are then based on the essential requirements. 
Off-the-shelf-option (OTSO) [108] is a multi-phase approach to COTS component selection. 
The phases are: the search phase, the screening and evaluation phase and the analysis phase. 
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In the first phase COTS components are identified. In the screening and evaluation phase the 
components are further filtered using a set of evaluation criteria (established from a number 
of sources, including the requirements specification, the high level design specification etc.). 
In the analysis phase results of the evaluation are analyzed, which lead to the final selection of 
COTS components for inclusion in the system. Other similar multiphase process approaches 
for COTS component evaluation that have been proposed include CEP (Comparative 
Evaluation Process Activities) [109], CBA Process Decision Framework [110] which in 
addition to defining a process for COTS component assessment also defines two other 
processes: COTS integration (“gluing”) and COTS configuration (“tailoring”); CAP-COTS 
Acquisition Process method [111] and PECA Process [112].  
Procurement-oriented requirements engineering (PORE) [113] is a process in which 
requirements are defined in parallel with COTS component evaluation and selection. [113] 
propose using prototypes to develop knowledge concerning COTS components and their use 
within the wider system. Other methods that are centred on the requirements to assist with the 
COTS component selection process are CRE-COTS-Based Requirements Engineering 
Method [114], Storyboard Process [115], Combined Selection of COTS Components [116] 
and COTS-DSS [117]. 
CISD (COTS-based Integrated System Development) [118] and CDSEM (Checklist Driven 
Software Evaluation Methodology) [119] are both checklist-based evaluation methodologies. 
STACE (Socio Technical Approach to COTS Evaluation) [120] is a socio-technical approach 
to evaluation which builds on work of [113]and [108] and emphasizes the organizational 
issues related to COTS selection. 
Most of the approaches above that we have surveyed are concerned with “process”, i.e. which 
phases should be followed through the COTS assessment so that a single COTS component 
can be chosen for a given application. When it comes to measurements, assessment and 
testing of the COTS components, most of these approaches use check-list based approaches to 
assess the COTS components and scores in the Likert scale [121] are given for each attribute 
under assessment. The results of each attribute rae then usually combined with multi-attribute 
utility theory or analytical hierarchical process approaches so that the competing COTS 
components are ranked and the one with the highest score is chosen. 
Two common deficiencies of all of these approaches is their failure to handle explicitly the 
uncertainty that is inherent during the assessment process and their failure to adequately 
capture and deal with the dependence between the values of the functional and non-functional 
attributes.       
Uncertainty conscious approach to COTS component assessment and selection  
At CSR, City University we have recently developed a method for assessment of COTS 
components when reliability (measured as probability of failure on demand) and performance 
(measured as probability of late response on demand, given a predefined timeout value) 
attributes of a COTS component are of main concern.  Full details of the method and the 
underlying assessment model are given in [122]. The method is based on an extension and 
adaptation of a previous assessment model developed at CSR, City University [123]. Our 
proposed method tried to improve on existing methods of COTS component assessment 
which, as mentioned previously, invariably assumed that values of the dependability attributes 
of COTS components are known with certainty and that the uncertainties in the values 
between the different attributes are independent of each other. Our approach attempts to 
provide the assessors with the capability of expressing (using probability distribution) their 
doubt (uncertainty) in the values of reliability and performance attributes of a COTS 
component and the dependencies that may exist between the values of these two attributes. 
We illustrated how the assessment can be done with off-the-shelf database management 
system products  [122]. In the same paper we also provide a discussion of how the method 
can be extended to assessments where more dependability attributes need to be considered, 
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and the difficulties associated with assessments where more than two attributes need to be 
considered.   
Domain specific assessment solutions 
A report [32] prepared by Adelard for the UK Health and Safety Executive gives a very good 
overview of methods and techniques for assessing safety integrity of COTS components (or 
“Software Of Uncertain Pedigree” (SOUP) which is the term used for COTS components in 
the aforementioned report). The same report also reviews the recommendations for use and 
assessment of safety properties of off-the-shelf components in the medical, nuclear and 
defence domains.  
COTS component use in the medical domain 
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Department of Health and Human 
Services have issued a guidance document for use of COTS components in medical devices 
[124]. The guidance document is risk based and hazard analysis is recommended to reduce 
the risk of safety-critical failures. The main purpose of the guide is to make recommendations 
on the needed documentation for all COTS software used in medical devices. It also provides 
recommendations of additional (special) needs and responsibilities of the COTS software 
vendor when the severities of the hazards from COTS software failure become more 
significant. 
COTS component use in the nuclear power-plant domain 
The first supplement of standard IEC 60880 of the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC)[125] provides requirements for software for computer-based safety systems in nuclear 
power plants. It also contains a section on COTS software (the standard uses the term “pre-
developed software” (PDS)). The evaluation process for COTS components recommended by 
the standard is as follows: 
 An evaluation of the functional and performance features of COTS components and 
existing qualification documentation. In this stage the COTS component is treated as a 
“black box”. 
 A quality evaluation of the software design and development process of COTS 
components. In this stage a “white box” approach is taken. 
 An evaluation of operating experience. This is done if there were weaknesses in the 
demonstration of the COTS quality in the previous two stages. At this stage the 
evidence required is: 
♦ The method for collection of data. 
♦ The operational history of defects, error report and other findings. 
♦ The operational history of modifications (patches/upgrades) made as a reponse to 
defects or for other reasons.  
 A comprehensive documented assessment of the evidence from all steps of evaluation. 
COTS component use in the defence domain 
The UK Defence Standard (DS) 00-55 [126] addresses safety critical (SIL 4) software. This 
standard also contains a section (clause) on COTS software (the term used in the standard is 
“previously developed software” (PDS)). DS 055 is used in the context of DS 00-56 which 
addresses safety management. 
DS 00-55 is targeted at software of very rigid safety-critical requirements. It requires that: 
 All COTS software should be identified, and justified in the software safety case. The 
justification should include a safety analysis of the COTS software. 
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 COTS software to be used in the final delivered equipment should conform to the 
requirements of the standard for new software. 
 Or, reverse engineering and validation and verification activities should be carried out 
on any COTS software that has not been produced to the requirements of the standard. 
Reverse engineering in this case should cover all stages of development including 
specification, design, verification and validation, and hence access to the source code, 
design and test documentation of the COTS software is required. 
 All changes to COTS software made as part of its incorporation in the safety-related 
software should be to the requirements of the standard. 
 “Unreachable code should only be allowed to remain in the final application where it 
can be shown that the risks of leaving it in are less than the risks of modifying the code 
to remove it” 
Summary of evaluation, validation and verification techniques for COTS components 
This sub-section outlines the various evaluation, validation and verification techniques that 
may be used to assess a complex ICT system, including those built out of COTS components. 
The main documents that have been consulted in deriving the list below are [127], [128] and 
[129] and the references therein. In Appendix B we provide details on how these techniques 
can be used for assessment of SoSs depicted in Appendix A. The techniques have been 
categorised depending on their objectives and purpose of use in assessment: 
 System development Life-cycle methods: these methods are aimed at assessing how a 
given system or COTS product  was developed, and they can be split into:  
♦ Compliance with processes defined in standards: quality (such as ISO 9001:2000), 
safety product development (IEC 61508) 
♦ Audit of specific aspects of a lifecycle (e.g. the requirements process, testing and test 
coverage etc.) 
♦ Use of iterative development processes  
♦ Competence management (e.g. assessment of the suitable training for personnel 
developing the product or system) 
♦ Review of the requirements process (since they are often identified as the most 
common source of problems in software development) 
 Review of Quality of supply: similar to the review of the system development life-cycle 
methods above. It is performed to gain confidence in the development of the system but 
may be considered separately “so as to emphasise its relationship with general 
organisational procedures and culture that affect any development made by the same 
supplier and supply chain, while lifecycle review focuses on the development of a 
particular product” [128]. Techniques include: 
♦ Supplier competency - can be assessed directly or through evidence of a competency 
management system used by a supplier. 
♦ Supplier process assessment – “assessment of the processes used by the supplier and 
the supply chain is based on an evaluation of the quality management systems and 
safety management systems in use” [128].  
 Architecture: the architecture of a system plays a significant role in its integrity and 
availability. Architectural controls exist which can improve the integrity and 
availability by monitoring, duplicating or diversifying equipment: 
Appendix C  Robin Bloomfield and Ilir Gashi 
 
 
Centre for Software Reliability   
City University, London  Page 98  
♦ Redundancy – using more than one redundant component or subsystem. Useful for 
protection against most hardware faults (and transient software faults) but not against 
design faults (hardware or software). 
♦ Diversity – using more than one redundant, but diverse, component or subsystem 
(such as diverse Firewalls, diverse IDSs). Depending on how effective diversity is, 
this technique may be the most useful protection against design faults (however it 
does bring other architectural difficulties from creating middleware to make the 
diverse components work consistently). Various forms of diversity are possible: 
 Design diversity – more than one diverse component are used 
 Data diversity – the requests sent to the system may be syntactically diverse but 
logically equivalent (observed to be a useful mechanism with SQL database 
servers [78]) 
 Functional diversity – the system is designed from functionally diverse 
components (for example a monitoring system made up of a pressure monitor and 
a temperature monitor)    
♦ Wrappers  - a wrapper will do additional plausibility checks on the input or output of 
the systems and protect the system from unreasonable or malicious demands. 
♦ Watchdogs  - similar to wrappers; the watchdog will constantly monitor the system 
and may take predefined corrective actions such as raising additional alarms or 
restarting the system (system ‘rejuvenation’ which may protect the system from 
certain (malicious or non-malicious) software ageing faults) 
 Validation and verification techniques: “verification is the assessment of code or a 
subsystem against its requirements specification; validation is the assessment of the 
final product against the user demands. V&V incorporates final product testing” [128]. 
The main V&V techniques commonly used in assessment are: 
♦ Testing -  Various forms of testing techniques exist and have been reported in the 
literature (a review of techniques is given in [127]): 
 Black Box (Functional) testing - testing performed without visibility of the 
implementation of the component. Main techniques of black box testing are:  
 Equivalence Classes and Input Partitioning Testing – input space during 
testing is divided into a set of equivalence classes (input values which are 
treated the same way by the software); testing is done over as many different 
equivalence classes as possible to increase the test coverage. 
 Boundary value analysis – input space during testing consists of values that lie 
at the edge of an equivalence partition;  
 Error Guessing – testing for common errors (e.g. division by zero, an empty 
file, record, or field, negative numbers, alphabetic character for numeric field 
etc.) 
 Stress testing – testing under, for example, a much higher demand rate, a 
greater temperature or pressure etc., so that the COTS component is tested 
outside the limits of its normal operating range. 
 Statistical testing (see the Reliability evaluation section below) 
 White Box (Structure-based) Testing - testing performed with full visibility of the 
implementation of the component. Main techniques of black box testing are: 
 Control Flow Analysis – testing is performed to analyse the internal flow of 
control in a program or a component. 
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 Data Flow Analysis - testing is performed to analyse the internal flow of data 
in a program or a component. 
 Cause Consequence Diagrams – diagrams are drawn to organise in a 
systematic way the combinations of inputs (causes) and outcomes (effects) into 
test cases. 
 Unit testing – testing is performed with individual software modules against 
their individual functional specifications. 
 Integration testing - testing performed when modules are integrated. At a 
higher level of granularity integration testing in COTS-based development 
would be performed once the COTS components have been integrated into the 
larger system. 
 Static Analysis - analysis of software code that is performed without actually 
executing the code. The analysis usually performed by an automated tool. 
♦ Common-mistake Analysis – similar to error guessing. For example, buffer overflows 
are a common problem with programs written in the C language, hence stress test C 
programs for buffer overflow problems. Depending on language and development 
methodology used a database of common-mistakes about these systems can be 
compiled.  
♦ Formal methods and semantic analysis – formal approaches to program correctness 
provide means for modelling the specification, design, or implementation of a system 
in a strict, precise mathematical formalism. 
♦ Human factors analysis – this involves considering the following: 
 the consideration placed on human factors in each phase of the lifecycle 
 availability and quality of operation and maintenance instructions 
 the level of human intervention required by the system 
 the complexity of operator actions required 
 the potential for operator error to directly lead to a system failure 
 the simplicity and intuitiveness of the user interface 
 the stress placed on the operator 
 the level of training available to the operator 
 Risk assessment: there exists a range of techniques for assessing and quantifying the 
risk of failure both from safety as well as reliability or security point of view (even 
though the techniques below have been traditionally used in the safety and reliability 
domains): 
♦ Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) – a structured discussion involving the 
various stakeholders of the system which is driven by the models of the system and 
its components. 
♦ Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) – a technique for assessing and 
prioritising the possible failures in a system. 
♦ Event Tree analysis – a diagrammatic representation of chains of events that can 
occur in the system. The root of the tree is a possible initiating event  
♦ Fault tree analysis and dependence diagrams – a similar modelling principle to Event 
tree analysis but constructed in the reverse direction: the root of the tree is a potential 
consequence. 
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 Reliability evaluation: The reliability of the system or product (both during its 
development and use) can be evaluated using various Reliability modelling techniques: 
♦ Reliability block diagrams – modelling, in a diagrammatic form, the chain of events 
that are necessary for the successful operation of a system. 
♦ Reliability growth modelling – modelling the reliability of the system dynamically 
during the system development or use where faults are being fixed/removed from the 
system, hence the trend is usually that reliability will grow (but not always as a “fix” 
may introduce a new potentially more harmful bug in the system leading to reliability 
decay).  
♦ Statistical testing - which involves the creation of a test harness to perform the 
testing; an ‘oracle’ against which the results obtained from the system under test are 
compared; and an accurate definition of the ‘operation profile’, i.e. the profile under 
which the system is expected to be used. 
♦ Evaluation of field experience – using field data (tracking and recording faults and 
incidents in a product or system) to gain insights into the reliability of the product.  
Difficulties with getting accurate measures stem from the difficulty in measuring the 
operational profile of the products in their given installation (however, some 
companies may offer incentives to users (such as cheaper products) if they are willing 
to allow the vending company to collect detailed data about the product usage, which 
can improve the quality of the data collected).   
The handbook of Software Reliability Engineering [67] gives a comprehensive guide. 
Reliability Growth modelling is the most useful of the techniques listed above when 
arguing about software reliability as it allows an organisation to monitor and argue about 
the reliability of the system as it is being developed (or, if it is in operation, as it is used). 
Statistical testing is also a very useful technique to estimate the reliability before a 
system or component is deployed in operation (but the operational profile is crucial to 
the accuracy of the results obtained from statistical testing). A plethora of Reliability 
models exists (some better than others) and there are techniques (developed at CSR, City 
University [68]) which can help with recalibrating the results of the reliability growth 
models.   
 Security cases: this is an emergent technique based on the more widely used concept of 
a “safety case”. The elements of a Security case are: 
♦ Claims about a property of the system or some sub-system. 
♦ Evidence (which can be facts (based on scientific principles and / or prior research), 
assumptions, or sub-claims, derived from lower level sub-arguments) used as the 
basis of the trust argument. 
♦ Argument which links the evidence to the claims. 
 Responsibility modelling: “To usefully reason about responsibilities in a complex 
socio-technical system, we must have some way of modelling the responsibility itself (as 
distinct from modelling the assignment of responsibilities). If we have some model of 
the responsibility, we can make better decisions about the appropriateness of 
responsibility assignment and so reduce vulnerabilities and consequent failures.” The 
above paragraph is from a chapter in the book “Responsibility and Dependable 
Systems” [130]. The book is an output of the DIRC project [76], of which CSR, City 
University was a partner. The responsibility modelling makes a clear distinction 
between:  
♦ Causal responsibility -  the obligation to ensure that some state of affairs comes about 
or is/is not maintained 
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♦ Consequential responsibility -  the obligation to take the blame if some state of affairs 
does not come about or is/is not maintained. 
Research challenges 
In sections 3 and 4 of this report we reviewed the research challenges for assessment of future 
systems including complex SoSs in general. The research challenges for assessment of 
complex SoSs made up of COTS components are similar. The main issues facing the 
assessors of complex SoSs of COTS components are predicted to be: 
 Dealing with uncertainty and statistical independence in the assessment process: 
dealing with inherent uncertainty in the assessment process and the dependence 
between values of different components of the system, as well as dependence between 
the values of various dependability attributes of even the same component, will become 
even more important in complex SoSs of the future, which may be constructed from a 
multitude of COTS components (both software and hardware). The assessment method 
we outlined in this Appendix C can only deal with a limited number of dependability 
attributes in the assessment process unless strong statistical independence assumptions 
are made. Hence further research is needed to investigate how the assessment methods 
that deal with uncertainty and dependence in the values of the COTS attributes, can 
scale in the SoS context where the number of dependability attributes that need to be 
considered may be higher. 
 Inter-dependence: we already discussed the interdependency issues of SoSs in section 
3.2.4. For SoSs constructed from COTS components interdependence between the 
constituent COTS components becomes very important both during system construction 
(to ensure overall system stability) as well as during assessment (to demonstrate that the 
various COTS components work reliably, securely, safely etc., together). Hence further 
research is needed in modelling and assessing the effects that these inter-dependencies 
between COTS components will have on the SoSs. 
 Patching and upgrading: we already discussed the problems that can stem from 
patching and upgrades in this Appendix. Further research is needed on establishing the 
optimal patch and upgrade frequencies and methods. Clearly refusing or postponing 
patches of COTS components may help with maintaining overall system or SoS 
stability, but may have a detrimental effect on security if vulnerabilities are left un-
patched.       
 Obtaining good metrics: we already discussed the importance of good metrics for 
assessment of systems and SoSs in section 4.3.2. This issue remains very important for 
SoSs composed of COTS components. Data in the form of bug or fault reports as well 
as vulnerability reports are often available, but with absence of detailed failure data (i.e. 
counts of occurrence of these failures caused by these faults in operation) it is difficult 
to use the data in reliability growth modelling for instance (in the case of accidental 
faults) or security assessment (for deliberate faults).   
 Emergent properties: as we discussed in section 3.2.3 unforeseen and /or unplanned 
emergent properties may arise as system complexity increases. When COTS 
components are used in SoSs (especially for those COTS components that are closed-
development and hence the code is not publically available) the problems from 
emergent properties may be more pronounced due to difficulties with establishing 
COTS provenance and dependencies that may exist between the COTS components. 
 Online assessment: we already discussed online assessment in section 4.3.2. It is clearly 
very much applicable for COTS components (for example, use the measurements 
during online operational assessment to decide when to upgrade a COTS component 
while in operation as part of a larger SoS). However further research and 
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experimentation is needed to learn more about the performance implications of online 
assessment and the difficulties with building the decision framework which will be 
required with any online assessment. 
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Appendix D 
This appendix lists the assessment techniques and methods that are possible for the three 
stages of COTS-based development which were highlighted in Appendix C of this report.   
Assessment techniques for COTS-based development phases – 
selection, configuration and Integration 
The following table contains listings of assessment techniques and methods that can be used 
to assess COTS components during the three main phases of COTS-based systems 
development, namely Selection, Configuration and Integration. We have listed the techniques 
per dependability attribute and functional requirements. 
Functional and 
Dependability 
attribute 
Selection Configuration Integration 
Functional 
properties 
 Checklist approach 
against the 
requirements 
specification. 
 Prototyping and 
testing. 
 Review of product 
documentation to 
check whether 
required 
functionality is 
supported in the 
component. 
 Review of 
documentation to 
ensure product is 
sufficiently 
tailorable and 
configurable for 
the new context. 
 Prototyping and 
testing. 
 Review of 
documentation to 
ensure interfaces 
are well 
documented to 
allow integration 
in the wider 
system. 
 Prototyping and 
testing. 
 Are architectural 
solutions listed in 
Appendix C 
possible/suitable 
for the 
component? 
Interoperability  Review of product 
documentation to 
check whether 
required interfaces 
for interoperating 
with other 
components in the 
wider systems are 
supported in the 
component. 
 Prototyping and 
testing of the 
product interfaces 
for interoperability.  
 [131] gives a list of 
38 characteristics 
that “define COTS 
product 
interoperability 
characteristics” 
[131]. 
 Review of 
 Prototyping and 
testing to check 
the COTS 
component is 
sufficiently 
configurable to 
interoperate with 
other COTS 
components in the 
system (the 
attributes from 
[131] can be used 
to drive the 
testing)   
 Interface testing to 
ensure 
interoperability 
with other 
components during 
system integration 
(again the 
characteristics of 
this 
interoperability 
can be derived 
from [131] and 
will also be driven 
by the specific 
requirements for a 
given system). 
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interoperability 
field data available 
for the component. 
 
Reliability  Reliability 
evaluation methods 
described in 
Appendix C. 
 The Uncertainty 
conscious approach 
to assessment 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Validation and 
verification 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C 
(especially black 
box testing if the 
code of the COTS 
component is not 
available) 
 Risk assessment 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Dependability 
cases. 
 Review of 
reliability field data 
available for the 
component. 
 
 Validation and 
verification 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C can 
be used to verify 
the reliable 
configurability of 
the COTS 
component (e.g. 
are there any side 
effects that stem 
from a given 
COTS 
configuration). 
 Risk assessment 
techniques 
described 
inAppendix C 
 Reliability 
evaluation 
methods described 
in Appendix C can 
be done at the 
system level once 
the COTS 
component has 
been integrated in 
the wider system.  
 Validation and 
verification 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C can 
also be done at the 
system level. 
 Risk assessment 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C 
performed at the 
system level 
Timing 
properties 
(Performance) 
 The Uncertainty 
conscious approach 
to assessment 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Experimentation 
with performance 
benchmarks (e.g. 
TPC-C for COTS 
database servers) to 
obtain measures of 
COTS response 
time and/or 
throughput rates. 
 Review of 
performance field 
data available for 
the component. 
 Experimentation 
and testing to 
obtain measures of 
time it takes for a 
COTS component 
to be configured. 
 Experimentation 
and testing to 
obtain measures of 
COTS response 
time and/or 
throughput rates 
once configuration 
of the COTS 
component is 
changed. 
 The Uncertainty 
conscious 
approach to 
assessment 
described in 
Appendix C 
performed at the 
system level. 
 Experimentation 
with performance 
benchmarks to 
obtain measures of 
system response 
time and/or 
throughput rates 
following 
integration of the 
COTS into the 
wider system. 
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Availability  Reliability 
evaluation methods 
described in 
Appendix C with 
emphasises now 
being placed on the 
proportion of 
downtime of the 
component during 
the testing period 
rather than 
probability of 
failure on demand. 
 
 Reliability 
evaluation 
methods described 
in Appendix C 
with emphasises 
now being placed 
on the proportion 
of downtime  the 
component will be 
in during the 
configuration 
process. 
 Same method as 
above but with 
emphasis on the 
proportion of 
downtime the 
system will be in 
following 
configuration or 
tailoring. 
 Reliability 
evaluation 
methods described 
in Appendix C 
with emphasises 
now being placed 
on the proportion 
of downtime of the 
component during 
the testing period 
rather than 
probability of 
failure on demand 
– but done at the 
system level 
following the 
COTS component 
integration into the 
wider system. 
Provenance  System 
development Life-
cycle methods 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Review of Quality 
of Supply methods 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Testing and 
prototyping. 
N/A N/A 
Resource usage  Experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to 
measure the 
response time, 
CPU-usage, 
memory-usage, file 
input /output, 
deadlocks, priority 
process allocation 
etc of a component. 
 Following 
configuration, 
further 
experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to 
measure resource 
usage of a 
component. 
 Experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to 
measure the 
response time, 
CPU-usage, 
memory-usage, 
file input /output, 
deadlocks, priority 
process allocation 
etc of the system 
following the 
integration of a 
component. 
Robustness  Experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to test 
the component 
robustness. 
 Review of the 
components 
documentation to 
check the level of 
 Experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to test 
the component 
robustness 
following 
configuration and 
tailoring. 
  
 Experimentation 
and stress-testing 
techniques to test 
the system 
robustness 
following the 
integration of the 
component in the 
wider system. 
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architectural 
redundancy and 
diversity in the 
component which 
would allow it to 
tolerate certain 
kinds of failures. 
 Review of 
reliability field data 
available for the 
component to 
check for the 
robustness of the 
component. 
Maintainability  Experimentation 
and measurement 
of mean-time-to-
repair of a 
component 
following failure. 
 Review of the 
components 
documentation to 
check the level of 
architectural 
redundancy and 
diversity in the 
component which 
would allow it to 
tolerate certain 
kinds of failures 
and hence reduce 
the cost of 
maintenance for the 
component. 
 Review of 
reliability field data 
available for the 
component to 
check for the mean-
time-to-repair times 
for the component 
in operational use. 
 Experimentation 
and measurement 
of mean-time-to-
repair of a 
component 
following failure, 
once the 
component has 
been configured. 
 Experimentation 
and measurement 
of mean-time-to-
repair of the 
component once it 
has been  
integrated in the 
wider system. 
Usability  Task analysis 
 Human factors 
analysis techniques 
listed in Appendix 
C 
 Usability in safety-
critical settings 
(such as air-traffic 
control) may also 
be measured in 
terms of the 
response-time and 
 Task analysis – 
how easy the 
systems is to 
configure 
 
 Usability 
assessment of the 
whole systems 
where the COTS 
components is 
integrated using 
the approach 
summarised in 
Appendix C 
 Human factor 
analysis for the 
whole system 
following COTS 
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correctness of the 
task performed 
hence the approach 
summarised in 
Appendix C of this 
report can be used 
for usability 
assessment. 
integration. 
 Responsibility 
modelling in 
organisation where 
the integrated 
system will be 
used.  
Safety  Safety cases 
 Review of quality 
of supply as 
described in 
Appendix C 
 Review of  system 
development life-
cycle methods for 
the component as 
described in 
Appendix C. 
 Risk assessment 
techniques 
described in 
Appendix C. 
 Safety cases need 
to be developed 
for safe 
configuration of 
components. 
 Risk assessment 
performed on the 
component 
following 
configuration. 
 Safety case for the 
whole system 
where the COTS 
component is 
integrated. 
 Risk assessment 
for the whole 
system where the 
COTS component 
is integrated.  
Security  Security cases. 
 Evaluation methods 
such as Common 
Criteria. 
 “Red team” 
penetration testing. 
 Review of quality 
of supply. 
 Validation and 
verification listed 
in Appendix C in 
the context of 
malicious failures. 
 “Red team” 
penetration testing 
following 
configurations. 
 Validation and 
verification listed 
in Appendix C in 
the context of 
malicious failures, 
following a COTS 
component 
configuration. 
 Security cases at 
the system level. 
 Evaluation 
methods such as 
Common Criteria 
applied at the 
system level where 
the COTS 
component is 
integrated. 
 “Red team” 
penetration testing 
applied at the 
system level. 
 Validation and 
verification listed 
in Appendix C in 
the context of 
malicious failures 
applied at the 
system level. 
 
